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Government employees often have policy beliefs that do not reflect those of the public. Civil servants are frequently more supportive of redistribution, which critics attribute to a state that socializes employees to be self-interested. But left-leaning citizens may instead self-select into public jobs. We test these two explanations using the case of Brazilian teachers. Leveraging selection rules where a meritocratic exam determines employment, we use a regression discontinuity design to compare those who become bureaucrats with those who tried but were unsuccessful. We find that teachers are significantly more left-leaning than the average citizen, but public employment has no further effect on political attitudes, and even makes teachers more conservative on some indicators. Comparing exam-takers, regardless of the outcome, to the Brazilian population, we find that right-leaning citizens simply do not apply. While bureaucrats' political attitudes are unrepresentative of the population, claims attributing their attitudes to state employment overlook self-selection.

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Politicians often denounce bureaucrats for holding views out of step with the average citizen. In 2019, President Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil condemned bureaucrats at the National Foundation for Indigenous Peoples[1] for holding beliefs about environmental protection that did not align with the indigenous populations they were supposed to represent.[2] In 2020, then New York City councilor Zohran Mamdani was quoted as saying that New York City police were "racist and anti-queer," harming average New Yorkers.[3] While particularly salient in the current moment, there is a long history of politicians making these claims. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher claimed that left-wing civil servants were obstructing her conservative agenda,[4] and U.S. President Richard Nixon accused employees of the Bureau of Labor Statistics of trying to undermine him in favor of the Democratic party.[5] These claims respond to a common reality: public servants consistently hold views that are distinct from those held by average citizens (Oberfield, 2012; Oberfield, 2014; Spenkuch, Teso, and Xu, 2023; Reny et al., 2025). The direction of the bias varies depending on the roles public employees take on; police officers have been found to have views to the right of the median voter (Oberfield, 2012; Oberfield, 2014; Reny et al., 2025), while teachers and healthcare workers are more likely to hold views to the left (Hartney and Kogan, 2025; Frey and Santarrosa, 2024; Tepe, 2012).

Despite this empirical regularity, we lack a clear explanation for the origins of bureaucrats' political beliefs, specifically those on the material left-right dimension, describing the size of the state and its role in redistribution.[6] The lack of robust evidence has reduced the quality of political debate and policy-making on the representativeness of the bureaucracy. Among existing scholarship, some argue that bureaucrats are *socialized* by their employment, such that their viewpoints reflect their experience working in the public sector (Blais, Blake, and Dion, 1990; Frey and Santarrosa, 2024; Garand, Parkhurst, and Seoud, 1991; Lewis, 1990; Levy and Razin, 2019; Tepe, 2012). The other approach emphasizes that bureaucrats are *self-selected*, meaning their viewpoints were formed prior

[1] Fundação Nacional dos Povos Indígenas (Funai)

[2] Fernandes, Talita. April 17, 2019. "Em live, Bolsonaro ataca Ibama, ONGs e ameaça cortar diretoria da Funai." *Folha de Sao Paulo*.

[3] Vakil, Caroline. October 10, 2025. "Mamdani apologizes to police for calling them 'racist,' 'wicked and corrupt'." *The Hill*.

[4] Young, Hugo. 1984. "Commentary on Thatcherism." *The Guardian*.

[5] Noah, Timothy. 2007. "Nixon's Jew Count: The Whole Story!" *Slate*.

[6] Other scholars have studied how public employment shapes a range of beliefs, on topics such as meritocracy, government legitimacy and national cohesion (Kuipers, 2023). While these factors are important to the operation of the bureaucracy itself, bureaucrats' role in broader political discourse has hinged almost exclusively on their ideological attitudes.

to obtaining their jobs (Holt, 2018; Reny et al., 2025). These arguments have often been constructed in isolation, ignoring that *socialization* and *selection* are likely to operate in tandem.[7]

In this paper, we seek to resolve this debate and determine the relative impact of each by employing an empirical design that allows us to compare individuals who became bureaucrats, those who tried and were unsuccessful, and the general population. To do so, we observe the universe of applicants to open teaching positions across four large recruitment exams for tenured public sector teachers in Brazil between 2016 and 2019 (N = 77,709) and administer an original survey, part of which replicates political attitude questions from nationally-representative surveys, to a targeted subset (N = 8,038). We document that teachers are more left-wing than the average Brazilian: They are 20 percentage points more likely to support redistribution, 8 percentage points more likely to identify with the left and 30 percentage points less likely to report having voted for (right-wing) President Bolsonaro. However, we find no evidence of *socialization*; using a regression discontinuity design, we show that those who barely passed the exam to become a tenured public sector teacher hold attitudes that are no more left-leaning than those who barely missed the cutoff. Instead, the entirety of the gap between teachers' attitudes and those of the broader population is driven by self-selection; those who attempt to become teachers, regardless of the result, are much more likely to favor redistribution than the average Brazilian.

In testing the mechanisms behind these two theories, we find evidence that challenges many of the assumptions that undergird socialization arguments. First, we show that, while public sector employees are self-interested, that self-interest only manifests as support for spending in their own sector, rather than the public sector as a whole. Second, the assumption of a public sector wage gap driving leftist attitudes requires interrogation; in Brazil, as in much of the Global South, tenured public sector jobs often have comparable, or even higher wages than those in the private sector (Gindling et al., 2020). Finally, we find that tenured employment is not associated with more union activity, reflecting the value of union protections for those in less secure temporary and private employment. By contrast, we demonstrate that selection mechanisms are strong, driven not just by demographic differences or educational requisites in who applies to become a bureaucrat but self-selection on the basis of political attitudes.

Given the inherent discretion bureaucrats have in carrying out their roles (Lipsky,

[7]For a notable exception, see Jost, Meshkin, and Schub, 2022.

1980), the question of preference alignment and its origins is of great consequence. Brazil is an acute example, as whether teachers express leftist beliefs in the classroom has been at the center of political conflict.[8] Our finding that bureaucrats' beliefs are driven by selection suggests that a more representative bureaucracy will depend on politicians adopting less polarizing discourse and rebuilding trust in the public sector among citizens who identify as right-wing (Moynihan, 2025). Beyond Brazilian teachers, we expect that other bureaucrats, in places with similarly meritocratic recruitment practices for permanent jobs, hold political beliefs that are the result of selection rather than socialization. We have focused on the case of teachers, a role where the frontline provision of public services emphasizes empathy and social equality, likely attracting left-leaning candidates. While a similar logic likely travels directly to bureaucrats in similar positions, such as healthcare and social workers, enforcement roles that emphasize rule compliance and public order, such as the police or tax authorities, may instead attract right-leaning individuals (Jost, Meshkin, and Schub, 2022; Oberfield, 2012; Oberfield, 2014; Reny et al., 2025). Our findings, however, anticipate that, once this pool of candidates has formed, employment will have no additional effect in pushing political attitudes in either direction.

Our results suggest that reforms that attempt to depoliticize the bureaucracy by depoliticizing hiring, such as the Pendleton Act in the United States (Aneja and Xu, 2024; Folke, Hirano, and Snyder Jr, 2011; Moreira and Pérez, 2024), and similar reforms internationally (Evans and Rauch, 1999; Rauch and Evans, 2000; Williams, 2026), partially miss the mark in terms of removing politics from the workplace. Bureaucracies are politicized not only because politicians interfere with their functioning (Colonnelli, Prem, and Teso, 2020; Davies, 2025; Toral, 2024), but also because certain ideological types select into jobs in the bureaucracy. It also highlights the futility of efforts, such as Escola sem Partido in Brazil and anti-diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) efforts in the US, of ridding the government workforce of left-leaning tendencies. This reinforces findings across a range of contexts that emphasize the centrality of selection effects to understanding the origins of political beliefs. The residential neighborhood in which people live can shape their attitudes, but is dwarfed in scale by self-selection in the initial choice of where to live (Gallego et al., 2016; Kaufmann and Harris, 2015). Participation in civic associations is also claimed to be influential, but the role of selection accounts for much of the observed correlation (Quintelier, 2013; Ingen and Meer, 2016). Even political parties (Recchi, 1999)

[8] "Pencil, Ruler, Gay Kit." *The Economist*. December 1, 2018.

and the military (Jost, Meshkin, and Schub, 2022; Chatagnier and Klingler, 2023) have limited capacity to shape the attitudes of those who join. Collectively, these findings push the causal weight of explaining variation in political attitudes earlier into the life cycle. Indeed, there is evidence that school-age experiences, like attending an integrated school (Billings, Chyn, and Haggag, 2021), as well as college experiences like roommate assignment (Strother et al., 2021), strongly affect political beliefs. Understanding the continued influence of parental attitudes, schooling, training and youth peer groups remain important research priorities, including for the study of bureaucrats.

THEORY

Polemical attacks by politicians as well as academic research studying bureaucrats' preferences typically fail to differentiate between many types of public employee, despite a long tradition in bureaucratic politics that recognizes the diversity of public service experiences (Lipsky, 1980). In this paper we focus on theory that explains the preferences of what we call *social civil servants*. These are public sector workers recruited meritocratically, who have permanent tenured contracts, and who engage in regular, often daily, interactions with citizens for the purpose of service delivery. Examples of such workers are teachers, health care workers, and social workers. These civil servants make up a large share of the bureaucracy, globally and in Brazil (Falanga, 2018; Levy and Walton, 2013). We focus on this type as we expect that aspects of their contract and the nature of their work make them a most-likely case for the production of left-wing attitudes.

We separate the influences on social civil servants along two distinct threads in the literature. First, civil servants can be *socialized* into a certain set of beliefs and behaviors through material self-interest, employment related opportunities, professional networks, and material changes. Second, individuals might *select* into the civil service, as a result of pre-existing preferences or job related requirements that screen for certain types of individuals.

Socialization

Five mechanisms of bureaucratic employment are expected to push social civil servants towards the left.

Self-Interest One strain of literature, largely organized under the bureaucratic (or bureau) voting model, expects public employees in all roles to support redistribution and the left because increasing the size of the state (particularly in the form of increased spending) is in their own interest (Blais, Blake, and Dion, 1990; Blais, Blake, and Dion, 1997; Hartney and Kogan, 2025; Moe, 2015). Expanding the state benefits its employees through higher salaries, better working conditions, career advancement, job security, pensions, prestige, and power (Niskanen, 1971; Blais, Blake, and Dion, 1990; Garand, Parkhurst, and Seoud, 1991; Lewis, 1990; Tepe, 2012). The evidence mainly draws from the United States (see Garand, Parkhurst, and Seoud, 1991; Lewis, 1990; Hartney and Kogan, 2025; Moe, 2015) and Western Europe (see Blais, Blake, and Dion, 1997; Geys and Sørensen, 2022). While much of this literature considers public employees' preferences for increased state spending to be self-evident (Blais, Blake, and Dion, 1997, p. 2; Moe, 2015), these preferences should be stronger for those with permanent contracts, which produce longer-time horizons, allowing them to reap the benefits that come from increased state spending.

The predictions of the bureau voting model can also be made more precise by narrowing the scope of self-interest to the specific policy areas in which civil servants are employed. Abundant evidence shows that interest groups mostly fight to protect benefits for their specific members (Campbell, 2003; Hacker, 1998; Pierson, 1994). Bureaucrats and the interest groups that represent them frequently oppose reforms that change the allocation of resources in the public sector that potentially have negative distributive consequences for them (Moe, 2015; Grindle, 2004; Corrales, 1999).

Unionization Bureaucrats may also become more left-wing because they are provided with incentives and opportunities to join unions. In the United States, Flavin and Hartney (2015) document that the passage of collective bargaining laws gave teachers' unions access to teacher mailboxes and other organizational benefits that allow them to recruit and mobilize teachers. More broadly, the stability of bureaucratic employment facilitates contact and relationships with union officials and outreach efforts. This may help to explain why, even in the face of falling union density in most of the world, public sector unions remain strong globally (Chambers-Ju, 2024).

Once a member of a union, active mobilization to defend workers' interests becomes more routine (Lamare, 2016), and norms of participation encourage greater engagement with parties of the left (Hertel-Fernandez, 2025; Lyon, Hemphill, and Jacobsen, 2024).

Exposure to information from unions tasked with protecting their members' interests is also likely to reinforce redistributive attitudes (Kim and Margalit, 2017). Participation in a tight-knit social group can similarly generate norms of group solidarity which encourage moderate members to defend the attitudes of their more radical colleagues (Mosimann and Pontusson, 2017). As such, 'value congruence' is often high; for instance, it has been documented that around 75 percent of United Auto Workers (UAW) members in the U.S. vote consistently with UAW endorsements (Sheppard and Masters, 1959).[9] Again, because of their longer time horizons, we might expect these effects to be greater for social civil servants than temporary workers.

Contact with the Poor Frontline bureaucrats may also become more left-wing as a result of their frequent interactions with citizens, many of whom are poorer than themselves (Falanga, 2018). Scholars of American politics have demonstrated that contact with individuals experiencing economic hardship is associated with both a belief that poverty has structural causes and that governments should engage in increased welfare spending (Newman, 2014; Wilson, 1996). The inferences civil servants draw about the population they interact with may, however, be framed by their employment role. Individuals who participated in Teach for America (a program that places university graduates, frequently from elite institutions, in low-performing public schools) were more likely to believe that people are economically disadvantaged due to systemic injustice, rather than a lack of hard work (Mo and Conn, 2018), to support increased redistribution, and prefer a larger role for the government in poverty reduction. By contrast, when police officers patrol less supportive communities, they are less likely to apply procedural justice (Pass et al., 2026).

Wages The redistributive preferences of social civil servants may be a function of their relatively lower wages (Gindling et al., 2020; Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Given the permanent nature of their contracts and the flat wage structure that is common in the public sector (Gindling et al., 2020), social civil servants are unlikely to expect significant increases in their future earnings potential. As such, they are particularly likely to support redistribution, which they see as benefiting them over the long-run. However, this wage gap varies more than this literature would expect, with a public sector wage premium in many economic contexts, such as Brazil (Mancha and Mattos, 2020).

[9]Similar results have been found in contemporary research (such as Clark and Masters, 2001).

The State as an Echo Chamber Even if the state plays no active role in shaping its employees' ideology, it may, like any organization, amplify pre-existing biases arising from selection (Levy and Razin, 2019; Levin, Milner, and Perrings, 2021). As employees interact with others predominantly drawn from one side of the political spectrum, more active employees may pull the rest further towards their ideologies. Pressures of social status and signaling can create echo chambers in which dissenting attitudes and ideologies are invalidated, homogenizing workplace discussion. Outside of the formal workplace, unions can also play this role, as interactions with more extreme members have the potential to nudge attitudes further towards the edges of the distribution (Mosimann and Pontusson, 2017). This mechanism could also reinforce the selection channel, since, as we argue below, those with more left-wing attitudes are most likely to self-select into social civil servant roles.

These arguments inform our first hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: *Becoming a social civil servant makes an individual more likely to support the left.*

Selection

An alternative reason why social civil servants might favor greater redistribution and support the left is that people holding those preferences may be more likely to apply for and take jobs in the public sector.

The primary channel of self-selection is that individuals with certain values and preferences are more likely to choose public sector work. These values are often described as public service motivation, encompassing a commitment to public service and prosocial behaviors (Barfort et al., 2019; Holt, 2018; Perry and Wise, 1990; Perry and Vandenabeele, 2015). Research has documented that social civil servants are more likely to have the attitudes described by public service motivation.[10] The high proportion of women in nursing and teaching professions has been linked to their values of empathy (Boughn, 1999), which are reinforced through stereotyping of those roles. Despite consistent evidence regarding the link between public service motivation and selecting into public service across contexts, it has been shown to be weaker where public service positions are socially desirable (Chen et al., 2020), in contexts rife with patronage or corruption

[10] see Ayaita, Yang, and Gülal, 2019 in Germany, Holt, 2018 in the United States, Lee and Park, 2024 in South Korea, and the CAF, 2016 in eight Latin American countries.

(Colonnelli, Prem, and Teso, 2020; Hanna and Wang, 2017), or for roles involving enforcement that select for 'antiegalitarian' attitudes (Reny et al., 2025).

Using data from Belgium, Vandenabeele (2011) documents that people with higher values of public service motivation are more likely to vote for a left-wing party. These results are echoed in findings from the Netherlands (Witteloostuijn, Esteve, and Boyne, 2017) and the United States (Holt, 2018; Piatak, 2021; Wright, Hassan, and Christensen, 2017). This link is also likely to be shaped by prevailing political discourse, particularly where the merit, neutrality and legitimacy of public employment is framed in contrasting ways by political actors associated with the left and right.

