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DO FACULTY AFFECT STUDENT PARTISANSHIP?*

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Abstract

We study whether Democratic college professors make their students more liberal. We link voter data to salary records from 33 state flagships and show that faculty skew Democratic, especially in the humanities and social sciences. We then use student transcripts from one flagship to estimate causal effects. Students become more liberal during college regardless of major and sort toward ideologically similar instructors. Exploiting plausibly random variation in when instructors teach courses, we find no effect of faculty partisanship on student partisanship. Text analysis shows exposure to liberal topics reflects student demand rather than instructor supply, leaving little room for indoctrination.

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Political liberals are overrepresented on many college campuses: twice as many college students, and four times as many college professors, identify in surveys as liberal than conservative (Stevens 2023; Strauss 2016). Based on this imbalance, some conservatives argue that professors “brainwash” students into holding liberal beliefs (Bouie 2024; Shapiro 2010). These indoctrination claims, which frequently focus on the social science and humanities disciplines and subjects including critical race and queer theory, have meaningful policy consequences. Conservative state legislatures in Florida and Ohio have placed legal restrictions on instruction topics at public universities (Moody 2025; Ohio General Assembly 2025), while employees at Texas public universities have lost their jobs based on concerns about campus liberal biases (Patel 2025).

However, these claims may conflate correlation with causation. Individuals who go to college are already more liberal than the country as a whole and students are more likely to prefer a college where peers share their political beliefs (Acton, Cook, and Ugalde Araya 2025). Moreover, even within a university, there can be selection into different disciplines: if politically liberal students and faculty are both drawn to the same field of study, then we would observe departments with more liberal students having more liberal professors, even though professors do not affect their students’ beliefs at all.

In this paper, we investigate whether liberal college faculty affect their students’ partisan preferences. We first link public voter registration records with salary data from 33 public flagship universities to document differences in faculty partisanship across schools and fields, where we measure partisanship using party registration status and participation in partisan primary elections. At the average school, 41 percent of faculty are Democrats compared to only 12 percent who are Republicans, with 18 percent non-partisan and 29 percent not registered.¹ The Democratic share ranges from just over 20 percent to 57 percent across public flagships and from 35 to 63 percent across fields. Schools in more conservative states have fewer Democratic and more Republican faculty, while departments in STEM fields typically have fewer Democrats compared to departments in the social sciences and humanities.

We then link course-taking records for students from one large state flagship university to a large-scale panel survey with self-reported political ideologies, and to voter registration records from before and after college. We use these longitudinal records to study how political identities change during college and whether faculty play a role. The flagship we study is quite selective,

¹ This registration rate is comparable to other studies (Langbert, Quain, and Klein 2016; Chin et al. 2025), and is due to a combination of non-registered US citizens and international faculty working at these institutions.

with average student SAT scores at the national 94th percentile and a share of liberal students and faculty above that of the typical school (Acton, Cook, and Ugalde Araya 2025). This school is a useful setting for studying faculty effects since concerns about liberal bias on college campuses typically focus on elite academic institutions (Bouie 2024).

Sixty-one percent of sampled students identify as liberal early in college, compared to 19 percent who identify as moderate and 20 percent who identify as conservative. The share of liberal students increases to 69 percent during college, while the share of self-identified moderates and conservatives decreases. These leftward shifts are present in every graduating major and demographic group, and are similar to secular trends among college students nationwide (Goldstein and Kolerman 2025).

By linking students to their instructors using course transcripts, we document a striking degree of ideological sorting across fields of study. Students who enter college as liberals take more courses taught by Democratic instructors, and vice versa for conservative students.² Sorting is minimal in introductory courses but grows considerably as students begin taking elective courses. In addition, students sort dynamically during college: those who become more liberal begin to take relatively more classes with Democrats, *after* their political ideology changes.

We then test for evidence of a causal effect of left-leaning faculty on student beliefs. To account for student sorting, we exploit the fact that different faculty teach sections of the same course. This allows us to compare students who enrolled in the same class when it was taught by instructors with different partisanship. We argue that students are unlikely to select when to take a given class based on the professor’s political beliefs, particularly for lower-level courses that serve as major pre-requisites, and show evidence that this is the case. To account for potential non-linearities, we also estimate the effects of cumulative exposure to Democratic faculty during college, using an approach similar to that in Borusyak and Hull (2023) to account for sorting into classes. While our research design does not let us study the global effects of attending colleges or enrolling in majors with more liberal professors, these estimates represent a salient object of interest in contemporary higher education policy debates, particularly those surrounding syllabus restrictions and academic freedom (Patel 2025).

We do not observe a causal relationship between instructor partisanship and student partisanship at the end of college. Our point estimates imply a one standard-deviation increase in exposure to Democratic instructors (3.2 more courses) decreases a student’s likelihood of being

² This sorting could in part come from intergenerational persistence, since all PhD faculty were at one point college students themselves.

a Democrat by 0.4 percentage points and increases the likelihood of being a Republican by 0.2 percentage points. Although our estimates are not statistically distinguishable from zero, they are tightly estimated. In particular, with 95 percent confidence, we can rule out a “liberalizing” effect of more than 0.46 percentage points. This upper bound is equivalent to fewer than 200 additional Democratic affiliations in total, or about 22 students per entering cohort. Estimates are small and statistically insignificant regardless of students’ baseline ideology.

These average treatment effects mask a small degree of heterogeneity across fields of study: when we restrict to just courses in the humanities and social sciences, we find that exposure to Democratic instructors increases the likelihood of being a *Republican* by approximately 0.6 percentage points, primarily among students who enter college as conservatives. This suggests that, if anything, Democratic faculty in some fields may engender backlash to liberal political views. However, these estimates can explain less than 10 percent of student partisan transitions during college and are sensitive to alternative sample restrictions.

Examining plausible mechanisms, we argue that these small, overall null effects are the result of two factors, one on the student side and one on the faculty side. First, the prior literature suggests that peers and campus environments are a primary setting for students’ ideological formation (Firoozi 2025; Strother et al. 2021; Mendelberg, McCabe, and Thal 2017; Hanson et al. 2012; Algan et al. 2025). Using other modules in our student survey, we document that students spend more time with peers than they do in lectures, and are also more likely to discuss politically controversial topics in social settings rather than in class.³ In contrast to the null effects of faculty, we estimate a small positive effect of liberal classroom peers on the likelihood of being a Democrat and a small negative effect on the likelihood of being a Republican, consistent with this literature.

