@EdWorkingPaper{ai24-957,
title = "Do Pensions Enhance Worker Effort and Selection? Evidence from Public Schools",
author = "Michael Bates, Andrew C. Johnston",
institution = "Annenberg Institute at Brown University",
number = "957",
year = "2024",
month = "May",
URL = "http://www.edworkingpapers.com/ai24-957",
abstract = {Why do employers offer pensions? We empirically explore two theoretical rationales, namely that pensions may improve worker effort and worker selection. We examine these hypotheses using administrative measures on effort and output in public schools around the pension-eligibility notch. Worker effort and output do not fall as workers cross the eligibility threshold, implying that pensions may not elicit additional effort. As for selection, we find that pensions retain low-value-added and high-value-added workers at the same rate, suggesting pensions have little or no influence on selection.},
}