While civil servants possessing public service motivation and left-wing views may self-select into public sector roles, those desiring the intrinsic characteristics of a bureaucratic position may also self-select. For example, the public sector is often associated with lower wages but greater security of tenure. In this case, potential applicants may anticipate these employment conditions and only those with greater risk-aversion (Chang, 2024), or who place less emphasis on material remuneration, both traits that may be associated with redistribution, will apply. In addition, bureaucratic jobs typically impose minimum educational qualifications for employment, which are frequently correlated with political attitudes; obtaining higher education has historically been shown to push political attitudes towards both socially liberal values and opposition to government redistribution (Marshall, 2016; Scott, 2022). However, other studies suggest this relationship is changing, with more educated voters likely to support parties on the left and redistribution (Abou-Chadi and Hix, 2021). While this evidence is focused on Western Europe and the U.S., higher education is likely to shape attitudes in other contexts, even if the direction remains unclear.

Overall, there are strong grounds to believe that social civil servant roles that emphasize public service and secure employment conditions are likely to attract a specific section of the population that favors redistribution. Since our focus is on meritocratic civil service positions, our second hypothesis focuses on this potential for self-selection, rather than on the patronage hiring preferences of managers or politicians (Brierley, 2020; Grindle, 2012; Toral, 2024):

Hypothesis 2: *Individuals that support the left are more likely to apply for a job as a social civil servant.*

PERMANENT PUBLIC SECTOR TEACHERS IN BRAZIL

To empirically untangle these conflicting forces and understand why social civil servants are more likely to be left-wing, our study draws on data from Brazil. Our case selection is motivated by two key characteristics of the Brazilian case.

First, the left-right ideological divide is a meaningful political cleavage and form of self-identification in Brazil and is reflected in how public sector teachers are perceived. Brazil exhibits high levels of political polarization around both economic and cultural dimensions (Samuels, Mello, and Zucco, 2024). Despite weak party institutionalization (Zucco and Power, 2024), compounding events in recent years have more acutely polarized voters, beginning with the economic crisis of 2014, the contentious impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff, and the election of the populist right-wing President Bolsonaro in 2019. This has resulted in a sharp divide characterized by political stereotyping and 'negative' political identities (Samuels, Mello, and Zucco, 2024).

This political divide is deeply ingrained in the education sector. When the anti-communist military dictatorship came to power in 1964, it cracked down on the efforts of liberation theologians and educators such as Paulo Freire to spread literacy to Brazil's rural regions (Kirkendall, 2010). Democratization in the 1980s allowed Freire's *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* to become a central part of teacher's training curricula, rejecting the idea that teaching can be apolitical and emphasizing the role of education as a route to freedom from oppression and as a means of generating politically-aware, active citizens. Conservative critiques gradually coalesced into the *Escola sem Partido* (School without Parties) movement which has explicitly sought to undercut Freire's pedagogical approaches by portraying them as partisan indoctrination (Knijnik, 2021). During President Bolsonaro's election campaign, dozens of municipalities and states introduced legislation to regulate teachers' classroom activities and language, including the mounting of posters in classrooms. The intense public debate over the movement led to the further politicization of the classroom, with students encouraged to film and denounce their teachers while others protested its enforcement.[11] During the COVID-19 pandemic, President Bolsonaro criticized teachers for school closures, stating "People should know what the ideology of teachers unions is like in almost all of Brazil. They are radical leftists,"[12] while his son, a congressman, complained of "teachers that indoctrinate. . . perceiving oppression

[11]"Pencil, Ruler, Gay Kit." *The Economist*. December 1, 2018.

[12]Rocha, Lucas. September 17, 2020. "Bolsonaro ataca professores e diz que eles não querem trabalhar". *Forum*.

in every type of relationship".[13]

This discourse regarding teachers' beliefs reflects, at least in part, the fact that teachers hold views significantly to the left of the average Brazilian. From our survey data, we find that only 25 percent of tenured public sector teachers voted for Jair Bolsonaro in the 2018 national elections compared to 55 percent of the Brazilian population. 93 and 58 percent of teachers voiced support for redistribution and identifying as left-wing respectively, compared to 73 and 50 percent of the Brazilian population.

Second, the procedures used for hiring permanent public sector teachers allow us to rule out patronage as a driver of attitudes, while disentangling selection from socialization. As in many other developing democracies, clientelist and patronage pressures impact the public sector in Brazil, particularly in education (Colonnelli, Prem, and Teso, 2020; Toral, 2024; Trucco, Moreira, and Akhtari, 2022). We bypass these influences by focusing on permanent public sector teachers, who are meritocratic hires with high levels of autonomy and insulation from politics (Brierley, 2020; Bresser-Pereira, 2003; Bersch, Praça, and Taylor, 2017, pp. 90, 103–4). Brazil was ranked by the Inter-American Development Bank as the most meritocratic and independent bureaucracy in Latin America in 2007 (Echeberría and Cortázar, 2007, pp. 138–9, 150–1). Trucco, Moreira, and Akhtari (2022) find that patronage affects only temporary teachers while "[p]olitical turnover does not affect civil servant contracts" (ibid., p. 463). Moreover, hiring is conducted by subnational governments with diverse ideologies who use rigorous and transparent 'concurso' exams to recruit new civil servants.[14]

METHODS & DATA

To understand why social civil servants hold more leftist beliefs, we administered an original survey to 77,709 applicants to open teaching positions to measure their political attitudes. We use the results of the survey first to employ a regression discontinuity design that compares those who just pass and fail the recruitment exam, allowing us to test the causal effect of employment in the public sector (the socialization hypothesis). We then combine the survey responses with the answers from two nationally representative samples to see how those who applied to become permanent public sector teachers differ from the rest of the Brazilian population, testing the theory of self-selection.

[13] Leitão, Matheus. July 10, 2023. "O recado absurdo de Eduardo Bolsonaro para os professores." *Veja*.

[14] Brazil's education system is decentralized, with 26 states, over 5500 municipalities and the Federal District all responsible for teacher recruitment.

Table 1: Sample of Recruitment Exercises and Competitions

Concurso	Year	Mini-Exams	Candidates	Qualified	Vacancies	Surveyed (%)
São Luís, Maranhão	2016	40	15,009	1,616	526	978 (7)
Distrito Federal	2016	35	45,397	2,950	800	4,914 (11)
Alagoas	2017	177	12,918	841	250	1,726 (13)
São Cristóvão, Sergipe	2019	10	4,385	100	27	420 (10)
Total		262	77,709	5,507	1,603	8,038 (10)

Notes: Column 1 presents the state or municipality holding the concurso, column 2 the year, column 3 the number of specific jobs with a unique threshold within the larger recruitment exercise, column 4 the number of candidates that applied to take the exam, column 5 the number of candidates that scored high enough to be considered for a job, column 6 the number of available jobs, and column 7 the number and percentage of the total number of candidates we surveyed.

Sample and Original Survey

To identify teacher candidates, we partnered with a non-profit organization, Cebraspe (Centro Brasileiro de Pesquisa em Avaliação e Seleção e de Promoção de Eventos), that organizes and implements competitive recruitment exams, or 'concursos,' on behalf of state and municipal governments across Brazil. This enabled us to use the recruitment exam scores of teaching candidates as the running variable in a regression discontinuity, use contact information provided at the time of the application to conduct our survey, and match candidates with employment and educational data. Our study relied on full consent, which candidates supplied both to Cebraspe at the time of their application for general research purposes and specifically before responding to our survey. We discuss the ethical issues associated with our study further in Appendix O.

The available data covers four concursos for teaching positions held by the state of Alagoas, the Federal District of Brasilia, and the municipalities of São Luís in the state of Maranhão and São Cristóvão in the state of Sergipe. While the decentralized nature of concurso administration prevented a nationally representative sample and our sample is biased towards the Northeast, applicants were eligible to apply from anywhere across the country and the recruitment localities range from some of the wealthiest parts of the country (the Federal District) to some of the poorest (in the states of Alagoas and Maranhão). Table 1 provides details of the four recruitment exercises and our survey sample.

Our population comprises all candidates that took the exam to become a public sector teacher across these four concursos. Our survey sought to contact all candidates, but targeted efforts were made to follow-up with exam takers around the job offer cut-off, where statistical power for the regression discontinuity and the avoidance of differential attrition are most critical. This entailed intensive contact efforts over a period of 30

Figure 1: Survey Sample by Survey Method



months (including delays induced by the COVID-19 pandemic) between February 2021 and August 2023. We surveyed job applicants between 1.2 and 6.8 years after they sat the teacher entrance exam, with a median time since the exam of 4.3 years.

Surveying efforts proceeded in four phases. We first emailed all test takers up to three times. We then sampled 9,358 test-takers who were either distributed around the discontinuity or had completed more than 75 percent of the survey, but had yet to respond in full, and sent them up to three SMS text messages with a link to the survey. In the third phase we sampled 3,153 of the remaining non-respondents and called them by telephone on different days and times, once again targeting those around the threshold. Finally, we sampled 2,500 of the remaining non-respondents using the `rdpower` package in R; considering respondents' proximity to the cut-off, the package identified 1,122 respondents above the cut-off and 1,378 below the cut-off. For these respondents, we attempted to administer an in-person survey at their last-known residence, stratifying respondents by their proximity to the cut-off and making between one to three attempts. We present the full data collection strategy in Figure 1. The intensified follow-up enabled us to achieve a 23 percent response rate at the discontinuity threshold.[15] There was no compensation.

We use this sampling strategy to collect original, self-reported data directly from the 8,038 (10%) respondents on a number of political and socioeconomic outcomes. For our primary outcome measure of left-right ideological attitudes, we measure four variables, including some selected to match the wording of questions on the Latin American

[15]Appendix A visualizes the response rate by the running variable, the respondent's exam score, and the targeted sampling windows by survey method. We also discuss the extent of non-response bias and how we address it in the same section.

Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and World Values Survey (WVS) questionnaires, two nationally representative public opinion surveys, to enable comparisons with the broader population: self-reported left-right political ideology, whether respondents believe the state should spend more on public goods, whether they believe the unemployed are unemployed for reasons outside their control, and whether the state should do more to reduce inequality. To limit the risks arising from multiple hypothesis testing we also combine these variables into a single index, with components weighted by the inverse covariance matrix, following the methodology in Anderson (2008). For the self-selection analysis, we are restricted to the variables in nationally-representative surveys, specifically self-reported political ideology and support for reducing inequality.[16]

To verify teaching candidates' employment history we also draw on two sources of administrative data: the Relação Anual de Informações Sociais (RAIS), a monthly labor market survey, and the Censo Escolar, the annual school census. We match teaching candidates to the RAIS data from 2008 to 2020 (nine years before the first concurso in our sample and two years after the last one) using their tax identification number (CPF) to construct a panel of pre- and post-concurso formal labor market histories and conduct pre-treatment randomization checks on income and occupation. Available School Census data from 2006 to 2023 (ten years before the first concurso to five years after the last concurso in our sample) is also matched using the CPF to construct variables on candidates' teaching employment history.

Testing the Socialization Hypothesis: Regression Discontinuity Design

To causally identify whether employment as a permanent civil servant makes people more left-leaning, we leverage the rules for hiring state employees in Brazil. Applicants must pass a competitive exam to be offered a job with the state, with exams graded using a continuous score. We observe this score for all candidates, and leverage this score as a running variable in a regression discontinuity design. As passing the exam only guarantees a job offer and not employment, we use the job-offer discontinuity to instrument for actual job take-up, which we capture through a self-reported measure on our original survey as well as through administrative data. Take-up of the job offer, at 73 percent, was high.

In practice, each concurso was comprised of a number of distinct mini-competitions, defined by attributes of the position (subject specialty), the school (whether located in

[16]We provide a full list of the variables we use in this manuscript in Appendix B.

an urban or rural zone or the capital city), and the candidate (disability status). These mini-competitions have the same format, but teachers are competing for a distinct set of open positions and are subject to separate thresholds. The subnational government conducting the round of hiring implicitly determines the cut-off score for employment in each mini-competition by publicizing the maximum number of positions they are seeking to fill ex-ante and setting a minimum score below which they will not consider a candidate. In practice, the hiring government rarely comes close to selecting candidates near this minimum score, instead setting a cut-off endogenously when they have hired the desired number of candidates.

We identify each employment cut-off by searching the official bulletins that subnational governments are required to publish listing all job offers and hiring decisions. We then set the cut-off to the score of the last person hired for that job.[17] We present the first-stage of our regression discontinuity design in Figure 2 using a self-reported measure of whether a survey respondent is working as a permanent public school teacher as our measure of take-up.[18] Although take-up is high at the job-offer discontinuity threshold, we observe two-sided non-compliance – not only can someone above the cut-off not accept the job offer, but a candidate below the threshold can enter multiple competitions and subsequently be employed in another government job while participating in one of the concursos in our data.[19] To limit bias from the endogenous location of the threshold, which guarantees that the last-hired person is an unrepresentative 'taker,' we drop the last person hired in each exam (de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020).[20] Given the large number of exams, we standardize the cut-off score for all of the exams at zero, allowing us to combine all the exam takers together in one analysis while controlling for the unique characteristics of each competition by including an exam fixed effect.

We next establish whether our sample is balanced on pre-treatment variables. For pre-concurso employment history, as shown in Figure 3, we fit a separate sharp regression discontinuity model on employment status available from the RAIS and school census datasets for years both before (a placebo treatment test) and after the concurso. Years are recoded as relative to the year in which the candidate took the concurso, the stan-

[17] The official bulletins are called *editals* and all state jobs must, by law, post in these bulletins both who has been offered a job and who accepted.

[18] In Figure A4, we compare this to two administrative measures of take-up from the Censo Escolar and RAIS. Results are largely similar across all three measures.

[19] An individual is free to enter as many concursos across, rather than within, geographic units as they wish and accept the job offer most appealing to them, if any.

[20] We show that our results are robust to their inclusion in Appendix G.

Figure 2: Probability of Working as a Permanent Public Sector Teacher by Score on the Running Variable



Notes: Points represent the mean number of respondents working as a permanent teacher in the public sector in each bin of the standardized exam score. The orange line is a smoothed lowess fit to the points. We present the first stage for three different survey measures in Figure A4 and Table A6 in the appendix.
Source: Authors' calculations from original survey data.

dardized concurso score is the running variable and the cut-off is set to the score of the last person hired, with state fixed effects and standard errors clustered by the value of the running variable.[21] Given the different years each concurso was held and the years certain variables were collected in the RAIS and school census, we have between six and ten years of pre-concurso data for each variable.

Figure 3 shows we are largely balanced on employment history *prior* to the concurso (corresponding Tables for all Figures can be found in Appendix M). While three of the

[21]We show that we are balanced on a larger number of outcomes from the two sources of administrative data in Appendix C. In contrast to our main analysis, Figure 3 clusters the standard errors by the score of the running variable. Between the last time we were able to access data from the Censo Escolar and RAIS in the restricted access data room at Instituto Nacional de Estudos e Pesquisas (INEP) in Brasilia and this submission, we changed our primary analysis to cluster our standard errors by the mini-exam rather than the running variable. We discuss these changes in Appendix N. We are able to change these specifications when we next access the secure data room in Brasilia although we believe they are unlikely to change the substantive conclusions here.

Figure 3: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Pre- and Post-Exam Job Histories



Notes: Points represent the point estimate of a separate sharp regression discontinuity regression fit on that particular year relative to the concurso. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the estimate. The p-value of the pooled test of difference for all pre-concurso years is 0.79. This figure is presented as a table in Table A27.
Source: Authors' calculations from *Censo Escolar*.

prior seven years show very small but significant differences, the p-value on the pooled data of having previously been a permanent public teacher prior to the concurso at the threshold is 0.79. There is a large and monotonically increasing positive effect of scoring above the cut-off on working as a permanent public sector teacher.

Turning to the time-invariant variables collected in our own survey, we are balanced on most variables in our preferred specification of a fuzzy regression discontinuity design in which we instrument for working as a permanent public sector teacher with being above the last-person-hired score cut-off and include state-level fixed effects (Figure 4). We lack balance on three variables: age, the date of the survey, and whether the survey was conducted in-person or online. Civil servant teachers are likely to be older.

This imbalance does not indicate a violation of the assumption that potential outcomes and pre-treatment variables are continuous across the threshold, but rather reflects the specific rules of the recruitment process, which prioritize more senior applicants in the event of a tied score. The imbalance on the survey date suggests permanent public teachers responded earlier to our survey, likely reflecting the stability of their employment situation and contact details. Since in-person surveying occurred as a final sampling stage, conditional on responding, this also translates into a lower rate of in-person survey responses.

Figure 4: Balance on Time-Invariant Variables



Notes: Each point represents a separate fuzzy regression discontinuity model fit on the variable labeled on the y-axis. The bars represent 95% confidence intervals. All variables are standardized with mean 0 and a standard deviation of 1 so as to be comparable. Table presented in Table A28

To account for these imbalances, we include age as a control in all subsequent specifications, as well as the survey date and modality (in-person vs. online), given the long duration over which data was collected and the possibility for political attitudes to shift over time.

Our data also enable us to test the proposed mechanisms linking public employment to political attitudes. To test self-interest in increased education spending, we asked teachers and teaching exam candidates to rank three education policies: (1) increased teacher pensions - benefiting permanent civil servants specifically; (2) smaller class sizes - benefiting all teachers; and (3) performance pay - which focuses more on differentiated compensation and accountability than on increased resources across the board and is generally opposed by public sector teachers because it does not increase available resources and is a threat to job security (see Corrales, 1999; Coyoli, 2024; Finger, 2018; Grindle, 2004, for example). Self-interest would be demonstrated by those who become social civil servants expressing higher support for teacher pensions.