Second, we show that exposure to liberal course topics is due to student demand rather than instructor supply. We collect course descriptions and assigned textbooks for course sections at our focal public flagship and measure the frequency of topics including DEI (diversity, equity, and inclusion) and LGBTQ+ issues. Exposure to these topics is rare: the average student takes fewer than two courses with any liberal topics referenced in their course descriptions while in college. Moreover, exposure is driven by student preferences, as liberal students take more courses that discuss liberal topics. Compared to other instructors teaching the same courses, Democratic faculty do not include more liberal topics in course descriptions or assign textbooks on these topics

³ We are not the first to document that college students’ engagement with coursework is often limited (Arum and Roksa 2011).

at higher rates. While liberal instructors may discuss the same classroom topics differently in ways we cannot measure, this suggests that sorting driven by partisan preferences may leave little scope for coursework to be the cause of college students’ liberalization. In contrast, as more liberal students enroll in a department’s courses, the frequency of liberal topics increases, suggesting the direction of influence may run from students to curriculum, not the reverse.

For more than a century, American academics have faced accusations that they encourage students to support liberal causes, including during the Bolshevik Revolution and the McCarthy era (Schrecker 1986; Shepherd 2023). We are, to our knowledge, the first paper to causally estimate whether they do so. Studies from Europe find that additional schooling makes students more liberal on social issues (Apfeld et al. 2024; Cavaille and Marshall 2019), while studies from the US are mixed, with some finding that additional schooling makes students more likely to vote Democratic (Firoozi 2025) and others finding that additional schooling increases voting without polarizing students (Kaplan, Spenkuch, and Tuttle 2025). A separate literature finds that, among college students, those who attend more-selective schools become more liberal, with exposure to more-liberal peers driving much of these effects (Strother et al. 2021; Firoozi 2025; Mendelberg, McCabe, and Thal 2017; Hanson et al. 2012; Algan et al. 2025). We use granular data from student transcripts and regression models that isolate plausibly random exposure to Democratic faculty to show that instructors do not contribute to this shift, and provide new evidence supporting the role of peer effects.

We also provide novel evidence on a key channel through which faculty could affect student partisanship: course content. We find that Democratic instructors teach about liberal topics at similar rates to other instructors teaching the same subjects and do not affect the overall presence of these topics in department course offerings. However, the frequency of liberal course content increases with liberal student enrollment, suggesting classroom topics respond to student demand. This complements a growing body of work that draws on syllabi and course catalogs with text as data approaches to study course content (for example, Biasi and Ma 2025; Paulson, Stange, and Flaster 2024; Javadian Sabet et al. 2024; Light, Moore, and Thau 2025). While Biasi and Ma (2025) find that within-course heterogeneity in exposure to content on the academic frontier affects student academic achievement, we show that this form of heterogeneity does not necessarily affect other dimensions of students’ development. Our work also contributes to the literature on the relationship between curriculum and political ideology. Nationalistic campaigns targeted at younger students

can affect their long-run political views (Chen, Lin, and Yang 2023; Cantoni et al. 2017).⁴ Similarly, exposure to large curricular differences between STEM and the humanities/social sciences during high school changes political views (Ainsworth et al. 2025). In contrast, we find little evidence that postsecondary coursework generates similar effects, as student sorting based on pre-existing political ideology drives exposure to liberal content.

Lastly, we contribute to a growing literature documenting the ideologies of instructors at selective academic institutions. We strike a middle ground between two literatures, one that uses big-data tools to document partisanship across many American workplaces (Kagan, Frake, and Hurst 2025; Chinoy and Koenen 2024) and another that studies the partisanship of university faculty in particular (Klein and Stern 2005; Mariani and Hewitt 2008; Chin et al. 2025). Our use of salary data allows us to study heterogeneity in political beliefs within institutions, such as across departments or by seniority. Unlike previous work that focuses on partisanship within a single field, such as law or economics (Bonica et al. 2024; Jelveh, Kogut, and Naidu 2024), or on a small number of universities (Cardiff and Klein 2005), we document faculty political affiliations for the majority of American state flagships, contributing to our understanding of partisan sorting in the labor market.

I Data

I.A Identifying Faculty Partisanship

We document the overall partisanship of faculty at flagship universities by linking publicly-available salary data from state flagship universities to voter records. We focus on flagships for multiple reasons. First, flagships are typically the most important public universities in their state, with large research and administrative budgets and meaningful earnings premia for graduates (Hoekstra 2009). Flagships have also faced increased political scrutiny in recent years. State governments in Florida, Ohio, and Texas have overhauled the leadership and curriculum norms at their state flagships out of concern that these institutions are overly favorable towards liberal ideas (Ohio General Assembly 2025; Patel 2025; Atterbury 2025; The Economist 2026).⁵

Our salary data primarily come from the non-profit American Transparency, published on their

⁴ Some have argued that the expansion of mass education was in part motivated by attempts to change beliefs and exert social control (Paglayan 2024).

⁵ Among elite academic institutions, state flagships are also comparatively easy to study, since employee salaries are public information.

website Open the Books (OTB; American Transparency 2025).⁶ The organization collected these data for public employees in every state via Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests. We identify faculty at flagship schools based on position titles and the specific employer listed (e.g., Assistant Professor, University of Michigan-Ann Arbor). We include professors, lecturers, and other instructors of record in our definition of faculty, since our focus is on classroom instruction rather than purely research. We supplement these records with hand-collected salary data for an additional 13 states where position titles were not included in the OTB files.

We identify partisanship by matching faculty to voter registration and voter history files from the commercial data provider L2. The company compiles near-universal voter registration records each year; we use records spanning 2017-2023. The data also include the voter’s date of registration, participation in presidential or congressional primary or general elections, and model-estimated demographic characteristics such as education.

Overall, we were able to identify faculty in salary records from 39 states. However, we omit six states (Hawai’i, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Vermont, Wisconsin) because our voter data lack any information on individual partisanship. This leaves us with 33 states which we include in our analysis. In 24 of these states, individuals register to vote with a political party, which we use to measure their partisanship. In the remaining nine states, we measure partisanship based on recent participation in primary elections. These two methods give similar rates of party identification: we assign 75 percent of registered voters to a political party using registrations, compared to 79 percent when using primary elections. Figure I presents our sample, and Appendix Table A.1 provides more details on the data for each state.

By using primary participation to measure partisanship, we assume that voters participate in their political primary corresponding to their preferred party. “Crossover voting” has become less common in recent years as American politics has become more polarized (Johnson 2023; Alvarez and Nagler 1997). It is also relatively rare in our sample: for example, less than one percent of faculty at the school we use for student-level analyses voted in both a Democratic and Republican primary during the period from 2016-2022.

We match faculty to voter records based on their name and county of residence. We describe our algorithm and validation in detail in Appendix B.1. In short, we match each faculty member to all registered voters in the state who share the same first and last name, prioritizing matches in the same county as the university or nearby counties, who share the same middle initial, and

⁶ See openthebooks.com.

who have a higher estimated education level from L2. We identify 74 percent of faculty, and 72 percent of faculty-year pairs, in voter records (see Appendix Table A.1 for state-level match rates). This match rate is similar to other studies of faculty voter registration (Langbert, Quain, and Klein 2016; Chin et al. 2025). Note that there is no reason it should be 100 percent; for example, the 2020 November Current Population Survey voter registration supplement indicates that 85 percent of Americans with advanced degrees are registered to vote (U.S. Census Bureau 2021).

We also use the same algorithm to match individuals to information on political donations. We link faculty to the Database on Ideology, Money, and Elections (DIME; Bonica 2023, 2014), which includes both individual donation histories as well as a “campaign finance score” (CFscore) summarizing the partisan lean of each donation portfolio.⁷ These scores are standardized to have mean zero, standard deviation one, with negative scores indicating a liberal donation history and positive scores indicating a conservative donation history.

Appendix Figure A.1 plots DIME campaign finance scores for voters we identify as Democrats, Republicans, and non-partisans. Republican voters have CFscores further to the right than Democratic or non-partisan voters. The average Republican faculty has a CF score of -0.17, compared to -0.89 for Democrats and -0.75 for non-partisans. Notice that even Republican faculty tend to make donations that are slightly left of the nation as a whole. Forty percent of Democratic faculty donate to political campaigns, compared to 27 percent of Republican faculty;⁸ it could therefore be the case that more-politically involved Republican faculty are on average less-conservative than less-politically involved faculty. Alternatively, even Republican academics could be less-conservative than the typical Republican.

I.B Student-Level Data

We use student-level transcript data from one state flagship university to measure the political ideology of students and the partisanship of their course instructors.⁹ We study students who entered college in Fall 2010 through Fall 2018, who we can follow for at least four academic years (through spring 2022). We restrict our sample to students who are at least 18 years of age when

⁷ Bonica (2014) calculates these CFscores using a correspondence analysis approach, which orders sets of donations based on the share of dollars that goes towards liberal or conservative candidates (relative to other portfolios). For example, for two individuals who both donated to Kamala Harris’ 2024 presidential campaign, if one individual also donated to a Republican candidate for US Senate and the other also donated to a Democratic candidate, the second individual would be ranked as more liberal than the first since their donations share more overlap with individuals who donated to further-left candidates. We refer interested readers to the paper for more details.

⁸ As another sign that our algorithm correctly identifies faculty, note that only 8 percent of non-registered voters have ever made a campaign donation in our data.

⁹ Our flagship transcript data come from a state with partisan party primaries.

they enter college and are a US citizen or permanent resident.¹⁰

We identify the instructor for each course from publicly-available course catalogs, which we then link to L2 to measure partisanship. Course catalogs do not always list the instructor’s name; in particular, the share of class sections with an instructor first and last name is higher in the university’s college of liberal arts and sciences and is close to zero for discussion and lab sections. We restrict our sample to only courses with known instructors and focus on primary enrollments (lectures, seminars, and recitations). We can identify instructor names (and therefore partisanship) for 83 percent of all undergraduate course enrollments.

Our outcome of interest is student partisanship at the end of college, which we measure using L2 voter records. Compared to the faculty matching algorithm, we match students to voter records using a more refined procedure that takes advantage of additional student information from university administrative records. In short, we first match students to voter records based on their full name, date of birth, and gender. For unmatched students, we loosen our match criteria gradually, for example by using their middle initial instead of middle name (see Appendix B.2 for details). Overall, 93 percent of domestic students ever appear in voter registration records. We benchmark annual registration rates against survey evidence from the National Study of Learning, Voting, and Engagement (NSLVE 2022), which surveys students at more than 1,000 colleges and universities to estimate voter registration and participation rates in each midterm and presidential election. Our match rates are relatively similar to the NSLVE estimates in 2014, 2016, 2018, 2020, and 2022 (Appendix Table B.2), though we slightly underestimate the registration rate for 2012.

One limitation is that we only have L2 registration data starting in 2018 for the state containing this flagship. This means we can observe post-college partisanship for all students who ever register to vote (albeit potentially at different ages). However, measures of pre-college political preferences are sparser. Given the importance of controlling for baseline political beliefs in our regressions, we supplement the voter data with additional survey-based ideology measures to increase the share of students with known baseline beliefs. Specifically, we impute baseline ideology using a university-wide survey conducted every one to two years at this flagship from 2011 onwards. In the survey, which receives responses from approximately 25 percent of students in each wave, students are asked: “How would you characterize your political orientation?” on a 1-7 scale; this measure of political ideology is similar to those used elsewhere in the literature (see, for example, Acton,

¹⁰ In our data, we cannot separately identify permanent residents from US citizens, as the university only collects this information for visa purposes. However, only about three percent of the US population consists of foreign-born permanent residents who are not naturalized citizens (Van Hook 2025).

Cook, and Ugalde Araya 2025). We use student responses from their first year in college to impute baseline preferences.¹¹

Our primary estimation sample includes all students for whom we observe early political preferences, as well as students who were not registered to vote before college regardless of whether we observe baseline ideology. As shown in Table A.2, these two samples collectively comprise 82 percent of eligible students. We include all non-registered students (including those without known baseline preferences) because these students are comparatively disengaged from the political process and therefore may have weaker political priors. Our main analyses exclude the 18 percent of students who were registered to vote before college but whose baseline political preferences are unobserved. Compared to non-registered students, these students likely have stronger pre-existing beliefs that we are unable to measure. However, we include them in robustness checks, and results are unchanged.

We observe baseline political preferences for 35 percent of our sample (Table A.3). We define these preferences as follows. We first identify all students who were registered to vote before college and were affiliated with a liberal or conservative political party, assigning these students this corresponding ideology.¹² We assign a “moderate” ideology to students who are registered as Independents. When this voter-based measure is missing, either because a student’s party affiliation is unknown or because they were not registered to vote before college, we instead assign baseline preferences using survey responses that come from students’ first year in college, where self-reported ideology of 1-3 is coded as liberal, 4 is coded as moderate, and 5-7 is coded as conservative.¹³

Table I summarizes the demographic and academic characteristics of the students in our primary sample.¹⁴ The first column includes all 43,321 individuals who meet our inclusion criteria. Overall, the student body at this university is relatively high-achieving and socioeconomically advantaged. The average SAT score is 1356, roughly corresponding to the national 94th percentile (College Board Research 2025). Nearly one-quarter of students come from households earning at least \$200,000 per year, and 61 percent are in-state residents. This institution’s student body is therefore affluent relative to most public universities. It is also considered highly selective, with

¹¹ Political identity and vote choice are distinct but highly related concepts (Campbell et al. 1960), and are highly correlated in our sample. For example, among students for whom both measures are available, 73 percent of baseline Democrats identify as liberal and 13 percent identify as conservative.

¹² Liberal parties are: Democratic, Green, and Peace. Conservative parties are: Republican, Libertarian, Constitution, American, and Conservative.

¹³ We prioritize the voter records in our definition since it provides a clear revealed-preference measure of partisanship (Firoozi 2025).

¹⁴ See Appendix Table A.4 for descriptive statistics on all students, including those excluded from the primary sample.

admissions rates typically below 20 percent. This school is therefore not representative of the typical American college experience. However, its demographic composition makes it a relevant setting for studying faculty effects, since concerns about liberal bias on college campuses typically focus on elite academic institutions (Bouie 2024).