To test whether teachers are more likely to be unionized, we ask survey respondents if they are members of a union and, conditional on being a member, if they are active members. To determine whether there are lower wages for teachers among the individuals we surveyed, we estimate the effects of becoming a social civil servant on self-reported income (our survey replicates questions from the Brazilian census) and administrative measures of income (from RAIS), as well as beliefs about past and likely future income growth, and whether the respondent owns a home. Finally, we test whether teachers have greater contact with the poor by creating an index of whether teachers live in the communities in which they work, whether they interact with the families of their students, and whether they report being close to the families of their students.

Testing Selection

We then test the theory of self-selection by comparing the attitudes of teacher candidates to those of the broader population, as measured by two nationally representative sources of public opinion data, the 2019 wave of the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) survey of 1,498 Brazilian adults, and the seventh wave of the World Values Survey in 2018 covering 2,000 Brazilians over the age of 16.

To test the hypothesis we combine the candidate and population datasets and use a regression framework to assess the direction and significance of a dummy variable indicating the teaching candidates:

$$Y_i = \beta \text{Candidate}_i + \gamma_s + \epsilon, \tag{1}$$

where Y_i is our outcome of interest, either left-right political ideology or preference for redistribution, Candidate_i is a dummy that indicates whether an individual is in our

exam candidate sample, and γ_s are state fixed effects. We also run separate specifications controlling for age, gender, education and state of residence to assess how much of the difference in attitudes is attributable to these core sociodemographic variables and how much is self-selection based directly on preexisting preferences and attitudes. We consider each survey as a separate stratum and use sample survey weights for LAPOP and the World Values Survey and inverse population weights from our survey.

RESULTS

Socialization

Table 2 presents results for the socialization hypothesis, with the overall index presented in Column 1 showing a null result. This is not consistent with the hypothesized relationship of increased leftism in the literature. For one component measure, the results in fact run directly contrary to the hypothesis; individuals working as public employees report lower support for public spending (Column 3). Column 2 also suggests public employees lean further to the right on a self-reported political ideology spectrum, although the result is not statistically significant. These results are robust to alternative bandwidths (we find a significant effect making tenured employees more conservative at half the optimal bandwidth, Appendix E.2), to using a sharp regression discontinuity to estimate the effect of receiving a job offer rather than accepting that offer (Appendix F), to retaining the last candidate to receive a job offer at the cutoff (Appendix G), to imputing missing values in the outcome indicators (Appendix H) and to weighting respondents by the share of respondents at their corresponding value of the running variable (Appendix K).

Interpreting these findings also requires clarity about the counterfactual forms of employment undertaken by those who do not pass the concurso. Within the bandwidth of our principal analysis (Column 1 in Table 2), the control group comprises, at the time of our survey, 30% temporary teachers, 15% private sector teachers and 55% non-teachers. Since tenured teaching jobs may be a bundled treatment involving some combination of a teaching role, a permanent contract and a public employer, we conduct an exploratory analysis to disaggregate these effects. By sequentially restricting our sample to those candidates who report in our survey being either tenured public employees or one of the three counterfactual groups of temporary public school teachers, private sector teachers or non-teachers we can compare attitudes only to these subgroups. While this method only captures a snapshot of employment status and omits pre-treatment

Table 2: Attitudinal Effects of Becoming a Civil Servant Teacher

			Attitudes Towards...		
	Left-Wing Index (1)	Left-Right Ideology (2)	...Greater Spending (3)	...The Unemployed (4)	...Reduced Inequality (5)
Civil Servant	-0.337	-0.377*	-0.162	0.032	0.004
	(0.321)	(0.186)	(0.116)	(0.109)	(0.075)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.076	0.642	0.776	0.676	0.894
N	1047	799	1032	1236	1071
N Above	528	402	521	586	533
N Below	519	397	511	650	538
Bandwidth	0.349	0.37	0.352	0.464	0.372

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Fuzzy regression discontinuity using whether the respondent is working as a civil service teacher as the assignment to treatment. We drop the last person hired as per de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. The sharp regression discontinuity of these results are presented in Table A8. Column 1 presents an inverse-covariance weighted index as described in Anderson, 2008 for all variables in Columns 2-5. Column 2 is coded from 0 to 1 where higher values represent greater affinity with the left. Columns 3 through 5 range from 0 to 1 with higher values representing greater support for redistribution, reduced inequality, and weaker beliefs that the unemployed are unemployed because they are lazy.

employment differences or the full post-concurso employment record, it helps calibrate whether the similarity in our control and treatment groups masks heterogeneity of the distinct treatment components. Table 3 replicates the regression discontinuity analysis for the left-wing index for each of the counterfactual groups. The estimates are consistently insignificant and negative in sign, suggesting that it does not matter if successful candidates are converting from a temporary role, switching over from private employers, or have just secured their first teaching post; their attitudes are likely to change little, and certainly do not become more leftist.

We do not explicitly hypothesize differential effects between the states and municipalities in our dataset given the myriad characteristics that vary between them and the large differences in available data, due to the different numbers of vacancies and candidates. Nevertheless, exploratory analysis using the sharp regression discontinuity design and a fully-interacted local linear model following Calonico et al. (2025) comparing the Federal District with the three Northeastern states and municipalities, suggest that there is no significant difference in the effect of permanent civil service employment across subnational regions ($p = 0.138$, see Appendix I). Nonetheless, the prevailing assumption that the public sector pushes employees to the left is further belied by the exploratory

evidence of a consistent and statistically significant rightward shift in attitudes in the Federal District across the index and 3 of its 4 component indicators (details in Appendix I).

Table 3: Attitudinal Effects of Becoming a Civil Servant Teacher: Changing the Counterfactual Group

	Non-Teachers (1)	Private Teachers (2)	Temporary Teachers (3)
Civil Servant	-0.106	-1.933	-0.461*
	(0.512)	(1.348)	(0.183)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.044	0.073	0.062
N	1123	846	1188
N Above	600	505	601
N Below	523	341	587
Bandwidth	0.562	0.501	0.652

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Fuzzy regression discontinuity using whether the respondent is working as a civil service teacher as the assignment to treatment. We drop the last person hired as per de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. The sharp regression discontinuity of these results are presented in Table A9. Each column replicates the results for Table 2 with a different counterfactual group. Column 1 only includes those not working as teachers, Column 2 only includes those working as private school teachers, and Column 3 only includes those working as temporary teachers

Mechanisms of Socialization

To understand where existing theories fall short, we also test the mechanisms they propose. If social civil servants support self-interested spending, we would expect to observe higher support for education policy focused on teacher pensions rather than reducing class sizes or performance pay. This is exactly what occurs, as illustrated in Column 1 in Table 4. Given the earlier null findings on aggregate redistributive attitudes, these results suggest that, rather than raising taxes and enlarging the state, teachers prefer reallocation within the state towards their own sector.

With respect to unionization, Column 2 of Table 4 demonstrates that teachers that receive permanent public sector contracts are *no more* likely to be union members, and Column 3 that, conditional on being in a union, they are no more active. This is consistent with our finding that political attitudes are unchanged and suggests that one reason for this null result is that the social networks, information sources, solidaristic norms

Table 4: Effects of Becoming a Civil Servant Teacher on Union Membership, Wealth, and Contact with the Poor

		Union...		Wealth...		
	Priority to Invest in Teacher Pensions	...Member	...Active Member	...Wealth Index	...Total Income	Contact with the Poor Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Civil Servant	0.507*	0.190	-0.954**	0.014	-3277.862	-0.254
	(0.199)	(0.204)	(0.352)	(0.190)	(3362.885)	(0.311)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.172	0.316	0.47	0.114	5387.286	0.009
N	965	1044	405	1310	1010	942
N Above	482	525	220	631	520	470
N Below	483	519	185	679	490	472
Bandwidth	0.349	0.342	0.391	0.439	0.31	0.331

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Fuzzy regression discontinuity using whether the respondent is working as a civil service teacher as the assignment to treatment. We drop the last person hired as per de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. The sharp regression discontinuity of these results are presented in Table A10.

and mobilizational pressures from unions do not vary once teachers receive permanent public sector contracts.

The results in Columns 4 and 5 of Table 4 further show no effect of becoming a social civil servant on income (Appendix C plots the pre- and post-treatment income differentials, confirming the null finding). The Brazilian case has been shown to exhibit a public sector wage premium (Mancha and Mattos, 2020). The lack of a wage premium in our study plausibly stems from the fact that our regression discontinuity approach means we are focusing on a local treatment effect estimation, with those who were on the cusp of getting a permanent public sector teaching job likely facing similar labor market opportunities in the education sector. To the extent that income drives political attitudes, the income-neutrality of securing a contract as a permanent public sector teacher is therefore consistent with the stable political attitudes we estimate. Finally, we test whether teachers have greater contact with the poor. Column 6 of Table 4 reports a negative but insignificant result for the contact with the poor index.

In sum, social civil servants are not pulled to the left by tenured public employment because - contrary to existing theory - their wages are stable, they have unchanged relations with their communities, they are no more likely to join a union or be active members conditional on being in a union, and while they value more resources for their own roles, this does not translate into a desire for a larger state overall.

Self-Selection

When we compare the attitudes of those who attempted to become public sector teachers to those held by the broader Brazilian population we observe a clear pattern of self-selection. Figure 5 illustrates that individuals who sit the teacher entrance examination are more likely (0.37 of a standard deviation) to place themselves to the left on the seven-point left-to-right political ideology scale and are much more likely (0.66 of a standard deviation) to show support for reducing inequality.

Figure 5: Teaching Exam Candidates Are More Likely to Identify with the Left and Have Higher Preferences for Redistribution than the General Public



Notes: The two top panels present the distribution of answers for the Brazilian population and teacher candidates for left-right ideology and support for reducing inequality. The left-right ideology variable has been rescaled from 1-7 to 0-1 with 0 indicating identifying with the far left and 1 identifying with the far right. The support for reducing inequality variable has been rescaled from 1-7 to 0-1 with 0 indicating strongly disagree and 1 indicating strongly agree. The bottom two panels represent coefficients of regressions using sample survey weights and independent strata for the Brazilian population and teacher candidates respectively. Both variables have been standardized in the regressions presented in the bottom two panels. Lines in the bottom two panels represent 95% confidence intervals.

This ideological skew is not simply a product of demographics or the higher edu-

cation qualifications demanded of teachers; the estimated differences in mean positions when we control for age (the median teacher candidate is 18 months older than the LAPOP sample), gender (74 percent of our candidates are female) and education (98 percent of our candidates have completed higher education compared to 10 percent in the LAPOP sample) persist. Only when we include state fixed effects does the difference in left-right ideology attenuate while the difference in support for reducing inequality remains large. Besides geography, the higher educational requirements for becoming a government teacher appear to drive some of the ideological selection of teachers. While age and gender do not change the point estimates for either left-right ideology or support for reducing inequality, education does for both outcomes, and it is significantly different in the support for reducing inequality outcome.

To understand the roots of these selection effects further, we draw on a nationally representative survey from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) on citizens' trust in the public sector fielded in 2025. To understand why left-leaning citizens might be more inclined to pursue public sector careers, we construct five outcomes measuring trust in the regional civil service, trust in the national civil service, trust in the police, an index of perceptions of the quality of government services, and an index of satisfaction with government services.[22] The questions are measured on a Likert scale ranging from 0-10 indicating no trust to complete trust and no satisfaction to completely satisfied respectively. We regress each outcome measure on the best available measure of ideological attitudes, whether the respondent voted for the largest party of the left, the *Partido de Trabalhadores* (PT), and we control for the same battery of controls as we do in Figure 5.

The results provide a clear indication of why right-leaning citizens are more likely to overlook a career in the public sector; compared to those who favor the left, they are much less trusting in the civil service and much less impressed by the work they do to deliver public services. Across all model specifications, a vote for the PT is significantly associated with a one unit increase on the Likert scales. Strikingly, an earlier 2023 study shows that lower levels of trust persist among supporters of the right even when the unambiguously right-wing President Bolsonaro was in office, suggesting that these patterns do not simply reflect partisan support while a favored party is in office (OECD, 2023, p. 51). Finally, the exception that proves the rule is trust in the police, for which citizens supporting the left show no greater trust, consistent with the argument

[22]Further details on the survey and measures are provided in Appendix L.

Table 5: Relationship Between Partisanship and Trust in Services in 2025

	Trust in...						Service...			
	...Regional Civil Service		...National Civil Service		...Police		...High Quality		...Satisfaction	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
Voted for PT	1.048***	0.990***	1.360***	1.317***	-0.034	-0.083	1.036***	1.034***	1.142***	1.164***
	(0.164)	(0.160)	(0.207)	(0.194)	(0.113)	(0.109)	(0.131)	(0.135)	(0.205)	(0.193)
N	1980	1976	1977	1973	1989	1985	1995	1991	962	959
Outcome Mean	4.97	4.97	4.88	4.88	5.87	5.87	4.83	4.83	6.35	6.35
Controls		X		X		X		X		X

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Survey robust standard errors in parentheses. Voted for PT is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the respondent reports having voted for the PT and 0 otherwise. Controls include region, gender, income, age, and level of education. All outcomes range from "Not at all/Very Unlikely" (0) to "Completely satisfied/Very Likely" (10).

that enforcement civil servants, such as the police, do not exhibit this partisan bias, confirming several studies (Reny et al., 2025; Oberfield, 2012; Oberfield, 2014) and our larger theoretical distinction between social and enforcement civil servants as in Jost, Meshkin, and Schub (2022). Along with our earlier results suggesting that civil servants develop ideological attitudes *prior* to joining the civil service, these survey findings underscore the deep-rooted ideological cleavage in attitudes about the public sector.

Taken together, our results suggest that there is little effect of becoming a civil servant on political attitudes and behaviors, and the evidence is more consistent with a strong effect of self-selection. Across a range of measures of political ideology, social civil servants are no different than similar peers that just missed the recruitment cutoff. Instead, most of the differences in attitudes between social civil servants and the general population emerge far earlier, likely through parental influences and the formative years of education. The size of this selection effect is approximately the same size as the differences in attitudes between the best and worst performing applicant to a social civil servant position.

CONCLUSION

In this paper, we ask what explains the differences in left-right political ideology between public employees and the general population. Using the case of teachers in Brazil, we find there is no effect of employment as a social civil servant on political ideology. If anything, findings for some indicators, subnational units and regression bandwidths suggest that tenured public employment may instead be more likely to nudge attitudes

to the right.

The stronger preference for redistribution expressed by social civil servants exists because of selection *into* the bureaucracy. The type of person that applies to work for the bureaucracy is qualitatively different from the median Brazilian citizen. These differences are explained partly by demographic and educational differences, but much selection occurs purely at the level of attitudes.

While the data analyzed here is not fully representative of Brazil, the wide range of economic and administrative contexts we study suggests that our findings are likely to apply more broadly to contexts where public service motivation is associated with the left and recruitment is meritocratic. Whether the dominance of self-selection extends to frontline civil servants engaged in enforcement, such as police officers, where attitudes typically lie to the right of the population, merits further research.

In other contexts, exam-based recruitment has been shown to shift the attitudes of those who fail the exam, particularly around the legitimacy of meritocratic processes and national unity (Kuipers, 2023). Our study allows us to focus on the effects of employment rather than any backlash from those who are not recruited both by using a fuzzy design that isolates the effect of employment rather than exam outcome itself, and by measuring an outcome variable - redistributive preference - which is not tied to the nature of the recruitment process.

Our findings speak to policy debates regarding the politicization of the bureaucracy and the size of the state. Caricatures of the state as reproducing itself by indoctrinating bureaucrats and mobilizing cadres of leftist activists are at the heart of neoliberal critiques and have taken center stage in political debates over the neutrality of bureaucrats, including in Brazil. Our work instead suggests that the state is not an active agent in shaping its employees' ideology, and that shrinking the state would not change its ideological distribution. Rather, persistent demonization of public employees may further discourage right-wing applicants and entrench in the bureaucracy those with left-wing attitudes. Improving the perceived legitimacy, merit and neutrality of public service is likely to rely on broader declines in polarization that entice citizens that identify with the right to consider public sector careers. These are similar to proposed bureaucratic reforms in other contexts, which focus on recruiting individuals who are more representative of the population they are designed to serve (Reny et al., 2025).

The results also highlight important gaps in existing theories of bureaucrats' political attitudes and point to potential refinements. First, the bureau voting model is a blunt

tool that overpredicts bureaucrats' support for a larger state, and needs to be revised to reflect a narrower conception of bureaucrats' self-interest. That teachers seem to strongly favor increased spending in their own sector but not more broadly suggests they possess more nuanced attitudes focused on reallocation within the public sector, although which sectors teachers would be willing to cut, and why they are averse to a larger state, remains unclear. Second, we continue to lack a clear understanding of why right-leaning citizens opt out of public service. These findings align with emerging research in political science and sociology showing the intensity of selection processes into the bureaucracy (Kuipers, 2024; Reny et al., 2025). Whether preferences for public employment are socialized during childhood or formed in higher education and training, and whether recent polarization in national politics has exacerbated self-selection skew, deserve intensive investigation.