The middle columns of Table I compare baseline characteristics across students identified as liberal, conservative, or moderate prior to college entry. These three groups are mutually exclusive. Liberals make up the largest ideological group (11,113 students), followed by conservatives (3,700) and moderates (3,501). Compared to liberals, conservative students are significantly more likely to be male, white, and from higher-income households. Moderate students fall in between these two groups on most demographic and socioeconomic characteristics but resemble liberals more closely in racial composition. The last two columns describe students who were and were not registered to vote before college. These students have mostly similar demographic and academic profiles, though non-registered students are slightly more likely to be male, in-state, and lower academic achievers.

II Partisanship of College Faculty

First, we document differences in faculty partisanship across flagship schools and fields of study. In Figure II, we graph the share of faculty who are Democrats, Republicans, non-partisans or third-party, or non-voters. At the average flagship in our sample, 41 percent of faculty are Democrats, though this ranges from 21 percent (the University of Idaho) to 57 percent (the University of California). However, among registered voters, college faculty are predominantly left-leaning: at the average flagship, 57 percent of registered faculty are Democrats compared to only 17 percent who are Republicans, with the remaining 26 percent non-partisan or registered with another party. There are more Democratic faculty than Republican faculty at every school except one (the University of Wyoming).

We also compare the partisanship of flagship faculty to their states overall. Appendix Figure A.2 plots the Democratic faculty share against the Democratic share of all registered voters in that state. In 25 of 33 states, the share of Democrats on the faculty exceeds the state’s overall Democratic share; the average difference is +5.1 percentage points. While adults with college degrees are disproportionately Democratic, this disparity in faculty partisanship is not driven solely by the fact that university faculty are very highly educated. The figure’s right panel shows that the differences are still present when we restrict to voters who likely have a college degree based

on L2’s predictive algorithm. In fact, the average difference between faculty and all voters in the state is slightly larger among just college-educated adults (+6.3 percentage points).

Figure III graphs the share of faculty in each field of study who are Democrats, Republicans, non-partisans, and non-voters. Note that salary records only contain information on department affiliations for faculty at 14 schools.¹⁵ We estimate these statistics at the individual level; because some schools have more faculty or more years of available salary data, Appendix Figure A.3 presents the same statistics for the average *department*, where we first estimate partisanship at each school and then average these measures across schools.¹⁶

The share of Democratic faculty varies across fields from 35 percent in engineering to 63 percent in history. STEM (science, technology, engineering, and math) fields are concentrated on the left of the figure, indicating they have lower shares of Democratic faculty. Meanwhile, the social sciences, humanities, and arts tend to have higher shares of Democratic faculty. Notice that the share of Republican faculty is quite low in all fields. In the fields with the most Republicans (natural resources, medicine, business), the share is still 15 percent or lower.

Lastly, we compare faculty across rank and field of study. In Appendix Figures A.4 and A.5, we investigate whether partisanship differs for lecturers compared to assistant or tenured professors for the subset of schools where rank is easily identifiable in salary records. Of these three groups, assistant professors tend to have slightly lower voter registration rates. Conditional on being registered to vote, tenured professors are 6 percentage points more likely to be Democrats than assistant professors, and 7 percentage points more likely than lecturers; these differences are statistically significant at the 1 percent level and are similar within and across institutions (i.e., when we estimate them with and without institution fixed effects).

III Political Preferences of College Students

Next, we describe the overall political ideology of college students at our flagship university before and after college. Table II shows transition matrices of political ideology during college. For clarity, we begin by showing changes separately within our survey and within voter records. The columns show student baselines, and the rows show ideology and partisanship at the end of college.

The top panel contains 5,646 students who responded to our survey multiple times during

¹⁵ The Universities of Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Texas, and Washington.

¹⁶ We classify departments into broad fields by their Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) codes; see Appendix C for more details.

college. At baseline, 61 percent of students report being liberal, 19 percent report being moderate, and 20 percent report being conservative.¹⁷ The share of liberal students is considerably higher than the nationwide share of college students (34 percent) but is relatively similar to institutions with comparable SAT scores (Acton, Cook, and Ugalde Araya 2025).

The proportion of liberal students increases to 69 percent by the time students take their last survey. While only 21 percent of students change their views during college, 73 percent of switchers move leftward. For example, 94 percent of students who reported being liberal at baseline remain so at follow-up, with only one percent becoming conservative. In contrast, only 68 percent of students who reported being conservative at baseline remain so, with 14 percent now identifying as liberal and 18 percent as moderate.

The same trends are present in voter records, albeit with smaller magnitudes. Among students with known partisan affiliations before college, 63 percent were Democrats. As the bottom panel of Table II shows, 95 percent of students who were Democrats before college remain so. However, only 81 percent of Republicans do so, with 14 percent becoming Democrats and 5 percent becoming unaffiliated with either party. Among students who enter as independents, 76 percent remain so, 20 percent affiliate with Democrats, and 4 percent affiliate with Republicans.

We combine the survey and voter records into our single measure of baseline beliefs in Table III. Here, we focus on our primary regression outcome: party affiliation after college. We observe the same trends as before, though magnitudes are attenuated because baseline ideology in the survey does not always match expressed partisan preferences in voter affiliations. Sixty percent of liberal students are Democrats at the end of college, versus 31 percent of moderates and 25 percent of conservatives. Political affiliation at the end of college is again skewed more leftward than ideology at baseline. For example, only three percent of baseline liberals and six percent of baseline moderates are Republicans at the end of college. Lastly, among students who were not registered to vote before college, 30 percent register and affiliate with the Democratic Party, compared to only four percent who affiliate with the Republican Party.¹⁸

Student partisanship differs along multiple characteristics. As the bivariate and multivariate regressions in Appendix Table A.5 show, female students, non-White students, and out-of-state

¹⁷ These partisan beliefs correspond to different policy preferences. In two survey waves (2013 and 2017), students were asked to rank up to three policy positions they care about when choosing a political candidate; note that the survey does not ask which side of an issue students prefer. These policy preferences differ by ideology. For liberal students, the top five policy areas in order are equal rights, education, healthcare, climate change, and the environment (Appendix Figure A.6). For conservative students, they are national security, jobs, healthcare, a balanced budget, and foreign policy.

¹⁸ 90.3 percent of these students are registered by the end of college.

students are more likely to be liberal at baseline. These demographic differences persist through the end of college, and in many cases are larger for party identification post-college than they are for self-identification pre-college.

However, *changes* in beliefs are mostly uncorrelated with observable characteristics. In our panel survey, students in all demographic subgroups are more likely to identify as liberal at the end of college, and the percentage-point increase is very similar across subgroups, ranging from 6.2 to 8.9 percentage points (Appendix Figure A.7). In Figure IV, we plot the share of students in each graduating major who identify as liberal in the survey, both at the beginning and end of college.¹⁹ At baseline, students in the social sciences and humanities are more likely to be liberal, while students in STEM fields are less likely. However, students in every single field are at least as likely to identify as liberal by the end of college.²⁰ These changes are not concentrated in departments with left-leaning faculty; the correlation between the leftward shift of students and the share of courses taught by Democrats is -0.07.

III.A Students Sort to Courses Based on Partisanship

We now compare the average baseline political ideology of students to their course instructors. The left panel of Figure V plots the average share of students in each department’s courses who identify as liberal against the share of courses taught by a Democrat; the right panel presents the same for conservative students. Overall, we observe a striking positive correlation between the political ideology of students and faculty within departments: a 10 percentage point increase in the share of courses with a Democratic instructor corresponds to a 3.6 percentage point increase in the share of students who identify as liberal, and a 2.8 percentage point decrease in the share of students who identify as conservative (the slopes are statistically significant at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively).²¹

The correlation between student baseline beliefs and faculty partisanship is more than twice as large for upper-level courses (300-level and above) than for lower-level courses (100- or 200-level), shown in Appendix Figures A.9-A.11. Because we measure student baseline beliefs either before

¹⁹ We use 6-digit CIP codes to identify fields of study, which are closely analogous but not identical to departments. See Appendix C for details on how we define fields from these codes.

²⁰ This is similar to Goldstein and Kolerman (2025), who show that in a national sample of college students, the share of liberals increases in every field, albeit less so in Business and Economics.

²¹ Moderate students lie in between liberals and conservatives (Appendix Figure A.8); a 10 percentage point increase in the share of Democratic instructors is associated with a 0.8 percentage point decrease in the share of moderate students.

college or very early in college,²² this is evidence that students sort more strongly into upper-level courses taught by instructors with similar politics to those they held at the beginning of college. Moreover, this partisan sorting is not explained by other student characteristics associated with partisanship. For example, female students are less likely to pursue STEM degrees and more likely to pursue humanities degrees, and are also more likely to be liberal. In Appendix Figure A.12, we residualize student ideology by regressing it on the observable characteristics summarized in Table I, and average these residuals within fields. The pattern across fields remains the same: accounting for student demographics only attenuates the relationship between the share of Democratic faculty and liberal/conservative students by approximately 20-25 percent.

Lastly, students also sort dynamically: that is, when students become more liberal they start to take comparatively more classes with Democratic instructors. To capture this, we exploit the fact that approximately one-quarter of the 5,600 students who responded to the survey multiple times during college report a different political ideology in their follow-up survey than they did at baseline. We identify students who became more liberal or more conservative from their first to last survey response and then calculate the share of courses taught by Democrats *after* students' partisan beliefs have shifted.

We present these statistics in Appendix Figure A.13. During the period when their beliefs are changing, students who become more liberal take 49.9 percent of courses with Democrats, compared to 50.0 percent for students who become more conservative. This difference, which has a p-value of 0.90, provides preliminary evidence of the fact we document more rigorously in the next section: that changes in student beliefs are not systematically associated with the ideology of their instructors. In contrast, after their beliefs change, the share of courses taught by Democrats diverges for these two groups, with students who shift leftwards taking more courses with Democrats than those who shifted rightwards. The difference is not particularly large (two percentage points) but is statistically significant, with a p-value of exactly 0.05.²³

IV Does Instructor Partisanship Affect Their Students?

So far, we have documented that students at our flagship become more liberal during college, and showed that both student and instructor political partisanship differ systematically across fields of

²² 97 percent of upper-level courses are taken after students' first year in college, the year in which they provide their baseline survey ideology.

²³ When we control for other student characteristics (including baseline ideology), magnitudes are similar and the post-change difference becomes statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

study. We now test whether Democratic faculty contribute to leftward shifts in political identity. In order to do so, we need to compare otherwise-similar students who are exposed to different faculty for plausibly random reasons. We use the following stacked regression to do so:

$$I_i^2 = \beta D_{i,c,t} + \gamma_c + \psi I_i^1 + \phi_1 X_i + \phi_2 W_{c,t} + \tau_t + \varepsilon_{i,c,t} . \quad (\text{I})$$

These regressions contain one observation per student i enrolling in a section of course c in semester t . The dependent variable I_i^2 is the student’s post-college partisan affiliation, measured in voter records.

$D_{i,c,t}$ is the proportion of a section’s instructors for a student i in course c in semester t that are Democrats;²⁴ we pool all other faculty (Republican, non-partisan, not registered) as the reference group to focus on the effect of Democrats, but separate these groups in supplemental analyses. The coefficient β captures how exposure to one additional Democratic instructor relates to the student’s partisanship after taking the class.

Importantly, in different models we include a fixed effect for fields of study and individual courses (γ_c). Field fixed effects, by isolating comparisons to students taking courses in the same department with different instructors, account for the fact that students disproportionately study topics taught by similarly-minded faculty, as we showed in Figure V. However, students may still choose which courses to take based on their political identity, even within fields; for example, liberal economics majors may be more likely to take a class on labor economics, while conservative economics majors may be more likely to take a class on corporate finance. Our preferred model therefore includes fixed effects for specific courses (e.g., Introductory Microeconomics).

We control for a vector of student characteristics (X_i) and course characteristics ($W_{c,t}$) that are potentially correlated with student and faculty partisanship. These covariates account for the possibility that students may choose their course enrollments based on characteristics that are correlated with instructor partisanship. For example, female students may prefer to take a class with a female instructor; because both of these groups are more likely to be Democrats, this sorting could introduce an upward bias in our estimates. Student controls include baseline voter registration status and whether the students’ baseline political preferences come from the survey or the voter file, as well as: gender; race/ethnicity; SAT/ACT scores and honors program participation;

²⁴ More than 99 percent of sections have a single instructor. For ease of exposition, our discussion treats $D_{i,c,t}$ as an indicator for whether an instructor in course c in semester t is a Democrat. However, in regressions we allow $D_{i,c,t}$ to equal a fraction between zero and one.

family income; and in-state, first-generation, and student-athlete status. Course characteristics include time of day, class size, and the following instructor characteristics: rank; lagged GPA and median ratings from course evaluations; and predicted race/ethnicity and gender from name-based algorithms.²⁵ We also include fixed effects for the course semester and the student’s cohort, to account for changes in the average partisanship of both students and faculty over time.

We consider the model with course fixed effects to provide the best causal estimate of how faculty affect student beliefs.²⁶ We rely on the assumption that students do not choose *when* to take a given course based on the partisanship of the instructor. This seems reasonable, given that student schedules are often relatively rigid and students may need to take courses in a particular order due to prerequisite requirements. Seventy-eight percent of courses only have a single course section per semester, meaning many students would have to delay the course to a later semester if they sorted on this margin. Lastly, we control for instructor characteristics potentially correlated with partisanship, including gender and rank. Therefore, any student sorting based on instructor partisanship would need to occur conditional on these observable traits.