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Appendix

A SAMPLE TARGETING AND RESPONSE RATE

Figure A1 graphs the response rate to our survey by the running variable in our regression discontinuity, the standardized exam score. We also highlight the sub-samples where we carried out targeted follow-up with phone and in-person contact methods.

Figure A1: Sample Targeting and Response Rate



Notes: The orange box bounds the candidates we targeted to be contacted over the phone and the green box bounds the candidates we attempted to survey in-person. The x-axis is the standardized score on the teacher entrance exam while the y-axis is the response rate to our survey. The smoothed LOWESS line is a line of best fit on the response rate.

Through our data collection strategy, we surveyed 8,038 respondents. There were 552 respondents that took the survey more than once. For those respondents, we kept the version of the survey for which they had completed most of the survey. If a respondent had completed the same amount of two or more surveys, we dropped all of their responses as we are unable to determine their best response.

A.1 Non-Response Bias

Given the targeted nature of our sampling strategy, systematic non-response bias is a potential concern for both our causal estimates and the observational selection results. We diagnose the extent of non-response bias in Figure A2 by regressing an indicator of whether the individual responded to our survey on the observables we have from our administrative data (level of education, gender, disability status, and region).

There are several results to note from this exercise. First, the total size of non-response bias is small. For the entire population, differences are no larger than 7 percent between those who responded and those that did not, and this decreases within the bandwidth of the model run in Column 1 of Table 2. We control for the differences in location of the exam by including state fixed effects in all regression discontinuity specifications. The biggest remaining differences are those for respondents with a tertiary and post-graduate education. To account for this, we also present results for the regression discontinuity using response probability weights in Appendix Section K. Our results do not change substantively using weights. For the selection analysis, we run our primary results using these weights in Figure 5.

Figure A2: Differences on Observables



Notes: Differences on observables between the sample who responded to the survey and those that did not in the entire population (Panel A), within the regression discontinuity bandwidth of the model presented in Column 1 of Table 2 (Panel B), below the employment offer cutoff but within the RD bandwidth (Panel C), and above the employment offer cutoff but within the RD bandwidth (Panel D).

B SURVEY QUESTIONS

Table A1 lists all of the survey questions analyzed in this paper, in both their original Portuguese, and translated into English.

Table A1: Survey Questions Used in Analysis

Variable	*Question in Portuguese*	*Question in English*
Number of Children, any children	Quantas crianças com menos de 18 anos moram em sua casa? Por favor, digite a sua resposta na caixa abaixo.	How many children under the age of 18 live in your house? Please write your response in the box below.
Race	O(A) sr./sra. se considera uma pessoa branca, preta, parda, indígena ou amarela? Por favor, escolha uma das seguintes opções: - Branco - Preto - Indígena - Pardo - Amarelo - Me recuso a responder	Do you consider yourself white, Black, mixed-race, Indigenous, or Asian? Please choose one of the following options: - White - Black - Indigenous - Mixed-race - Asian - I refuse to answer
Education	Na sua formação, qual foi o último ano ou série da escola que o(a) sr./sra. concluiu com aprovação? - Sem escolaridade - Ensino fundamental incompleto - Ensino fundamental completo - Ensino médio incompleto - Ensino médio completo - Ensino superior incompleto - Ensino superior completo Pós-graduação (Mestrado, Doutorado, Extensão ou Especialização)	In your education, what was the last year or grade of school that you finished and passed? - No formal education - Incomplete primary education - Completed primary education - Incomplete secondary education - Completed secondary education - Incomplete higher (tertiary) education - Completed higher (tertiary) education - Postgraduate education (Masters, Doctorate/PhD, Extension, or Specialization)

Table A1 – *continued from previous page*

Variable	*Question in Portuguese*	*Question in English*
Left-right political ideology	Hoje em dia, quando se conversa de tendências políticas, fala-se de pessoas que simpatizam mais com a esquerda e de pessoas que simpatizam mais com a direita. De acordo com o sentido político que os termos esquerda e direita têm para o(a) sr./sra, onde o(a) sr./sra. se situa nesta escala? Para responder a pergunta imagine uma escala de 1 a 7, em que o número 1 representa "esquerda" e o número 7 representa "direita". Pedimos que o(a) sr./sra. indique o número que melhor expressa sua resposta.	Nowadays, when we talk about political trends, we talk about people who sympathize more with the left and people who sympathize more with the right. According to the political meaning that the terms left and right have for you, where would you place yourself on this scale? To answer this question, imagine a scale from 1 to 7, where the number 1 represents left and the number 7 represents right. Please indicate the number that best expresses your answer.
Attitudes toward reduced inequality	Para responder a pergunta, imagine uma escala de 1 a 7, em que o número 1 representa "discordo muito" e o número 7 representa "concordo muito". Pedimos que o(a) sr./sra. indique o número que melhor expressa sua resposta: O Estado brasileiro deve implementar políticas firmes para reduzir a desigualdade de renda entre ricos e pobres. Discordo muitonem discordo nem concordo...concordo muito, Não sei	To respond to the question, imagine a scale where the number 1 represents "Strongly disagree" and the number 7 represents "Strongly agree." Please indicate which number best expresses your response: The Brazilian state should implement policies to reduce inequality between the rich and the poor. Strongly disagree...neither disagree nor agree...strongly agree, I don't know

Table A1 – *continued from previous page*

Variable	*Question in Portuguese*	*Question in English*
Attitudes toward the unemployed	Para responder a pergunta, imagine uma escala de 1 a 7, em que o número 1 representa "discordo muito" e o número 7 representa "concordo muito". Pedimos que o(a) sr./sra. indique o número que melhor expressa sua resposta: A maioria dos desempregados poderia encontrar um trabalho se quisesse. Discordo muitonem discordo nem concordo...concordo muito, Não sei	To respond to the question, imagine a scale where the number 1 represents "Strongly disagree" and the number 7 represents "Strongly agree." Please indicate which number best expresses your response: The majority of unemployed could find a job if they wanted to. Strongly disagree...neither disagree nor agree...strongly agree, I don't know
Attitudes toward greater spending	Para responder a pergunta, imagine uma escala de 1 a 7, em que o número 1 representa "discordo muito" e o número 7 representa "concordo muito". Pedimos que o(a) sr./sra. indique o número que melhor expressa sua resposta: O governo deve gastar mais na ajuda aos pobres. Discordo muitonem discordo nem concordo...concordo muito, Não sei	To respond to the question, imagine a scale where the number 1 represents "Strongly disagree" and the number 7 represents "Strongly agree." Please indicate which number best expresses your response: The government should spend more to help the poor. Strongly disagree...neither disagree nor agree...strongly agree, I don't know
Priority to invest in teacher pensions, smaller classes, or performance pay	Das políticas a seguir, em quais você mais gostaria de investir? Você pode ordenar a lista para deixar na sua ordem de preferência. Clique e arraste cada opção. - Contribuições do governo para aposentadoria de professores - Classes (turmas) menores - Remuneração do professor vinculada ao desempenho dos seus alunos	Of the following policies, which would you most want to invest in? You may reorder the list to reflect your order of preference. Click and drag each option. - Government contributions to teacher pensions - Smaller class sizes - Teacher pay tied to student performance

Table A1 – *continued from previous page*

Variable	*Question in Portuguese*	*Question in English*
Union member, active union member	O(A) Sr./sra. poderia me dizer se é um membro ativo (que frequenta reuniões, por exemplo), um membro inativo ou se não é um membro de um sindicato? - Sou um membro ativo - Sou um membro inativo - Não sou um membro de um sindicato	Could you tell me whether you are an active member (for example, someone who attends meetings), an inactive member, or not a member of a labor union? - I am an active member - I am an inactive member - I am not a member of a labor union
Main income	No trabalho principal, qual era o rendimento bruto (ou a retirada) mensal que ganhava habitualmente em novembro de 2020 (R$)? Insira somente números sem os decimais, por favor.	In your main job, what was the gross monthly income (or withdrawal) that you usually earned in November 2020 (R$)? Please enter numbers only, without decimals.
Other income	No demais trabalhos, qual era o rendimento bruto (ou a retirada) mensal que ganhava habitualmente em novembro de 2020 (R$)? Insira somente números sem os decimais, por favor.	In your other jobs, what was the gross monthly income (or withdrawal) that you usually earned in November 2020 (R$)? Please enter numbers only, without decimals.
Future income growth	Você acredita que sua renda será maior, menor ou igual daqui a cinco anos? - Maior - Igual - Menor - Não sei	Do you believe your income will be higher, lower or the same five years from now? - Higher - The same - Lower - I don't know

Table A1 – *continued from previous page*

Variable	*Question in Portuguese*	*Question in English*
Past income growth	Nos últimos 12 meses seu rendimento bruto aumentou, diminuiu ou permaneceu o mesmo? - Aumentou - Diminuiu - Permaneceu o mesmo - Não sei	In the last 12 months, has your gross income increased, decreased, or remained the same? - Increased - Decreased - Remained the same - I dont know
Owns home	O seu domicílio é: - Próprio de algum morador -Alugado - Cedido por empregador - Outra condição	Your home is: - Owned by one of the residents -Rented - Provided by your employer - Other
Lives in the community where they teach	Até que ponto você concorda ou discorda das seguintes declarações? Lembre-se de que você pode usar qualquer número entre 1 e 7. Os professores da sua comunidade vivem no mesmo bairro em que os seus alunos vivem. Discordo muitonem discordo nem concordo...concordo muito, Não sei/Me recuso a responder	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Remember that you can use any number between 1 and 7. Teachers in your community live in the same area where their students live. Strongly disagreeneither disagree nor agreestrongly agree, I don't know/I refuse to answer.
Interacts with families of students	Até que ponto você concorda ou discorda das seguintes declarações? Lembre-se de que você pode usar qualquer número entre 1 e 7. Os professores de sua comunidade interagem regularmente com alunos e famílias fora da escola. Discordo muitonem discordo nem concordo...concordo muito, Não sei/Me recuso a responder	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Remember that you can use any number between 1 and 7. Teachers in your community regularly interact with students and families outside of school. Strongly disagreeneither disagree nor agreestrongly agree, I don't know/I refuse to answer.

Table A1 – *continued from previous page*

Variable	*Question in Portuguese*	*Question in English*
Close to families of students	Até que ponto você concorda ou discorda das seguintes declarações? Lembre-se de que você pode usar qualquer número entre 1 e 7. Os professores da sua comunidade têm relações pessoais com as famílias dos seus alunos. Discordo muitonem discordo nem concordo...concordo muito, Não sei/Me recuso a responder	To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements? Remember that you can use any number between 1 and 7. Teachers in your community have personal relationships with the families of their students. Strongly disagreeneither disagree nor agreestrongly agree, I don't know/I refuse to answer.
Non-teacher	O(A) Sr./Sra. é empregado(a) como professor(a) atualmente? - Sim - Não	Are you currently employed as a teacher? - Yes - No
Permanent public school teacher, private teacher, temporary teacher	Você ensina em escola pública ou privada atualmente? Marque todos os que se aplicam. - Escola pública como professor(a) efetivo(a) - pública temporário - Escola privada	Do you currently teach in a public or private school? Check all that apply. - Public school as a permanent teacher - Public school as a temporary teacher - Private school

Note: This table only includes the variables from our original survey. Other variables come from the *Censo Escolar*, RAIS, or Cebraspe. Notes in corresponding tables indicate when variables came from these sources.

C BALANCE OVER TIME AND TREATMENT

In Figure A3, we extend the results presented in Figure 3 with a greater number of outcomes.

Figure A3: Difference-in-Discontinuity of Pre-and Post-Exam Job Histories



Notes: Points represent the point estimate of a separate sharp regression discontinuity regression fit on that particular year relative to the concurso. Bars represent 95% confidence intervals of the estimate.
Source: Panels A, K, and L authors' calculations from RAIS. All other panels from authors' calculations from *Censo Escolar*.

There are several results to note from the difference-in-discontinuity analysis in Figure A3 in addition to those presented in Figure 3. First, we are largely balanced on employment history *prior* to the concurso, especially for the years before and of the concurso. Second, as expected, there is a large and monotonically increasing positive effect of scoring above the last person hired cut-off on three key outcome variables: working as a permanent public school teacher, being concursado, and working as a public school teacher. There are also strong positive effects in later years on working as a teacher and appearing in the school census data.

D INDEX COMPONENTS

The tables below implement the main analysis for each of the component indicators in our outcome indices.

Table A2: Effects on Self-Interest of Becoming a Civil Servant Teacher

		Priority to Invest In...		
	Self-Interested Reforms Index	...Teacher Pensions	...Smaller Classes	Performance Pay is Lowest Priority
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Civil Servant	0.442*	0.507*	-0.116	0.417
	(0.223)	(0.199)	(0.230)	(0.246)
Below Cutoff Mean	-0.017	0.172	0.564	0.441
N	972	965	973	993
N Above	487	482	487	494
N Below	485	483	486	499
Bandwidth	0.352	0.349	0.353	0.365

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Fuzzy regression discontinuity using whether the respondent is working as a civil service teacher as the assignment to treatment. We drop the last person hired as per de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. The sharp regression discontinuity of these results are presented in Table A11. Column 1 presents an inverse-covariance weighted index as described in Anderson, 2008 of the variables in columns 2-4. Variables have been recoded so positive point estimates represent confirmation of the hypothesis.

Table A3: Effects of Becoming a Civil Servant Teacher on Union Membership

	Union...	
	...Member	...Active Member
	(1)	(2)
Civil Servant	0.190	-0.954**
	(0.204)	(0.352)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.316	0.47
N	1044	405
N Above	525	220
N Below	519	185
Bandwidth	0.342	0.391

Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Fuzzy regression discontinuity using whether the respondent is working as a civil service teacher as the assignment to treatment. We drop the last person hired as per de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. The sharp regression discontinuity of these results are presented in Table A12. Column 1 ranges from 0-1, with 1 equal to being a union member. Column 2 ranges from 0-1 for union members, with 1 equal to being an active union member.

Table A4: Effects of Becoming a Civil Servant Teacher on Wealth

		Income (R$)			Income Growth...		
	Wealth Index	Total	Main	Other	...Future	...Past	Owns Home
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Civil Servant	-0.099	-3277.862	-4640.409	1249.047	-0.162	0.060	-0.095
	(0.208)	(3362.885)	(3412.095)	(1378.095)	(0.180)	(0.208)	(0.179)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.105	5387.286	4138.055	1304.336	0.868	0.536	0.611
N	1208	1010	1033	927	1038	1039	1078
N Above	589	520	525	484	531	522	541
N Below	619	490	508	443	507	517	537
Bandwidth	0.389	0.31	0.318	0.291	0.364	0.323	0.332

Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Fuzzy regression discontinuity using whether the respondent is working as a civil service teacher as the assignment to treatment. We drop the last person hired as per de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. The sharp regression discontinuity of these results are presented in Table A13. Column 1 presents an inverse-covariance weighted index as described in Anderson, 2008 of the variables in columns 2-7. Column 2 is a self-reported measure of total monthly income. Column 3 is a self-reported measure of income from the respondent's primary job. Column 4 is a self-reported measure of income from the respondent's other jobs. Columns 5 and 6 are self-reported measures of beliefs about income growth in the future and past respectively. Column 7 is a dummy indicating whether respondents own their home.

Table A5: Effect of Becoming a Civil Servant Teacher on Contact with the Poor: Sharp Regression Discontinuity Results

		Teachers...		
	Contact with the Poor Index	...Live in the Community	...Interact with Families	...are close to Families
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Civil Servant	-0.254	-0.217	0.152	-0.162
	(0.311)	(0.129)	(0.145)	(0.119)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.009	0.489	0.494	0.384
N	942	972	965	1169
N Above	470	499	489	554
N Below	472	473	476	615
Bandwidth	0.331	0.358	0.355	0.484

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Fuzzy regression discontinuity using whether the respondent is working as a civil service teacher as the assignment to treatment. We drop the last person hired as per de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. The sharp regression discontinuity of these results are presented in Table A14. Column 1 presents an inverse-covariance weighted index as described in Anderson, 2008 of the variables in Columns 2-4. Variables in Columns 2-4 are measured on a likert scale ranging from 0-1 where 0 is "I disagree a lot" and 1 is "I agree a lot", with six intervals.

D.1 Robustness of Regression Discontinuity Design

In this section, we test the robustness of our regression discontinuity design to threats to validity outlined in Imbens and Lemieux (2008).

D.2 First Stage

We present three different measures of the strength of our first stage to complement Figure 2 in the main manuscript. We prefer our survey-based measure presented in Panel A of Figure A4, as we have complete data for all respondents to our survey, but they closely match measures using the Censo Escolar and RAIS (Panels B and C of A4 respectively). In the Censo Escolar, we coded someone as being a permanent public sector teacher if they were working as a teacher, in a public school, and were on a permanent contract. In RAIS, we coded someone as being a permanent public sector teacher if they were working in education for a public sector employer and were on a permanent contract.