To further minimize sorting risk, we restrict our attention to introductory and intermediate courses that comprise 60 percent of all enrollments. Recall that these courses were subject to less baseline sorting than upper-level electives (Appendix Figures A.9-A.11). Lower-level courses are the most likely to serve as prerequisites where the order of course scheduling is relatively rigid, reducing the likelihood of sorting on the basis of instructor partisanship. These courses are also likely where instructors have the most ability to influence student beliefs, since students are less familiar with the field’s content and have weaker priors about specific academic topics, such as critical race theory or free-market economics.

We conduct two tests of this no-sorting assumption. First, we regress student characteristics on instructor partisanship to test whether students who enroll in class sections taught by Democrats differ observably from students taking the same class when it is taught by other instructors. As in our main estimates, we include term fixed effects and control for other instructor observable characteristics in these regressions. Appendix Table A.6 presents these balance tests, where we

²⁵ We predict race/ethnicity using last names with *ethnicolr2*, an update of the name-based algorithm in Sood and Laohaprapanon (2018). We predict gender using full names with *genderize.io* (Genderize.io). Predicting gender and race/ethnicity using names results in imperfect predictions (see, for example, Lockhart, King, and Munsch 2023) and we use the continuous predicted probabilities of race/ethnicity and gender to account for this measurement error.

²⁶ Note that estimating these models require that the ideology of instructors changes across sections of the same course. There is some within-course variation in whether the instructor is a Democrat in 49 percent of courses (Appendix Figure A.14). This variation exists within every academic field as well. Courses without variation are typically smaller classes, meaning we are able to include approximately 70 percent of all introductory and intermediate enrollments in our regressions.

cluster standard errors at the student and course level. Magnitudes of within-course differences are consistently very small and, with rare exceptions, lack statistical significance. Importantly, there is no difference in the share of students who identify as liberal, moderate, or conservative at baseline, or the share who were registered to vote before college. Second, we compare the coefficient β in models where we do and do not control for students' baseline (pre-course) ideology I_i^1 . If liberal students delay taking classes in order to take them with Democrats, and endline partisanship is positively correlated with baseline ideology, then β will be upward-biased without this control.

The coefficients identified by this course fixed effects design answer a specific question: when students engage with their chosen subjects, does their instructor's political identity affect their own political evolution? We take student course preferences as given and ask whether instructors with different political beliefs teach these courses differently.²⁷ However, these models are limited in that they only identify the marginal effect of each additional course with Democratic instructors. If there are cumulative or non-linear effects of taking many courses with Democrats, they would not be identified from these models.

Given this, we also estimate models that collapse faculty exposure to the student level. We regress student party affiliation at the end of college on the share of their courses taught by a Democrat, including the same student controls as before and the average of the other course controls. To account for students sorting into courses based on partisanship, we also control for each student's *expected* share of courses with a Democrat, based on all course sections for each class they take. For example, if a student enrolls in 10 classes, where each of those classes is taught by a Democrat 50 percent of the time, then their expected share of courses with a Democrat is 50 percent. If, for idiosyncratic reasons, 70 percent of the student's courses were actually taught by Democrats, then the regression identifies the effects of faculty off the difference between true and expected exposure. Figure A.15 shows this variation, which is substantial in practice: the absolute difference between actual and predicted exposure exceeds 10 percentage points for nearly half of students.

This regression follows the “re-centered treatment” approach in Borusyak and Hull (2023). We assume that deviations from the expected treatment are as-good-as-random. This is analogous to our previous identifying assumption: that students may choose which courses to take, but not

²⁷ In interpreting this regression, we note that there may be an interaction between course content and instructor political beliefs that we cannot capture. A Republican instructor that chooses to teach environmental economics might plausibly hold beliefs about and teach content concerning the environment in a manner more similar to a Democratic instructor while holding beliefs that are not related to course content that are more conservative. Our model identifies whether a Democratic instructor that selects into teaching a particular course has an effect relative to a Republican that selects into teaching that same course.

which sections to enroll in, based on their instructor’s partisanship.²⁸ However, because we cannot include course fixed effects, the strongest potential control for student sorting, these estimates may be subject to more residual bias than the enrollment-level estimates.

IV.A Estimates

Table IV shows coefficients from these models. The outcome is the student’s party affiliation at the end of college: in the top panel, it is whether the student is a Democrat, and in the bottom panel whether the student is a Republican.²⁹ We weight each course by the number of credits relative to a typical full-time course (worth four credits) and cluster standard errors at the student and course level. We apply two-way clustering in order to account for the mechanical correlation in the dependent variable within students given our stacked regression design, and for potential unobserved class components that could generate common shocks.

We begin by showing a simple correlation in the first column, regressing student partisanship on whether their instructor is a Democrat (controlling for the student’s cohort and academic term). Students enrolled in courses taught by Democrats are 0.60 percentage points more likely to be a Democrat at the end of college and 0.34 percentage points less likely to be a Republican, statistically significant at the five and one percent level, respectively. The second column adds a field fixed effect, isolating comparisons to students enrolled in the same field exposed to different faculty. Within fields we observe no relationship between the partisanship of instructors and their students. The third column adds a course fixed effect, isolating comparisons to two students taking the same course in different semesters. Students taking a given course with a Democratic instructor are 0.04 percentage points more likely to be a Democrat and 0.01 percentage points less likely to be a Republican, compared to students who take the same course when it is taught by a non-Democratic instructor. Neither estimate is statistically significant.

In the fourth column, we control for students’ baseline ideology to test whether students select which section of a given course to take based on the instructor’s partisanship. If students time their enrollment in order to take a particular class with an instructor with similar politics, then this control will be positively correlated with our main variable of interest, biasing the column 3

²⁸ We follow the practical recommendation in Borusyak and Hull (2023) for settings without true randomization and control for the expected treatment μ_i rather than instrumenting with the recentered treatment. Note that we also control for the expected value of all other class-level covariates such as instructor gender, since these may also affect student sorting.

²⁹ See Appendix Table A.7 for coefficients on the demographic controls. We do not find any effect of Democratic faculty on whether students are registered to vote at the end of college, estimating an insignificant difference of -0.04 percentage points using the same regression model.

estimate upwards.³⁰ In contrast, the estimates barely shift, decreasing by 0.03 percentage points in the top panel and increasing by 0.01 percentage points in the bottom panel. Lastly, we control for other student and course characteristics in column five, generating our main estimate: each additional course taken with a Democratic instructor has a statistically insignificant negative effect on the likelihood of being a Democrat, reducing the probability by 0.12 percentage points per course, and on being a Republican, increasing the probability by 0.06 percentage points.

Estimates from our preferred specification, shown in column 5 of Table IV, are not only statistically insignificant, but also small in practice and tightly bounded. The standard deviation of the number of lower-level courses taken with a Democratic instructor is 3.2. Scaling up the point estimates by this amount, a one standard deviation increase in exposure to Democratic instructors decreases students’ likelihood of identifying as Democrats by 0.38 percentage points and increases their likelihood of identifying as Republicans by 0.19 percentage points. Compared to the share of students who are Democrats or Republicans at the end of college (36 and 6 percent, respectively), the effect of faculty partisanship is marginal at best. Based on the estimates’ standard errors, the one-sided 95 percent confidence bounds imply that a one standard deviation increase in exposure to Democratic faculty has a “liberalizing” effect of no more than 0.46 percentage points, measured as an increase in Democratic affiliation, and no more than 0.33 percentage points, measured as a reduction in Republican affiliation. These “upper bounds” are equivalent to approximately 1.3 percent of the Democratic-affiliation outcome mean and 5.4 percent of the Republican-affiliation outcome mean, respectively. In our sample of 43,321 students across nine entering cohorts, these bounds correspond to about 22 additional Democratic students and about 16 fewer Republican students per entering cohort.

These average treatment effects represent the primary policy parameter of interest. They provide evidence on the question: given the current distribution of college student political partisanship and course-taking patterns, do liberal faculty shift these views further to the left when students take their courses? Because the majority of students with pre-existing political affiliations are liberal, it is perhaps not surprising that we do not observe an overall effect of faculty. However, faculty may still have liberalizing effects on sub-groups of students, such as those who do not already share their political views. Because political affiliations lie on a spectrum, we expect that if effects exist, that we would see increases in Democratic affiliation among moderate students and decreases

³⁰ Note that we conduct this test before controlling for other instructor characteristics such as gender or rank; therefore, this test is, if anything, biased towards finding evidence of sorting.

in Republican affiliation among conservative students. Lastly, students who enter college without strong political beliefs may be more swayed by faculty, since their baseline priors are weaker. Given this, treatment effects may be larger among non-registered students.

We estimate effects separately by baseline ideology and registration status in Table V, presenting the full-model estimates only for space reasons. Estimates are consistently small, with all but one statistically insignificant, and do not point in the expected direction of a liberalizing effect of Democratic faculty. The only positive point estimate is for students who enter college as moderates, though it lacks statistical significance. This estimate, taken at face value, would imply that a one standard deviation increase in Democratic instructors increases the likelihood of being a Democrat by 2.6 percentage points. However, since 31 percent of baseline moderates are Democrats at the end of college, even this (insignificant) estimate suggests Democratic faculty are responsible for only eight percent of the leftward shift these students experience.

IV.B Faculty Effects in the Humanities and Social Sciences

It is plausible that faculty political beliefs only enter the classroom in some academic disciplines. Recent public policy debates on faculty indoctrination mostly focus on the humanities and social sciences (Moody 2025; Ohio General Assembly 2025; The Economist 2026), where faculty may be more likely to discuss academic topics including critical race theory, economic inequality, and the transgender community because they are more directly relevant to their discipline. Given this, Democratic faculty may have more influence on political identity in these courses than they could when teaching calculus or physics.

We also estimate faculty effects just for courses in the humanities and social sciences.³¹ Estimates show a statistically insignificant decrease in the likelihood of being a Democrat when students take courses with Democratic instructors (Table VI). In addition, students who take courses with Democrats are *more* likely to be Republicans at the end of college, with this difference statistically significant at the 1 percent level. When scaled to represent a one standard deviation increase in exposure to Democratic instructors in these fields (1.69 courses), we estimate that exposure to Democratic instructors in the humanities and social sciences increases the likelihood of being a Republican by 0.6 percentage points, a ten percent increase. Estimates are similar in percent terms for students with different baseline ideology, though they are only marginally statistically significant

³¹ Humanities courses are those in the following departments: English, history, languages, philosophy, religion, and women/gender studies. Social sciences courses are those in the following departments: anthropology, business, communication, economics, education, political science, psychology, public policy, sociology.

for baseline conservative students. They are also larger in percent terms for students who were not registered to vote before college. While magnitudes are very small, this suggests that, if anything, exposure to Democratic faculty in culturally topical fields may engender political backlash.

IV.C Student-Level Regressions

Table VII presents estimates from our student-level models, where we regress end-of-college partisanship on the share of students' courses taught by Democrats, controlling for the expected share based on their course enrollments. Students who take more courses with Democrats during college are not significantly more likely to be Democrats or less likely to be Republicans themselves, with each 10 percentage point increase in Democratic exposure decreasing one's own probability of being a Democrat by 0.11 percentage points and increasing the probability of being a Republican by 0.01 percentage points. With our standard errors, we can rule out "liberalizing effects" from cumulative exposure of more than 0.1 percentage points per ten percentage point increase. We again observe a slightly more positive (albeit still insignificant) point estimate for moderate students; even with the larger standard errors in this smaller sample, we can rule out increases in Democratic affiliations of more than 1.3 percentage points with 95 percent confidence.

We also estimate models that bin students by their exposure level, in order to capture potential non-linearities. We regress end-of-college partisanship on indicators for the following groups: [0-25%, 25-50%, 50-75%, 75-100% taught by a Democrat]. We include fixed effects for these categories of expected exposure as well, so we identify the effect of higher or lower exposure to Democrats for students with similar expected exposure. The estimates in Table A.8 show no evidence of non-linear effects and, consistent with our humanities/social sciences estimates, suggest, if anything, that exposure to large numbers of Democratic instructors reduces the likelihood of being a Democrat more than exposure to fewer Democrats. For instance, in our full sample, we estimate that, relative to exposure to courses where 25-50% are taught by Democrats, students exposed to courses where 75-100% of courses are taught by Democrats are 2.6 percentage points *less* likely to register as Democrats after college, with this difference statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

IV.D Alternative Faculty Partisanship Measures

We also estimate models using alternative measures of faculty partisanship. Our main estimates compare partisanship for students who take classes with Democrats compared to other instructors. This measure provides an easily interpretable treatment effect. However, it is relatively coarse,

meaning our estimates may fail to capture meaningful heterogeneity across faculty and may suffer from attenuation bias due to measurement error.

We first split non-Democratic faculty into three groups: Republicans, other registered voters, and non-registered faculty. We do this to ensure our main estimates are not masking heterogeneous effects; e.g., that Democrats only have a liberalizing effect relative to more conservative Republican faculty. Estimates, presented in Appendix Tables A.9 and A.10, do not support this hypothesis. In these regressions, the reference group is now Democratic faculty (since they are the largest single category), and other faculty are either Republicans, Registered Independent, or Not Registered. Student partisanship does not meaningfully differ when they take courses taught by Democratic versus Republican instructors, in all courses or just the humanities and social sciences. In contrast, the magnitudes of any differences are often largest when comparing Democrats to independent or non-registered instructors, though these differences are also overall small and mostly statistically insignificant. The fact that the largest differences do not arise between faculty with the greatest ideological contrast (Democrats and Republicans) casts doubt on the idea that differences in partisan exposure generates meaningful treatment effects.