We also present the exact point estimates in Column 1 of Tables A6 and A7. Respondents are 24, 55, and 37 percent more likely to be working as permanent public school teachers if they are above the threshold according to our survey based measure (Column 1 of Table A6 and A7), the Censo Escolar (Column 2 of Table A6), and RAIS (Column 3 of Table A6) respectively.

Table A6: First Stage Take-up

	Survey (1)	Censo (2)	RAIS (3)
Exam Score	0.192***	0.553***	0.367***
	(0.043)	(0.030)	(0.045)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.389	0.324	0.024
N	1103	11041	10420
N Above	568	3793	3279
N Below	535	7248	7141
Bandwidth	0.316	0.548	0.56

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Column 1 corresponds to Panel A of Figure A4, Column 2 to Panel B of Figure A4, and Column 3 to Panel C of Figure A4.

Figure A4: Probability of Working as a Permanent Public Sector Teacher Using Three Different Measures of Treatment by Score on the Running Variable



Notes: Points represent the mean number of respondents working as a permanent teacher in the public sector in each bin of the standardized exam score. The orange line is a smoothed lowess fit to the points. Panel A corresponds to Figure 2 in the main body of the manuscript and uses a self-reported survey based measure of whether a respondent is a permanent public sector teacher. Panel B uses a measure calculated from the Censo Escolar. Panel C uses a measure calculated from RAIS.
Source: Authors' calculations from original survey data, Censo Escolar, and RAIS.

E ROBUSTNESS TO JUMPS AT NON-DISCONTINUITY POINTS

We also test if there are jumps at non-discontinuity points for the first-stage in the design in Table A7. Column 1 of Table A7 presents the job-offer discontinuity that we use as the assignment to treatment in our first-stage of the design. As expected, there is a strong and positive effect, with a 22 percent increase in the probability that a survey respondent is working as a permanent public sector teacher at this cutoff.

Table A7: Test for Jumps at Non-Discontinuity Points

	Employment Offer Cutoff (1)	Below Cutoff Median (2)	Above Cutoff Median (3)
Effect at Cutoff	0.192***	0.055	0.019
	(0.043)	(0.029)	(0.054)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.389	0.356	0.361
N	1103	1691	1060
N Above	568	880	314
N Below	535	811	746
Bandwidth	0.316	0.394	0.382

Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights.

In Columns 2 and 3 of Table A7, we shift the cutoffs to placebo cutoffs of the median value of the range of the running variable above and below the actual cutoff. For these two placebo cutoffs, we estimate precise nulls.

E.1 McCrary Density Test

We present the McCrary (2008) density test for the sample from who we collected survey data and the entire population graphically in Figure A5. The p-values of 0.14 and 0.98 respectively allow us to reject any potential manipulation at the discontinuity.

Figure A5: McCrary, 2008 Density Test for the Surveyed Sample and Entire Population



Notes: Panel A presents the McCrary, 2008 density test for the sample of test takers from who we collected survey data. The p-value for a jump at the discontinuity is 0.14. Panel B presents the McCrary, 2008 density test for the population of test takers. The p-value for a jump at the discontinuity is 0.98.

E.2 Robustness to Alternative Bandwidths

A concern of regression discontinuity designs is that they are sensitive to the choice of bandwidth. We test whether our main results are sensitive to the choice of bandwidth in Figure A6. We find that our results are not sensitive to the bandwidth choice, with no directional differences in results with larger bandwidths and an attenuation of results as we increase the bandwidth choice, in line with the theory in the paper.

Figure A6: Sensitivity to Bandwidth Choice



Notes: Points represent the point estimate of a separate regression discontinuity regression using the bandwidth specified in the legend. Lines are 95% confidence intervals. Bandwidths are half the optimal bandwidth, the optimal bandwidth, twice the optimal bandwidth, and then a bandwidth of 1 and 2 of the standardized running variable on either side of the discontinuity. The standardized running variable runs from -6 to 3, so a bandwidth of 2 represents one third of the length of the population distribution below the cutoff and two thirds of the length of the population distribution above the cutoff. The results for the optimal bandwidth replicate those presented in Table 2

F SHARP REGRESSION DISCONTINUITY RESULTS

In this section, we provide equivalent tables for all the results shown in the main manuscript using a sharp regression discontinuity design as our preferred estimand rather than the fuzzy regression discontinuity design. Although we have a strong first stage and there is high take-up of a public sector job if offered one, we do see imperfect compliance on either side of the threshold (see Figure 2 for the first-stage of take-up and Figure 3 for balance on employment up to ten years prior to the exam and a strong first-stage up to five years after the exam). Above the exam score cut-off, respondents can decline to take-up the job offer and below the exam score cut-off, respondents could become a public sector teacher in a different state or municipality if they were above the exam score cut-off in a different exam we do not observe.

Table A8: Attitudinal Effects of Becoming a Civil Servant Teachers: Sharp Regression Discontinuity

			Attitudes Towards...		
	Left-Wing Index	Left-Right Ideology	...Greater Spending	...The Unemployed	...Reduced Inequality
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Qualified	-0.053	-0.076	-0.029	-0.000	0.002
	(0.055)	(0.042)	(0.022)	(0.027)	(0.015)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.074	0.639	0.775	0.672	0.898
N	1076	920	1022	1028	1156
N Above	540	440	516	519	564
N Below	536	480	506	509	592
Bandwidth	0.368	0.445	0.348	0.357	0.411

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Sharp regression discontinuity using their score on the teacher entrance exam as the running variable for whether the individual qualified from the exam. We drop the last person hired as per de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. The fuzzy regression discontinuity of these results are presented in Table 2. Column 1 presents an inverse-covariance weighted index as described in Anderson, 2008 for all variables in Columns 2-5. Column 2 is coded from 0 to 1 where higher values represent greater affinity with the left. Columns 3 through 5 range from 0 to 1 with higher values representing greater support for redistribution, reduced inequality, and weaker beliefs that the unemployed are unemployed because they are lazy.

Table A9: Attitudinal Effects of Becoming a Civil Servant Teacher: Changing the Counterfactual Group

	Non-Teachers (1)	Private Teachers (2)	Temporary Teachers (3)
Qualified	-0.031	-0.098	-0.127*
	(0.066)	(0.062)	(0.061)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.046	0.057	0.066
N	820	767	797
N Above	474	470	438
N Below	346	297	359
Bandwidth	0.376	0.443	0.374

Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Fuzzy regression discontinuity using whether the respondent is working as a civil service teacher as the assignment to treatment. We drop the last person hired as per de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. The sharp regression discontinuity of these results are presented in Table 3. Each column replicates the results for Table 2 with a different counterfactual group. Column 1 only includes those not working as teachers, Column 2 only includes those working as private school teachers, and Column 3 only includes those working as temporary teachers

Table A10: Effects of Becoming a Civil Servant Teacher on Union Membership, Wealth, and Contact with the Poor: Sharp Regression Discontinuity Results

		Union...		Wealth...		
	Priority to Invest in Teacher Pensions	...Member	...Active Member	...Wealth Index	...Total Income	Contact with the Poor Index
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Civil Servant	0.083*	0.034	-0.219**	-0.041	164.748	-0.040
	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.068)	(0.045)	(523.782)	(0.066)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.176	0.31	0.472	0.183	5095.852	-0.006
N	1084	1242	353	882	1501	1098
N Above	526	593	192	443	685	540
N Below	558	649	161	439	816	558
Bandwidth	0.414	0.444	0.323	0.253	0.515	0.415

Notes: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Sharp regression discontinuity using their score on the teacher entrance exam as the running variable for whether the individual qualified from the exam. We drop the last person hired as per de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. The fuzzy regression discontinuity of these results are presented in Table 4.

Table A11: Effects on Self-Interest of Becoming a Civil Servant Teacher: Sharp Regression Discontinuity

		Priority to Invest In...		
	Self-Interested Reforms Index	...Teacher Pensions	...Smaller Classes	Performance Pay is Lowest Priority
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Qualified	0.077	0.083*	-0.049	0.074
	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.049)
Below Cutoff Mean	-0.019	0.176	0.565	0.435
N	948	1084	1235	926
N Above	471	526	575	457
N Below	477	558	660	469
Bandwidth	0.337	0.414	0.495	0.329

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Sharp regression discontinuity using their score on the teacher entrance exam as the running variable for whether the individual qualified from the exam. We drop the last person hired as per de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. The fuzzy regression discontinuity of these results are presented in Table A2. Column 1 presents an inverse-covariance weighted index as described in Anderson, 2008 of the variables in columns 2-4. Variables have been recoded so positive point estimates represent confirmation of the hypothesis.

Table A12: Effects of Becoming a Civil Servant Teacher on Union Membership: Sharp Regression Discontinuity

	Union Membership...	
	...Member	...Active Member
	(1)	(2)
Qualified	-0.046	0.054*
	(0.027)	(0.026)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.13	0.143
N	1248	1292
N Above	625	633
N Below	623	659
Bandwidth	0.364	0.379

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Sharp regression discontinuity using their score on the teacher entrance exam as the running variable for whether the individual qualified from the exam. We drop the last person hired as per de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. The fuzzy regression discontinuity of these results are presented in Table A3. Column 1 ranges from 0-1, with 1 equal to being a union member. Column 2 ranges from 0-1 for union members, with 1 equal to being an active union member.

Table A13: Effects of Becoming a Civil Servant Teacher on Wealth: Sharp Regression Discontinuity Results

		Income (R$)			Income Growth...		
	Wealth Index	Total	Main	Other	...Future	...Past	Owns Home
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Qualified	-0.041	164.748	-736.046	299.457	-0.034	0.004	-0.048
	(0.046)	(523.782)	(594.713)	(236.218)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.034)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.168	5095.852	4037.278	1261.068	0.865	0.555	0.596
N	882	1501	1093	1292	962	857	1188
N Above	443	685	550	615	488	432	582
N Below	439	816	543	677	474	425	606
Bandwidth	0.254	0.515	0.338	0.461	0.324	0.25	0.383

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Sharp regression discontinuity using their score on the teacher entrance exam as the running variable for whether the individual qualified from the exam. We drop the last person hired as per de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. The fuzzy regression discontinuity of these results are presented in Table A4. Column 1 presents an inverse-covariance weighted index as described in Anderson, 2008 of the variables in columns 2-7. Column 2 is a self-reported measure of total monthly income. Column 3 is a self-reported measure of income from the respondent's primary job. Column 4 is a self-reported measure of income from the respondent's other jobs. Columns 5 and 6 are self-reported measures of beliefs about income growth in the future and past respectively. Column 7 is a dummy indicating whether respondents own their home.

Table A14: Effect of Becoming a Civil Servant Teacher on Contact with the Poor

		Teachers...		
	Contact with the Poor Index	...Live in the Community	...Interact with Families	...are close to Families
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Qualified	-0.040	-0.043	0.039	-0.033
	(0.066)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.028)
Below Cutoff Mean	-0.006	0.493	0.496	0.384
N	1098	891	1044	1155
N Above	540	455	509	549
N Below	558	436	535	606
Bandwidth	0.415	0.319	0.393	0.474

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Sharp regression discontinuity using their score on the teacher entrance exam as the running variable for whether the individual qualified from the exam. We drop the last person hired as per de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. The fuzzy regression discontinuity of these results are presented in Table A5. Column 1 presents an inverse-covariance weighted index as described in Anderson, 2008 of the variables in Columns 2-4. Variables in Columns 2-4 are measured on a likert scale ranging from 0-1 where 0 is "I disagree a lot" and 1 is "I agree a lot", with six intervals.

G ALWAYS TAKERS

In situations where there is an oversubscribed waiting list, such as the tenured teaching positions we study, de Chaisemartin and Behaghel (2020) recommend dropping the last person selected off the waiting list to ensure that the treatment and control groups are statistically comparable. By definition, the last person hired is an always-taker and therefore the probability of always takers in the treatment group is higher than the probability of always takers in the control group. de Chaisemartin and Behaghel (ibid.) show that by dropping the last person hired, you can rebalance the relative weights of always takers in the treatment and control groups. All our analysis in the manuscript drops the last person hired. In Table A15, we replicate our analysis from Table 2 without dropping the last person hired to show our results are robust to their inclusion.

Table A15: Attitudinal Effects of Becoming a Civil Servant Teacher Without Dropping the Last Person Hired as per de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020

			Attitudes Towards...		
	Left-Wing Index	Left-Right Ideology	...Greater Spending	...The Unemployed	...Reduced Inequality
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Civil Servant	-0.192	-0.215	-0.161	0.079	-0.018
	(0.324)	(0.166)	(0.117)	(0.137)	(0.085)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.071	0.64	0.774	0.673	0.895
N	1119	891	1103	1138	1084
N Above	567	448	557	567	554
N Below	552	443	546	571	530
Bandwidth	0.373	0.407	0.377	0.397	0.368

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Fuzzy regression discontinuity using whether the respondent is working as a civil service teacher as the assignment to treatment. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. Replicates the results from Table 2 without dropping the last person hired as recommended in de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020.

Although the point estimates change with their inclusion, our results are statistically and substantively similar to those in Table 2. The result for Attitudes Towards The Unemployed in Column 4 of Table A15 switches signs, but remains not significant.

H ROBUSTNESS TO IMPUTATION OF MISSING DATA IN THE OUTCOME INDICATORS

We have missing data in our survey data. To test if our results are sensitive to this missingness, we impute missing values using the `amelia` function in R and re-run our results from Table 2 over 5 imputed datasets. We present the fuzzy and sharp results in Tables A16 and A17 respectively.

Table A16: Attitudinal Effects of Becoming a Civil Servant Teacher with Multiple Imputation of Missing Values

			Attitudes Towards...		
	Left-Wing Index	Left-Right Ideology	...Greater Spending	...The Unemployed	...Reduced Inequality
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Civil Servant	-0.091	-0.196	-0.115	-0.088	-0.045
	(0.201)	(0.263)	(0.103)	(0.135)	(0.160)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.068	0.617	0.772	0.654	0.879
N	1679.4	1466.2	1600.4	1584.6	1414.4
N Above	770.2	650.4	721	727.8	664.6
N Below	909.2	815.8	879.4	856.8	749.8
Bandwidth	0.445	0.386	0.419	0.415	0.362

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. Replicates Table 2 with multiple imputation of missing values in the dependent variables. The goodness of fit statistics presented in the footer represent the mean statistics for the multiple imputations.

Results are substantively similar between our main results and the results with imputed values, although the results are no longer statistically significant.

Table A17: Attitudinal Effects of Becoming a Civil Servant Teacher with Multiple Imputation of Missing Values. Sharp Regression Discontinuity

			Attitudes Towards...		
	Left-Wing Index	Left-Right Ideology	...Greater Spending	...The Unemployed	...Reduced Inequality
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Civil Servant	-0.015	-0.035	-0.027	-0.043	-0.002
	(0.042)	(0.041)	(0.025)	(0.074)	(0.021)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.068	0.62	0.776	0.659	0.882
N	1413.8	1278.6	1311.6	1370.8	1513.4
N Above	671.4	614.2	631.2	639.4	722.8
N Below	742.4	664.4	680.4	731.4	790.6
Bandwidth	0.359	0.323	0.334	0.359	0.392

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. Replicates Table A8 with multiple imputation of missing values in the dependent variables. The goodness of fit statistics presented in the footer represent the mean statistics for the multiple imputations.

I HETEROGENEOUS EFFECTS BY STATES

We also test for heterogeneous effects by state of concurso. We divide our population of test-takers by the state specific exams they sit and run the same RD as that presented in Table 2. We also subset our data for the three Northeastern states (Alagoas, Maranhão, and Sergipe). We present results of these state-specific heterogeneous effects in Table A18 in which we calculate the optimal bandwidth for each state, and Table A19 in which we fix the bandwidth to the corresponding set of outcomes from Table 2.

Table A18: Heterogeneous Effects by States

			Attitudes Towards...		
	Left-Wing Index (1)	Left-Right Ideology (2)	...Greater Spending (3)	...The Unemployed (4)	...Reduced Inequality (5)
Primary Results (see Table 2)					
Literacy Cutoff	-0.337	-0.377*	-0.162	0.032	0.004
	(0.321)	(0.186)	(0.116)	(0.109)	(0.075)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.076	0.642	0.776	0.676	0.894
N	1047	799	1032	1236	1071
N Above	528	402	521	586	533
N Below	519	397	511	650	538
Bandwidth	0.349	0.37	0.352	0.464	0.372
Federal District Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	-0.559*	-0.326**	-0.206*	-0.115	-0.052
	(0.241)	(0.103)	(0.104)	(0.072)	(0.059)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.117	0.638	0.78	0.682	0.916
N	758	943	717	902	863
N Above	388	423	374	442	419
N Below	370	520	343	460	444
Bandwidth	0.373	0.673	0.353	0.488	0.45
Northeast States Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	5.618	13.804	7.784	1.119	0.578*
	(3.972)	(22.159)	(11.308)	(0.702)	(0.274)
Below Cutoff Mean	-0.009	0.623	0.762	0.654	0.866
N	458	311	327	445	522
N Above	192	129	149	187	215
N Below	266	182	178	258	307
Bandwidth	0.588	0.527	0.383	0.617	0.726
Maranhão Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	8.194	1.126	0.244	0.373	1.840
	(8.079)	(3.360)	(2.471)	(9.604)	(1.438)
Below Cutoff Mean	-0.025	0.605	0.748	0.642	0.844

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Table A18: Heterogeneous Effects by States (Continued)

			Attitudes Towards...		
	Left-Wing Index (1)	Left-Right Ideology (2)	...Greater Spending (3)	...The Unemployed (4)	...Reduced Inequality (5)
N	313	205	269	210	285
N Above	145	89	124	103	131
N Below	168	116	145	107	154
Bandwidth	0.692	0.604	0.597	0.412	0.639
Alagoas Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	1.025	0.355	-0.136	0.888	0.290
	(1.129)	(0.659)	(0.412)	(0.628)	(0.304)
Below Cutoff Mean	-0.127	0.607	0.708	0.602	0.85
N	84	51	71	78	91
N Above	39	23	35	37	42
N Below	45	28	36	41	49
Bandwidth	0.394	0.292	0.302	0.384	0.465
Sergipe Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	0.673	-1.220055e+26	1.667	-2.176	-0.060
	(7.276)	(2.752911e+26)	(14.827)	(3.272)	(0.190)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.105	0.603	0.744	0.7	0.912
N	31	18	21	28	25
N Above	10	5	6	8	8
N Below	21	13	15	20	17
Bandwidth	0.267	0.149	0.152	0.224	0.164

Replicates results from Table 2 for each state individually and the three Northeastern states (Maranhão, Alagoas, and Sergipe).

From Table A18, we see that when we calculate the optimal bandwidth for each state-outcome pair, we find that it is the Federal District of Brasilia driving our results – the point estimates are substantively similar and in the same direction as the primary set of results in Table 2. The results for the three Northeastern states are substantively different to those in Table 2. Together, they point to the different contexts of the exams in each state driving the results we find in the manuscript.

Table A19: Heterogeneous Effects by States with Bandwidth Fixed to Optimal Bandwidth from Population RD

			Attitudes Towards...		
	Left-Wing Index (1)	Left-Right Ideology (2)	...Greater Spending (3)	...The Unemployed (4)	...Reduced Inequality (5)
Primary Results (see Table 2)					
Literacy Cutoff	-0.337	-0.377*	-0.162	0.032	0.004
	(0.321)	(0.186)	(0.116)	(0.109)	(0.075)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.076	0.642	0.776	0.676	0.894
N	1047	799	1032	1236	1071
N Above	528	402	521	586	533
N Below	519	397	511	650	538
Federal District Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	-0.645*	-0.447	-0.159	-0.163	-0.039
	(0.329)	(0.253)	(0.126)	(0.124)	(0.092)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.123	0.649	0.78	0.683	0.916
N	728	550	717	874	745
N Above	380	293	374	424	383
N Below	348	257	343	450	362
Northeast States Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	-24.847	-497.393	-2.304	-11.230	-3.913
	(27.896)	(747.845)	(3.042)	(20.063)	(4.887)
Below Cutoff Mean	-0.019	0.631	0.767	0.662	0.85
N	319	249	315	362	326
N Above	148	109	147	162	150
N Below	171	140	168	200	176
Maranhão Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	-80.581	-0.938	-1.732	-10.277	-55.088
	(61.098)	(2.350)	(3.507)	(8.335)	(46.823)
Below Cutoff Mean	-0.053	0.635	0.763	0.662	0.837
N	201	150	197	228	203
N Above	99	72	97	109	99
N Below	102	78	100	119	104
Alagoas Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	-0.130	6.551	-0.383	0.551	0.124
	(1.495)	(40.604)	(0.522)	(0.699)	(0.480)
Below Cutoff Mean	-0.114	0.578	0.726	0.599	0.845
N	76	63	77	87	82
N Above	37	29	38	40	39
N Below	39	34	39	47	43
Sergipe Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	-7.978	-3.659	0.232	-0.806	-1.238
	(23.847)	(16.060)	(16.131)	(5.503)	(4.550)

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Table A19: Heterogeneous Effects by States with Bandwidth Fixed to Optimal Bandwidth from Population RD (Continued)

			Attitudes Towards...		
	Left-Wing Index (1)	Left-Right Ideology (2)	...Greater Spending (3)	...The Unemployed (4)	...Reduced Inequality (5)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.222	0.685	0.833	0.745	0.908
N	42	36	41	47	41
N Above	12	8	12	13	12
N Below	30	28	29	34	29
Bandwidth	0.349	0.37	0.352	0.464	0.372

Replicates results from Table 2 for each state individually and the three Northeastern states (Maranhão, Alagoas, and Sergipe). The bandwidth is set at the optimal bandwidth derived from the full sample in Table 2

When we fix the bandwidth to the optimal bandwidth calculated for each outcome in Table 2, our results are substantively similar to the results in Table 2, with different results for Alagoas to the other states in the Northeast as well as Brasilia.

Next, we repeat the exercise conducted in Table 3 by subsetting the control group to only include respondents who are not working as teachers, respondents working as teachers in private schools, and respondents working as temporary teachers in public schools. We do this given there might be different labor markets for teachers and teacher candidates across the four states we study, especially as there are likely to be greater private sector options in Brasilia, the wealthiest federal unit in the country. Again, we do not find any substantive differences depending on the state-teacher counterfactual group presented in Tables A20, A21, and A22.

Table A20: Heterogeneous Effects by States Subsetting to Not Teacher Control Group Jobs

			Attitudes Towards...		
	Left-Wing Index (1)	Left-Right Ideology (2)	...Greater Spending (3)	...The Unemployed (4)	...Reduced Inequality (5)
Federal District Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	-0.996	-0.394	-0.626	-1.579	-0.959
	(0.557)	(0.428)	(0.522)	(1.597)	(1.522)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.078	0.593	0.776	0.67	0.936
N	732	467	582	483	463
N Above	423	290	356	298	290
N Below	309	177	226	185	173
Bandwidth	0.542	0.455	0.426	0.326	0.304

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Table A20: Heterogeneous Effects by States Subsetting to Not Teacher Control Group Jobs (Continued)

			Attitudes Towards...		
	Left-Wing Index (1)	Left-Right Ideology (2)	...Greater Spending (3)	...The Unemployed (4)	...Reduced Inequality (5)
Northeast States Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	7.368	2.006	-0.350	1.956	0.771
	(13.495)	(4.369)	(1.173)	(1.970)	(0.600)
Below Cutoff Mean	-0.037	0.633	0.76	0.633	0.865
N	279	225	271	252	347
N Above	140	106	135	125	164
N Below	139	119	136	127	183
Bandwidth	0.387	0.449	0.388	0.347	0.547
Maranhão Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	18.536	1.226	0.048	3.024	0.998
	(91.948)	(2.697)	(0.234)	(3.247)	(0.995)
Below Cutoff Mean	-0.063	0.616	0.74	0.665	0.85
N	183	156	297	186	206
N Above	98	77	143	97	107
N Below	85	79	154	89	99
Bandwidth	0.437	0.551	0.924	0.468	0.521
Alagoas Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	20.679	-1.589	9.324	-33.377	1.672
	(94.284)	(1.591)	(46.595)	(46.664)	(8.634)
Below Cutoff Mean	-0.092	0.598	0.743	0.579	0.856
N	100	80	78	80	97
N Above	47	36	41	40	46
N Below	53	44	37	40	51
Bandwidth	0.567	0.631	0.428	0.475	0.549
Sergipe Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	-6.095	-9.730	2.077	0.793	0.163
	(34.217)	(39.804)	(5.932)	(2.612)	(2.049)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.194	0.718	0.804	0.713	0.917
N	27	36	23	26	26
N Above	8	7	6	8	8
N Below	19	29	17	18	18
Bandwidth	0.287	0.564	0.231	0.279	0.295

Replicates results from Table 2 for each state individually and the three Northeastern states (Maranhão, Alagoas, and Sergipe) with members of the control group only working outside of education.

Table A21: Heterogeneous Effects by States Subsetting to Only Private Sector Control Group Jobs

			Attitudes Towards...		
	Left-Wing Index (1)	Left-Right Ideology (2)	...Greater Spending (3)	...The Unemployed (4)	...Reduced Inequality (5)
Federal District Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	-1.437*	-4.350	-0.109	-0.304	-0.482*
	(0.619)	(2.840)	(0.245)	(0.203)	(0.230)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.149	0.664	0.79	0.674	0.937
N	853	585	837	786	690
N Above	490	362	482	462	422
N Below	363	223	355	324	268
Bandwidth	0.922	0.777	0.926	0.854	0.654
Northeast States Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	11.168	-0.123	-2.692	7425.922	11.534
	(68.463)	(0.789)	(12.475)	(13458.982)	(29.001)
Below Cutoff Mean	-0.091	0.626	0.754	0.635	0.852
N	203	157	264	263	258
N Above	108	79	131	130	131
N Below	95	78	133	133	127
Bandwidth	0.309	0.333	0.504	0.512	0.484
Maranhão Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	0.323	-0.925	-2.293	0.369	1.428
	(1.635)	(2.520)	(1.683)	(4.239)	(3.102)
Below Cutoff Mean	-0.093	0.626	0.722	0.639	0.821
N	123	95	177	158	175
N Above	65	50	95	85	94
N Below	58	45	82	73	81
Bandwidth	0.298	0.314	0.595	0.504	0.574
Alagoas Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	2.469	-0.967**	-0.621	3.472	0.594
	(2.252)	(0.354)	(0.750)	(2.500)	(0.549)
Below Cutoff Mean	-0.108	0.646	0.767	0.558	0.885
N	59	35	47	55	96
N Above	32	19	27	29	44
N Below	27	16	20	26	52
Bandwidth	0.317	0.236	0.227	0.294	0.588
Sergipe Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	-31.715	-0.061	-2.122	-0.751	-0.752
	(426.029)	(2.677)	(3.515)	(2.228)	(2.893)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.24	0.66	0.827	0.716	0.949
N	23	33	33	25	34
N Above	7	6	8	8	8

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Table A21: Heterogeneous Effects by States Subsetting to Only Private Sector Control Group Jobs (Continued)

			Attitudes Towards...		
	Left-Wing Index (1)	Left-Right Ideology (2)	...Greater Spending (3)	...The Unemployed (4)	...Reduced Inequality (5)
N Below	16	27	25	17	26
Bandwidth	0.506	1.157	0.872	0.601	0.876

Replicates results from Table 2 for each state individually and the three Northeastern states (Maranhão, Alagoas, and Sergipe) with members of the control group only working in the private sector.

Table A22: Heterogeneous Effects by States Subsetting to Only Temporary Teacher Control Group Jobs

			Attitudes Towards...		
	Left-Wing Index (1)	Left-Right Ideology (2)	...Greater Spending (3)	...The Unemployed (4)	...Reduced Inequality (5)
Federal District Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	-0.682**	-0.371***	-0.229**	-0.212	-0.059
	(0.228)	(0.095)	(0.078)	(0.137)	(0.060)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.106	0.665	0.77	0.67	0.922
N	653	600	739	602	508
N Above	355	319	394	336	290
N Below	298	281	345	266	218
Bandwidth	0.447	0.59	0.544	0.408	0.316
Northeast States Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	-0.581	3.873	0.143	1.939	0.259
	(6.315)	(4.212)	(1.359)	(6.638)	(2.490)
Below Cutoff Mean	-0.048	0.637	0.77	0.61	0.855
N	187	139	202	222	188
N Above	94	67	104	117	96
N Below	93	72	98	105	92
Bandwidth	0.281	0.272	0.329	0.411	0.294
Maranhão Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	-1.675	27.577	0.251	-1.843	-0.279
	(2.101)	(60.349)	(0.529)	(1.820)	(0.372)
Below Cutoff Mean	-0.017	0.632	0.798	0.617	0.87
N	115	85	119	94	127
N Above	59	42	63	47	68
N Below	56	43	56	47	59
Bandwidth	0.278	0.28	0.301	0.232	0.345
Alagoas Subset					

Continued on next page

Table A22: Heterogeneous Effects by States Subsetting to Only Temporary Teacher Control Group Jobs (Continued)

			Attitudes Towards...		
	Left-Wing Index (1)	Left-Right Ideology (2)	...Greater Spending (3)	...The Unemployed (4)	...Reduced Inequality (5)
Literacy Cutoff	0.525	-0.576	-0.279	0.593*	0.275
	(0.479)	(0.460)	(0.206)	(0.278)	(0.193)
Below Cutoff Mean	-0.096	0.657	0.705	0.565	0.876
N	65	37	49	58	90
N Above	33	19	27	30	43
N Below	32	18	22	28	47
Bandwidth	0.337	0.232	0.225	0.304	0.559
Sergipe Subset					
Literacy Cutoff	-109.940	-0.015	-6308.167	-6.713	-214.279
	(379.823)	(1.559)	(4590.901)	(15.514)	(402.203)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.142	0.647	0.762	0.683	0.917
N	25	23	21	17	21
N Above	7	6	7	7	7
N Below	18	17	14	10	14
Bandwidth	0.877	1.218	0.852	0.637	0.803

Replicates results from Table 2 for each state individually and the three Northeastern states (Maranhão, Alagoas, and Sergipe) with members of the control group only working as temporary teachers.

J SELECTION EFFECTS

Here we provide the full regression tables for the results presented in Figure 5. Column 1 in Tables A23 and A24 are equivalent to the "No controls" models in Figure 5 while Column 2 in both tables are equivalent to the "All Controls and State FEs."

The "Passed Exam" and "Failed Exam" provide results for candidates that passed and failed the exam, "Offered Job" and "Not Offered Job" for those that were offered and not offered jobs as permanent public teachers, while the "Permanent Public Teacher" and "Not Teacher" are for individuals currently working as permanent public teacher and otherwise within the exam candidate pool.

Table A23: Selection Effects on Partisanship Using Demographic Weights

	Left-Right Ideology (0-1)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Exam Candidate	-0.371***	-0.018						
	(0.031)	(0.129)						
Passed Exam			-0.560***	-0.134				
			(0.042)	(0.131)				
Failed Exam			-0.315***	0.080				
			(0.033)	(0.130)				
Offered Job					-0.563***	-0.174		
					(0.044)	(0.133)		
Not Offered Job					-0.323***	0.049		
					(0.033)	(0.129)		
Permanent Public Teacher							-0.505***	-0.172
							(0.038)	(0.131)
Not Teacher							-0.317***	0.034
							(0.033)	(0.129)
Age		0.012***		0.011***		0.011***		0.012***
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Woman		-0.066*		-0.066*		-0.066*		-0.076**
		(0.028)		(0.030)		(0.030)		(0.028)
Primary Education		0.053		0.044		0.042		0.052
		(0.102)		(0.102)		(0.102)		(0.102)
Lower Secondary Education		0.243**		0.226*		0.227*		0.246**
		(0.094)		(0.094)		(0.094)		(0.094)
Upper Secondary Education		0.158*		0.150*		0.149*		0.158*
		(0.075)		(0.075)		(0.075)		(0.074)
Post-Secondary Education		0.278*		0.289*		0.285*		0.251*
		(0.126)		(0.133)		(0.134)		(0.126)
Bachelors		0.040		-0.011		-0.014		0.040
		(0.095)		(0.097)		(0.097)		(0.095)
Masters or Higher		0.003		-0.013		-0.015		0.035
		(0.094)		(0.095)		(0.095)		(0.093)
N	6183	6090	5456	5369	5456	5369	6183	6090

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include exam fixed effects. Support for redistribution measured on a seven point scale with 0 indicating "Strongly disagree" and 1 "Strongly agree," with the statement "The Brazilian state should implement policies to reduce inequality between the rich and the poor." Column 1 presents the top panel and Column 2 presents the bottom panel of Figure 5. Analysis uses demographic weights proportional to population.

Table A24: Selection Effects on Support for Redistribution Using Demographic Weights

	Support for Redistribution (0-1)							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Exam Candidate	0.660***	0.533**						
	(0.039)	(0.163)						
Passed Exam			0.746***	0.614***				
			(0.045)	(0.165)				
Failed Exam			0.636***	0.501**				
			(0.040)	(0.164)				
Offered Job					0.772***	0.619***		
					(0.045)	(0.094)		
Not Offered Job					0.635***	0.490***		
					(0.040)	(0.091)		
Permanent Public Teacher							0.736***	0.589***
							(0.042)	(0.091)
Not Teacher							0.631***	0.486***
							(0.040)	(0.089)
Age		0.001		0.002		0.002		0.001
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Woman		0.023		0.021		0.024		0.029
		(0.027)		(0.030)		(0.029)		(0.026)
Primary Education		0.061		0.092		0.098		0.066
		(0.154)		(0.152)		(0.152)		(0.154)
Lower Secondary Education		0.305*		0.311*		0.345**		0.338**
		(0.126)		(0.126)		(0.126)		(0.126)
Upper Secondary Education		0.349***		0.347***		0.360***		0.361***
		(0.095)		(0.095)		(0.095)		(0.094)
Post-Secondary Education		0.320*		0.316*		0.342*		0.354*
		(0.151)		(0.161)		(0.159)		(0.150)
Bachelors		0.350**		0.354**		0.355**		0.347**
		(0.121)		(0.123)		(0.122)		(0.120)
Masters or Higher		0.402***		0.390**		0.387**		0.383**
		(0.120)		(0.121)		(0.120)		(0.119)
N	7776	7647	6879	6761	6879	6761	7776	7647

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Robust standard errors in parentheses. All models include exam fixed effects. Support for redistribution measured on a seven point scale with 0 indicating "Strongly disagree" and 1 "Strongly agree," with the statement "The Brazilian state should implement policies to reduce inequality between the rich and the poor." Column 1 presents the top panel and Column 2 presents the bottom panel of Figure 5. Analysis uses demographic weights proportional to population.

K RESULTS USING WEIGHTS

While we attempted to survey every job applicant, feasibility and non-response meant that only 10of the population responded to our survey. To mitigate the non-response rate and with a focus on the regression discontinuity design, we oversampled and made a greater effort to survey around the job offer threshold (see Figure 1 and the discussion in that section). As a result of these efforts and the nature of surveying a very specific population, respondents were not randomly sampled and there might be concerns of differential response rates by value of the running variable.

To test whether this differential response rate on the running variable changed results, we reweight our sample by the proportion of respondents that responded at each value of the running variable. We present those results in Table A25.

Table A25: Attitudinal Effects of Becoming a Civil Servant Teacher: Survey Response Weights

			Attitudes Towards...		
	Left-Wing Index	Left-Right Ideology	...Greater Spending	...The Unemployed	...Reduced Inequality
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Civil Servant	0.050	-0.117	-0.039	0.026	0.117
	(0.331)	(0.163)	(0.059)	(0.113)	(0.098)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.076	0.649	0.77	0.674	0.897
N	1056	777	1510	1089	1094
N Above	534	396	666	530	536
N Below	522	381	844	559	558
Bandwidth	0.353	0.353	0.582	0.386	0.378

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights as well as weights by the proportion of respondents at each value of the running variable. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Fuzzy regression discontinuity using whether the respondent is working as a civil service teacher as the assignment to treatment. We drop the last person hired as per de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. Column 1 presents an inverse-covariance weighted index as described in Anderson, 2008 for all variables in Columns 2-5. Column 2 is coded from 0 to 1 where higher values represent greater affinity with the left. Columns 3 through 5 range from 0 to 1 with higher values representing greater support for redistribution, reduced inequality, and weaker beliefs that the unemployed are unemployed because they are lazy.

We also calculate weights based on observables of all exam takers. Here we calculate the inverse probability that each combination of demographic indicators (age, gender, and level of education) responded to our survey and weigh our regression discontinuity using these weights. We present those results in Table A26.

Results are substantively similar to those in Table 2 with the exception of the results on self-

Table A26: Attitudinal Effects of Becoming a Civil Servant Teacher: Respondent Demographic Weights

			Attitudes Towards...		
	Left-Wing Index	Left-Right Ideology	...Greater Spending	...The Unemployed	...Reduced Inequality
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Civil Servant	-0.432	-0.456*	-0.202	0.016	0.000
	(0.313)	(0.180)	(0.117)	(0.133)	(0.075)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.073	0.643	0.774	0.674	0.898
N	1111	840	1079	1142	1303
N Above	547	410	533	561	616
N Below	564	430	546	581	687
Bandwidth	0.379	0.388	0.377	0.417	0.49

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights as well as demographic weights for the population of exam takers. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Fuzzy regression discontinuity using whether the respondent is working as a civil service teacher as the assignment to treatment. We drop the last person hired as per de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. Column 1 presents an inverse-covariance weighted index as described in Anderson, 2008 for all variables in Columns 2-5. Column 2 is coded from 0 to 1 where higher values represent greater affinity with the left. Columns 3 through 5 range from 0 to 1 with higher values representing greater support for redistribution, reduced inequality, and weaker beliefs that the unemployed are unemployed because they are lazy.

reported left-right ideology (Column 2) in Table A25 which loses its significance at conventional significance levels. All other results are substantively similar.

L OECD SURVEY

To provide further nuance on how selection into the civil service operates in the Brazilian context, we rely on a survey fielded in 2025 by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) across six countries in Latin America, including Brazil. The survey was designed to understand citizens' trust in government and service provision. The survey was fielded to 2,000 Brazilian citizens.

We rely on a number of questions from the survey that ask respondents to say how much they trust the regional civil service, national civil service, and police, as well as two indices that seek to understand perceptions of whether public services are of high quality and, conditional on having used a public service recently, whether they are of high quality.

The variables used to compose the two indices in Table 5 are:

L.1 Service High Quality

The survey asked all respondents questions on the perception of the quality of services they received from the Brazilian state. Respondents were asked to rate their belief in the likelihood of the government responding to the questions below and answer from 0 to 10, with 0 equal to "Very unlikely" to 10 equal to "Very likely."

We take the mean value of these questions as our index of belief that services are of high quality.

1. If a public employee was offered money by a citizen or a firm for speeding up access to a public service, how likely do you think it is that they would refuse it?
2. If there was a large-scale emergency, how likely do you think it is that government institutions would be ready to protect peoples lives?
3. If you shared your personal data with a public agency/office/department, how likely do you think it is that it would be used for legitimate purposes only?
4. If you needed information about an administrative service (for example obtaining a passport, registering a birth, applying for benefits, etc.), how likely do you think it is that clear information would be easily available?
5. If a public employee interacted with the public in the area where you live, how likely do you think it is that they would treat all people equally regardless of their income level, gender identity, sexual orientation, ethnicity or country of origin?
6. If you or a member of your household applied for a government benefit or service, how likely do you think it is that your application would be treated fairly?

L.2 Service Satisfaction

Questions on service satisfaction were only asked of respondents that said they had a recent experience with administrative services. For these questions, respondents were asked to rate their satisfaction on services on a scale from 0 to 10 with 0 equal to "Not at all satisfied" and 10 "Completely satisfied."

We take the mean value of these questions as a measure of satisfaction with services.

1. Thinking about the most recent administrative service that you personally made use of, how satisfied were you with each of the following? - Ease of obtaining the service.
2. Thinking about the most recent administrative service that you personally made use of, how satisfied were you with each of the following? - Speed of obtaining the service.
3. Thinking about the most recent administrative service that you personally made use of, how satisfied were you with each of the following? - Courtesy of the employees I interacted with.
4. Thinking about the most recent administrative service that you personally made use of, how satisfied were you with each of the following? - Clarity of the language and information throughout the process.
5. Thinking about the most recent administrative service that you personally made use of, how satisfied were you with each of the following? - Competence of the public employees I interacted with.
6. Thinking about the most recent administrative service that you personally made use of, how satisfied were you with each of the following? - Degree to which the service met my needs.
7. Thinking about the most recent administrative service that you personally made use of, how satisfied were you with each of the following? - Ability to access the service in the way I wanted (online, by phone, by mail or in person).
8. Thinking about the most recent administrative service that you personally made use of, how satisfied were you with each of the following? - Ease of using the digital service (website, app).

M TABLES OF FIGURES IN MANUSCRIPT

Table A27: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Pre- and Post-Exam Job Histories

Years Relative to Concurso Year	Offered Job	SE	Below Cutoff Mean	N	N Below	N Above	Bandwidth
-6	-0.002	(0.025)	0.079	11,268	7,451	3,817	0.561
-5	0.003	(0.031)	0.088	7,092	4,130	2,962	0.360
-4	0.064*	(0.029)	0.106	6,742	3,899	2,843	0.339
-3	0.045	(0.028)	0.106	7,041	4,091	2,950	0.357
-2	0.007	(0.030)	0.136	11,330	7,511	3,819	0.563
-1	0.065*	(0.032)	0.143	9,147	5,768	3,379	0.455
0	0.064*	(0.032)	0.155	9,467	5,987	3,480	0.471
1	0.240***	(0.042)	0.174	5,357	2,974	2,383	0.264
2	0.500***	(0.044)	0.186	4,581	2,397	2,184	0.234
3	0.389***	(0.037)	0.198	7,254	4,273	2,981	0.368
4	0.561***	(0.046)	0.213	6,092	3,444	2,648	0.312
5	0.566***	(0.032)	0.173	10,757	7,039	3,718	0.531

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by running variable in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Sharp regression discontinuity using their score on the teacher entrance exam as the running variable for whether the individual qualified from the exam. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. The p-value of the pooled test of difference for all pre-concurso years is 0.79. These results are presented in Figure 3

Table A28: Balance on Time-Invariant Variables

	Woman	Any Children	Number of Children	Race: Asian	Race: White	Race: Indigenous	Race: Brown	Race: Black	Race Information Provided	Age	Date Surveyed	In-Person Survey
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Civil Servant	-0.352	-0.147	0.268	0.984	-0.259	-0.319	0.214	-0.133	0.379	1.031*	-3.935***	-5.777***
	(0.383)	(0.445)	(0.387)	(0.525)	(0.514)	(0.263)	(0.502)	(0.416)	(0.311)	(0.440)	(1.065)	(1.673)
Mean	0.726	0.535	0.818	0.027	0.279	0.005	0.504	0.151	0.951	33.849	18936.84	0.22
N Below	585	504	571	634	585	476	572	638	567	585	594	598
N Above	614	562	587	629	611	513	590	630	581	615	619	620
Bandwidth	0.352	0.301	0.332	0.379	0.351	0.263	0.335	0.382	0.33	0.354	0.361	0.362

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Fuzzy regression discontinuity using whether the respondent is working as a civil service teacher as the assignment to treatment. We drop the last person hired as per de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. Table version of Figure 4

M.1 Tables of Figures in Appendix

Table A29: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Pre- and Post-Exam Job Histories: Present in RAIS

Years Relative to Concurso Year	Offered Job	SE	Below Cutoff Mean	N	N Below	N Above	Bandwidth
-9	0.152***	(0.039)	0.308	4,010	2,171	1,839	0.227
-8	0.076*	(0.033)	0.331	5,294	3,058	2,236	0.293
-7	0.036	(0.032)	0.357	5,673	3,380	2,293	0.316
-6	-0.004	(0.030)	0.353	6,664	4,098	2,566	0.367
-5	0.026	(0.029)	0.354	6,511	3,962	2,549	0.359
-4	0.037	(0.031)	0.374	6,436	3,907	2,529	0.352
-3	0.009	(0.029)	0.387	7,164	4,545	2,619	0.386
-2	-0.005	(0.029)	0.398	7,670	4,862	2,808	0.420
-1	0.036	(0.031)	0.383	6,466	3,926	2,540	0.356
0	0.045	(0.027)	0.407	8,637	5,674	2,963	0.482
1	0.025	(0.028)	0.446	7,745	5,108	2,637	0.464

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by running variable in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Sharp regression discontinuity using their score on the teacher entrance exam as the running variable for whether the individual qualified from the exam. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. These results are presented in Panel A in Figure A3

Table A30: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Pre- and Post-Exam Job Histories: Present in Censo Escolar

Years Relative to Concurso Year	Offered Job	SE	Below Cutoff Mean	N	N Below	N Above	Bandwidth
-10	0.063	(0.032)	0.129	5,939	3,310	2,629	0.304
-9	0.040	(0.030)	0.181	7,386	4,395	2,991	0.373
-8	0.010	(0.021)	0.210	15,116	10,764	4,352	0.736
-7	-0.027	(0.026)	0.259	10,077	6,502	3,575	0.503
-6	-0.046	(0.025)	0.289	11,680	7,836	3,844	0.576
-5	-0.048	(0.027)	0.320	11,368	7,547	3,821	0.564
-4	-0.041	(0.028)	0.373	10,072	6,498	3,574	0.502
-3	-0.003	(0.028)	0.413	8,318	5,054	3,264	0.421
-2	-0.039	(0.025)	0.441	14,148	9,942	4,206	0.692
-1	-0.044	(0.028)	0.468	11,150	7,345	3,805	0.557
0	-0.049	(0.027)	0.530	10,367	6,773	3,594	0.513
1	-0.019	(0.024)	0.543	12,633	8,620	4,013	0.627
2	0.004	(0.024)	0.514	11,615	7,775	3,840	0.574
3	0.010	(0.028)	0.532	8,879	5,546	3,333	0.446
4	0.009	(0.033)	0.524	5,900	3,273	2,627	0.302
5	0.139***	(0.023)	0.427	11,383	7,560	3,823	0.565

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by running variable in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Sharp regression discontinuity using their score on the teacher entrance exam as the running variable for whether the individual qualified from the exam. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. These results are presented in Panel B in Figure A3

Table A31: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Pre- and Post-Exam Job Histories: Teacher

Years Relative to Concurso Year	Offered Job	SE	Below Cutoff Mean	N	N Below	N Above	Bandwidth
-10	0.066*	(0.033)	0.128	5,763	3,175	2,588	0.293
-9	0.070*	(0.033)	0.176	5,863	3,247	2,616	0.300
-8	0.027	(0.026)	0.205	8,459	5,168	3,291	0.429
-7	-0.041	(0.026)	0.249	10,425	6,819	3,606	0.515
-6	-0.046	(0.025)	0.282	12,159	8,208	3,951	0.597
-5	-0.029	(0.030)	0.319	8,703	5,382	3,321	0.441
-4	-0.025	(0.029)	0.358	9,596	6,071	3,525	0.480
-3	-0.025	(0.028)	0.406	9,299	5,864	3,435	0.466
-2	-0.053*	(0.026)	0.426	12,826	8,794	4,032	0.633
-1	-0.059*	(0.026)	0.451	12,627	8,617	4,010	0.626
0	-0.035	(0.027)	0.516	10,501	6,878	3,623	0.518
1	-0.017	(0.024)	0.534	12,434	8,437	3,997	0.616
2	0.014	(0.022)	0.502	14,818	10,548	4,270	0.716
3	0.041	(0.026)	0.517	10,766	7,045	3,721	0.532
4	0.026	(0.032)	0.511	6,331	3,640	2,691	0.321
5	0.147***	(0.024)	0.420	11,147	7,342	3,805	0.557

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by running variable in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Sharp regression discontinuity using their score on the teacher entrance exam as the running variable for whether the individual qualified from the exam. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. These results are presented in Panel C in Figure A3

Table A32: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Pre- and Post-Exam Job Histories: Private School

Years Relative to Concurso Year	Offered Job	SE	Below Cutoff Mean	N	N Below	N Above	Bandwidth
-10	0.050	(0.035)	0.057	6,543	3,787	2,756	0.331
-9	0.011	(0.027)	0.075	10,686	7,006	3,680	0.524
-8	-0.026	(0.025)	0.085	12,074	8,154	3,920	0.591
-7	0.014	(0.026)	0.091	9,971	6,400	3,571	0.500
-6	-0.029	(0.026)	0.097	11,036	7,243	3,793	0.547
-5	-0.015	(0.026)	0.106	11,182	7,376	3,806	0.559
-4	-0.061*	(0.027)	0.112	11,319	7,500	3,819	0.562
-3	0.024	(0.031)	0.122	8,225	5,001	3,224	0.409
-2	-0.020	(0.030)	0.130	9,576	6,058	3,518	0.479
-1	-0.060*	(0.027)	0.127	11,526	7,695	3,831	0.569
0	-0.006	(0.025)	0.124	12,557	8,550	4,007	0.622
1	-0.019	(0.026)	0.122	12,171	8,218	3,953	0.598
2	-0.051	(0.028)	0.111	10,249	6,661	3,588	0.510
3	-0.077**	(0.029)	0.105	10,284	6,695	3,589	0.510
4	-0.057*	(0.028)	0.094	10,934	7,168	3,766	0.540
5	-0.031	(0.023)	0.076	10,425	6,819	3,606	0.515

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by running variable in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Sharp regression discontinuity using their score on the teacher entrance exam as the running variable for whether the individual qualified from the exam. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. These results are presented in Panel D in Figure A3

Table A33: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Pre- and Post-Exam Job Histories: Public School

Years Relative to Concurso Year	Offered Job	SE	Below Cutoff Mean	N	N Below	N Above	Bandwidth
-10	0.020	(0.029)	0.077	6,868	3,975	2,893	0.347
-9	0.014	(0.028)	0.113	7,998	4,893	3,105	0.392
-8	0.033	(0.027)	0.136	8,419	5,135	3,284	0.426
-7	-0.047	(0.027)	0.186	9,220	5,819	3,401	0.460
-6	-0.026	(0.025)	0.208	11,880	8,010	3,870	0.584
-5	-0.049	(0.029)	0.236	9,683	6,143	3,540	0.485
-4	-0.020	(0.029)	0.278	9,619	6,089	3,530	0.482
-3	-0.006	(0.027)	0.312	10,291	6,702	3,589	0.511
-2	0.003	(0.031)	0.345	10,298	6,709	3,589	0.512
-1	-0.002	(0.030)	0.365	10,674	6,997	3,677	0.523
0	-0.052	(0.030)	0.435	9,701	6,156	3,545	0.487
1	0.027	(0.026)	0.443	13,633	9,490	4,143	0.660
2	0.057	(0.029)	0.436	9,575	6,057	3,518	0.479
3	0.072*	(0.032)	0.453	9,084	5,717	3,367	0.453
4	0.071	(0.036)	0.461	5,900	3,273	2,627	0.302
5	0.174***	(0.024)	0.363	12,343	8,358	3,985	0.607

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by running variable in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Sharp regression discontinuity using their score on the teacher entrance exam as the running variable for whether the individual qualified from the exam. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. These results are presented in Panel E in Figure A3

Table A34: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Pre- and Post-Exam Job Histories: Private School Teacher

Years Relative to Concurso Year	Offered Job	SE	Below Cutoff Mean	N	N Below	N Above	Bandwidth
-10	0.072	(0.038)	0.058	5,995	3,357	2,638	0.307
-9	0.063*	(0.032)	0.076	7,633	4,613	3,020	0.380
-8	-0.037	(0.024)	0.083	13,743	9,570	4,173	0.671
-7	-0.002	(0.025)	0.086	12,022	8,114	3,908	0.589
-6	-0.027	(0.027)	0.093	10,743	7,034	3,709	0.530
-5	0.015	(0.027)	0.100	11,591	7,758	3,833	0.571
-4	-0.060*	(0.028)	0.106	11,526	7,695	3,831	0.569
-3	-0.029	(0.027)	0.115	12,337	8,355	3,982	0.606
-2	-0.052	(0.029)	0.122	10,910	7,149	3,761	0.538
-1	-0.078**	(0.027)	0.122	11,179	7,373	3,806	0.559
0	-0.014	(0.026)	0.121	12,565	8,557	4,008	0.623
1	-0.028	(0.026)	0.119	12,202	8,238	3,964	0.600
2	-0.056*	(0.028)	0.109	10,236	6,653	3,583	0.508
3	-0.080**	(0.029)	0.103	10,154	6,574	3,580	0.506
4	-0.063*	(0.028)	0.093	10,771	7,050	3,721	0.532
5	-0.033	(0.023)	0.076	10,236	6,653	3,583	0.508

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by running variable in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Sharp regression discontinuity using their score on the teacher entrance exam as the running variable for whether the individual qualified from the exam. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. These results are presented in Panel F in Figure A3

Table A35: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Pre- and Post-Exam Job Histories: Public School Teacher

Years Relative to Concurso Year	Offered Job	SE	Below Cutoff Mean	N	N Below	N Above	Bandwidth
-10	0.002	(0.028)	0.077	7,635	4,615	3,020	0.380
-9	0.016	(0.029)	0.111	7,684	4,655	3,029	0.382
-8	0.030	(0.029)	0.132	8,078	4,936	3,142	0.397
-7	-0.061*	(0.028)	0.182	8,697	5,377	3,320	0.439
-6	-0.037	(0.022)	0.199	15,881	11,472	4,409	0.765
-5	-0.066*	(0.031)	0.232	8,808	5,479	3,329	0.444
-4	-0.010	(0.029)	0.267	9,853	6,290	3,563	0.494
-3	-0.021	(0.026)	0.301	12,431	8,434	3,997	0.616
-2	0.004	(0.031)	0.331	10,388	6,789	3,599	0.515
-1	-0.002	(0.029)	0.352	11,040	7,247	3,793	0.548
0	-0.034	(0.030)	0.423	10,152	6,572	3,580	0.506
1	0.029	(0.024)	0.423	16,551	12,071	4,480	0.790
2	0.072*	(0.028)	0.423	11,039	7,246	3,793	0.547
3	0.094**	(0.031)	0.440	9,549	6,042	3,507	0.476
4	0.091*	(0.036)	0.455	6,210	3,547	2,663	0.317
5	0.187***	(0.024)	0.356	12,676	8,660	4,016	0.628

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by running variable in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Sharp regression discontinuity using their score on the teacher entrance exam as the running variable for whether the individual qualified from the exam. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. These results are presented in Panel G in Figure A3

Table A36: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Pre- and Post-Exam Job Histories: In Censo Escolar, Not Teacher

Years Relative to Concurso Year	Offered Job	SE	Below Cutoff Mean	N	N Below	N Above	Bandwidth
-10	0.076	(0.067)	0.022	1,045	673	372	0.426
-9	-0.354***	(0.074)	0.025	914	516	398	0.260
-8	-0.096	(0.077)	0.024	885	456	429	0.223
-7	0.141***	(0.033)	0.024	1,723	1,019	704	0.338
-6	0.017	(0.043)	0.031	3,060	2,036	1,024	0.530
-5	-0.178***	(0.052)	0.041	1,584	884	700	0.252
-4	-0.057	(0.029)	0.040	2,516	1,472	1,044	0.343
-3	0.116***	(0.024)	0.029	3,895	2,500	1,395	0.474
-2	0.097***	(0.025)	0.037	4,889	3,168	1,721	0.536
-1	0.046	(0.030)	0.035	4,716	3,005	1,711	0.495
0	-0.049	(0.026)	0.025	6,810	4,539	2,271	0.628
1	-0.012	(0.019)	0.017	4,093	2,314	1,779	0.362
2	-0.033	(0.022)	0.013	3,864	2,145	1,719	0.355
3	-0.093**	(0.035)	0.014	3,350	1,797	1,553	0.307
4	-0.090**	(0.033)	0.012	4,513	2,584	1,929	0.409
5	-0.033	(0.022)	0.014	3,881	2,217	1,664	0.427

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by running variable in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Sharp regression discontinuity using their score on the teacher entrance exam as the running variable for whether the individual qualified from the exam. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. These results are presented in Panel I in Figure A3

Table A37: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Pre- and Post-Exam Job Histories: Concursado

Years Relative to Concurso Year	Offered Job	SE	Below Cutoff Mean	N	N Below	N Above	Bandwidth
-8	0.062***	(0.008)	0.001	8,316	5,053	3,263	0.420
-7	0.011	(0.033)	0.006	8,244	5,014	3,230	0.412
-6	-0.003	(0.025)	0.080	11,215	7,406	3,809	0.560
-5	0.003	(0.031)	0.088	7,092	4,130	2,962	0.360
-4	0.064*	(0.029)	0.106	6,742	3,899	2,843	0.339
-3	0.045	(0.028)	0.106	7,041	4,091	2,950	0.357
-2	0.007	(0.030)	0.136	11,331	7,512	3,819	0.563
-1	0.065*	(0.032)	0.143	9,146	5,767	3,379	0.455
0	0.060	(0.032)	0.155	9,531	6,026	3,505	0.475
1	0.234***	(0.041)	0.176	5,470	3,033	2,437	0.269
2	0.500***	(0.044)	0.186	4,581	2,397	2,184	0.234
3	0.389***	(0.037)	0.198	7,255	4,274	2,981	0.368
4	0.559***	(0.046)	0.213	6,050	3,406	2,644	0.311
5	0.565***	(0.033)	0.174	10,690	7,008	3,682	0.525

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by running variable in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Sharp regression discontinuity using their score on the teacher entrance exam as the running variable for whether the individual qualified from the exam. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. These results are presented in Panel J in Figure A3

Table A38: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Pre- and Post-Exam Job Histories: Number of Formal Jobs

Years Relative to Concurso Year	Offered Job	SE	Below Cutoff Mean	N	N Below	N Above	Bandwidth
-9	0.229***	(0.044)	0.534	3,647	1,989	1,658	0.202
-8	0.125**	(0.039)	0.563	4,922	2,863	2,059	0.264
-7	0.084*	(0.037)	0.601	5,282	3,049	2,233	0.293
-6	0.078*	(0.035)	0.605	5,555	3,274	2,281	0.311
-5	0.135**	(0.041)	0.611	4,494	2,567	1,927	0.248
-4	0.116**	(0.041)	0.653	5,099	2,949	2,150	0.274
-3	0.063	(0.041)	0.622	6,347	3,846	2,501	0.350
-2	0.009	(0.036)	0.656	7,452	4,741	2,711	0.395
-1	0.056	(0.038)	0.638	5,613	3,324	2,289	0.313
0	0.086*	(0.036)	0.652	6,020	3,633	2,387	0.339
1	0.056	(0.034)	0.736	8,505	5,743	2,762	0.505

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by running variable in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Sharp regression discontinuity using their score on the teacher entrance exam as the running variable for whether the individual qualified from the exam. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. These results are presented in Panel K in Figure A3

Table A39: Regression Discontinuity Estimates for Pre- and Post-Exam Job Histories: Income (R$)

Years Relative to Concurso Year	Offered Job	SE	Below Cutoff Mean	N	N Below	N Above	Bandwidth
-9	0.114*	(0.054)	2271.167	2,483	1,663	820	0.435
-8	0.063	(0.054)	2698.316	2,060	1,298	762	0.359
-7	0.061	(0.042)	3159.021	2,566	1,713	853	0.396
-6	0.215***	(0.053)	3368.032	2,110	1,336	774	0.343
-5	0.231***	(0.068)	4003.205	1,440	826	614	0.235
-4	0.097	(0.107)	4620.577	1,933	1,152	781	0.292
-3	0.082	(0.054)	4638.305	2,595	1,680	915	0.379
-2	0.106*	(0.050)	5322.130	2,335	1,460	875	0.336
-1	-0.008	(0.043)	5507.673	3,380	2,304	1,076	0.474
0	0.085	(0.054)	6280.076	1,640	934	706	0.238
1	0.067	(0.052)	6309.711	3,552	2,383	1,169	0.461

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by running variable in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Sharp regression discontinuity using their score on the teacher entrance exam as the running variable for whether the individual qualified from the exam. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. These results are presented in Panel L in Figure A3

N DEVIATIONS FROM PRE-ANALYSIS PLAN

The analysis in this paper was pre-registered at [Anonymized for review] and the full [de-identified] pre-analysis is attached as a supplementary appendix.

In this paper, we have made two deviations from the pre-analysis plan. First, we have changed how we cluster standard errors given recent advances in regression discontinuity methodology (see Kolesár and Rothe (2018) and Armstrong and Kolesár (2020)). We stated in our pre-analysis plan that we would cluster standard errors by the value of the running variable. Simulations suggest that this strategy results in poor coverage of errors and leads to overly generous confidence intervals, leading to a greater likelihood of false positives. We now cluster standard errors by the exam, assuming that outcomes are likely clustered within specific exams respondents sit.

Table A40: Comparison of Results in Paper and as Pre-Registered

			Attitudes Towards...		
	Left-Wing Index	Left-Right Ideology	...Greater Spending	...The Unemployed	...Reduced Inequality
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Panel A: Cluster at Exam-Level (Deviation from Pre-Analysis Plan)					
Civil Servant	-0.337	-0.377*	-0.162	0.032	0.004
	(0.321)	(0.186)	(0.116)	(0.109)	(0.075)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.076	0.642	0.776	0.676	0.894
N	1047	799	1032	1236	1071
N Above	528	402	521	586	533
N Below	519	397	511	650	538
Bandwidth	0.349	0.37	0.352	0.464	0.372
Panel B: Cluster at Running Variable-Level (As in Pre-Analysis Plan)					
Civil Servant	-0.331	-0.383*	-0.168	0.022	0.003
	(0.325)	(0.184)	(0.112)	(0.121)	(0.082)
Below Cutoff Mean	0.071	0.643	0.774	0.675	0.899
N	1098	840	1079	1266	1108
N Above	544	410	533	602	538
N Below	554	430	546	664	570
Bandwidth	0.374	0.388	0.377	0.479	0.386

Notes: * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$. Standard errors clustered by exam in parentheses. All specifications use triangular kernel weights. The cutoff is centered around the lowest score on the exam offered a job. Fuzzy regression discontinuity using whether the respondent is working as a civil service teacher as the assignment to treatment. We drop the last person hired as per de Chaisemartin and Behaghel, 2020. The Below Cutoff Mean is the mean value for respondents below the exam score cutoff and within the regression discontinuity design optimal bandwidth. The sharp regression discontinuity of these results are presented in Table A8. Column 1 presents an inverse-covariance weighted index as described in Anderson, 2008 for all variables in Columns 2-5. Column 2 is coded from 0 to 1 where higher values represent greater affinity with the left. Columns 3 through 5 range from 0 to 1 with higher values representing greater support for redistribution, reduced inequality, and weaker beliefs that the unemployed are unemployed because they are lazy.

We present results for the main regression discontinuity results in the manuscript in Panel A of Table A40, whereas Panel B shows the results clustering as discussed in our pre-analysis plan. There are a couple of results to note. First, all results are substantively equivalent, with no results changing signs or statistical significance. Second, point estimates and standard errors are nearly identical between the two clustering choices, but the bandwidths used to construct estimates are narrower in our preferred specifications clustering at the exam level.

We also only present results from *one* of our pre-registered hypotheses in this paper. We do so as we believe the entirety of the pre-analysis plan would be too large a paper for one submission and are dividing the analysis and results from the paper into several manuscripts.

O ADHERENCE TO THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION'S PRINCIPLES AND GUIDANCE FOR HUMAN SUBJECT RESEARCH

In this section we discuss how we adhered to the American Political Science Association's Principles and Guidance for Human Subject Research. Given our engagement with human subjects through a third party (Cebraspe), it was important that we separated our role as researchers from Cebraspe's role as evaluators and any potential belief of an offer of employment or financial benefit. Respondents had already previously consented to be eligible to be entered in a research study through Cebraspe. Candidates authorized their application details, including their *Cadastro de Pessoas Físicas* (CPF) – similar to a Social Security Number in the United States, to be used for (unspecified) research purposes at the moment in which they enrolled to participate in the *concurso*.

While we relied on this prior consent to make initial contact with respondents, we sought additional specific and explicit consent for our study's data collection. The survey was first sent to the study population via email. In the body of the email, respondents were presented with a brief description of the research study, that their participation was voluntary, a link to take the survey, and an opt-out link to opt-out from all future communication from the research team and contact with Cebraspe for the purposes of this study. Cebraspe could still be in touch with members of the study population that opted-out of our study for any matters concerning their exams.

If the participant clicked on the link from the survey, they would be taken to a consent form. The consent form is presented in full in Portuguese with redactions for anonymity in the attached pre-analysis plan. At the end of the consent form, participants were asked to consent to the survey and only then could they begin the survey.

If the participants took the survey over the phone or in-person, the surveyor would read the participants the full consent form and ask for their verbal consent before proceeding with the survey.

Given the high levels of education of our study population, the publicity around Brazil's data protection and privacy law modeled on the European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), and how common public opinion and other academic surveys are in Brazil, we believe it is unlikely that respondents would not understand the consent process and the voluntary nature of participation.

If a respondent clicked on the email opt-out link at any point, even after completing the survey, their data was removed from the survey.

O.1 Deception

In a separate part of the survey, not included as part of this paper, we presented respondents with false statements from public figures. These statements were provided near the end of the survey and at the end of survey, respondents were debriefed that all the statements were false.

O.2 Harm and Impact

The collection and analysis of the data is foreseen to generate no or minimal risk of harm. There is no physical risk to respondents and the psychological risks are extremely small as the questions focus on broad political attitudes and opinions on widespread education policies that are not particularly sensitive. Even a breach of confidentiality would be very unlikely to generate any risk of backlash or negative social consequences.

The study has no capacity to impact ongoing political processes as it studies historical employment decisions and the study has no capacity to alter who is employed or how they behave or are treated.

O.3 Confidentiality

Respondents were promised their data will be kept confidential. Survey response data is securely stored on password-protected devices accessible only to the Principal Investigators. Data are fully de-identified in the replication data to be shared publicly.

In order to maintain confidentiality while matching the survey data with the pre-existing data on candidates' applications held by Cebraspe we used the following procedure: All candidates were assigned an arbitrary identifier by Cebraspe employees, and this identifier was used to track survey responses in data visible to the Principal Investigators. At no time did the members of the research team have access to the names, the contact information, or the CPFs applicants had previously supplied to Cebraspe. The merging of the datasets was conducted by Cebraspe and only a de-identified dataset shared with the researchers. All survey outreach by email, SMS, telephone or in-person was also conducted exclusively by Cebraspe.

The data were also merged with administrative datasets held by the government (RAIS and Censo Escolar). The merging was conducted in the secure room of INEP which provides robust data security and ensures no identifiable information can be removed from the secure room. To conduct the merging, employees at Cebraspe sent INEP the list of exam takers with their CPFs and the matched arbitrary identifiers. INEP then matched the CPFs with their identified databases, stripped the data of CPFs, and provided the research team with a database that contained the arbitrary identifiers to be able to match to the collected survey data.