Using party affiliations from voter records also introduces measurement error, since there is considerable variation in ideology within political parties and voters may not change their party affiliation even if their beliefs change.³² As an alternative, we use campaign finance scores (“CF-scores”) from the DIME database as a continuous measure of faculty political ideology (Bonica 2023). These scores, which are derived from Federal Elections Commission records of campaign donations, are standardized to mean zero and standard deviation one, where negative scores indicate a liberal donation history and positive scores indicate a conservative donation history (see Section I.A for additional discussion). Many individuals do not contribute to any political campaigns: only 29 percent of all faculty (47 percent of registered faculty) have a CFscore. Therefore, donations provide a clearer measure of partisan intensity, but only for a selected subset of instructors.

Appendix Table A.11 presents results from these regressions. We estimate three versions of these regressions. First, we study whether student partisanship differs when they are taught by instructors who ever donated to a political campaign. If these instructors are more intensely partisan, they may be more likely to share their political views in the classroom, potentially affecting students. Second, we split ever-donors into those with above- versus below-median CFscores. Third,

³² This measurement error would be particularly problematic if it is correlated with academic disciplines; for example, if both Democratic and Republican environmental scientists are systematically more liberal than Democratic and Republican economists, then within-field differences in viewpoints would be smaller.

we restrict to instructors who ever made a political donation and regress student partisanship on the continuous CFScore.³³ We find no evidence that faculty who are more politically active affect student partisanship, or that faculty with more-liberal or conservative donation histories move students towards politically aligned parties.

IV.E Robustness

We estimate a number of robustness checks. First, we show that our estimates are not driven by the decision to exclude upper-level courses from our estimates. We argue that if faculty affect students' political partisanship, it likely takes place in lower-level courses, when students have weaker priors about topics in the field and could therefore be more-easily influenced by faculty. In addition, because lower-level courses often serve as pre-requisites for electives, students are less able to choose when they enroll in a class, which is critical for identification. However, faculty may have less control over content when teaching lower-level courses with more standardized content and therefore have more scope to affect students through instruction in upper-level courses. Since 41 percent of course enrollments are in upper-level electives, omitting these courses may mean we miss important effects on student partisanship. When we include upper-level courses (Appendix Tables A.12 and A.13), estimates are very similar in magnitude and significance. In addition, the significant positive effect of Democratic faculty on Republican affiliations in the humanities and social sciences attenuates dramatically and loses statistical significance in most samples.

We also show that the absence of liberalizing effects persist through at least age 25. Because voter registration is often updated infrequently, students may only change their party affiliations when they move after college, meaning we fail to capture actual changes in partisan preferences by focusing on partisanship measured shortly after graduation. In Appendix Table A.14, we restrict ourselves to students who entered college in Fall 2015 or earlier, for whom we can observe partisanship at age 25 (since our L2 data go until 2022). The top panel shows that our baseline estimates are similar in this sample. The bottom panel shows that Democratic faculty continue to have no liberalizing effects when partisanship is measured a few years after graduation. The only statistically significant estimates again suggest the opposite effect, with non-registered students more likely to be a Republican and moderate students less likely to be a Democrat when they have

³³ While we could include faculty who never made political donations and assign them a CFScore of zero, this would effectively assume that non-donors are politically moderate, when they may in reality have strong and divergent policy opinions (Pew Research Center 2021). Even with this restriction, we are still able to include 49 percent of course enrollments in our regression (i.e., for courses where at least two instructors made donations).

more Democratic instructors. Magnitudes remain below 10 percent of the sample mean.

Lastly, we confirm that our findings are not driven by sample or specification choices. To further purge potential bias from students sorting into sections of the same course within a semester, we estimate effects in the subset of courses with a single section offered per semester, finding similar results (Appendix Table A.15). We include registered students with unknown baseline partisanship, showing estimates are similar (Appendix Table A.16). We confirm that estimates are similar when we do not weight courses based on their credit-hours (Appendix Table A.17). We also confirm that our lack of statistical significance is not driven by clustering decisions. In our main models, we cluster our standard errors at both the student and class level. We argue this is the correct level for clustering; there are clear correlations in unobserved components of partisanship within-student, and there are many unobserved components of any individual class that could generate common shocks to the outcome. Nevertheless, if we impose additional clustering when none is necessary, this could artificially inflate our standard errors, masking a true effect of faculty (Cameron, Gelbach, and Miller 2011). In Appendix Table A.18, we show three sets of standard errors estimated with two-way clustering and clustering at just the student or just the course level. Estimates are similarly precise across these approaches.

V Mechanisms: Peers and Course Content

In the previous section, we estimated null overall effects of faculty on students’ likelihood of being either a Democrat or Republican at the end of college. These effects are largely consistent for students with different baseline ideology, and while magnitudes are slightly larger for students who enter college as political moderates, they lack statistical significance and would still explain only eight percent of the overall increase in Democratic affiliations among these students. In the humanities and social sciences, where politically controversial topics are most common, we estimate a small “backlash” effect, with conservative and non-registered students more likely to be Republicans at the end of college when they are taught by Democrats. Even these estimates are small in magnitude, explaining less than 10 percent of changes in partisan affiliation during college, and are not robust to alternate specifications.

These small effects stand in contrast to an overall leftward ideological shift during college, which is present in both survey responses and voter records (Table II). We argue that this discrepancy can be explained by two forces. First, the role of classroom instruction in shaping political views is

likely small compared to other aspects of student life on college campuses. Peer effects commonly appear as an important influence on college students' political views; Strother et al. (2021) finds that the ideologies of randomly assigned freshman roommates converge towards each other, and suggestive evidence from Firoozi (2025) and Woessner and Kelly-Woessner (2020) also supports this peer mechanism. Algan et al. (2025), exploiting quasi-random assignment of students to social groups early in college, estimate that friendships reduce ideological gaps by 40 percent of a standard deviation, and find that this similarity in preferences generates homophilic peer group formation where students seek out future friends with similar beliefs.

We investigate whether peer effects might exist in the classroom by including the (leave-out) share of liberal peers in each class as an additional regressor in Equation I. Under the same assumptions as before, the ideology of peers in a student's course sections should be as good as random conditional on the classes they take. Because many class sections only have small numbers of students, peer exposure is measured with some error. Given this, we instrument for course section-level ideology using semester-level course means, under the assumption that sorting into sections of the same course within a semester is uncorrelated with (unanticipated) differences in each section's instructor or peer composition. Table A.19 shows that, in contrast to estimates for faculty, enrolling in classes with more liberal classmates has a small liberalizing effect. Students are 0.5 percentage points more likely to be Democrats and 0.26 percentage points less likely to be Republicans at the end of college for every ten percentage point increase in the share of liberal peers in their courses (both significant at the 5 percent level). Estimates are larger and more statistically precise among non-registered students. They are also larger (in absolute terms) for baseline moderate and conservative students, though the estimates lack statistical significance in these smaller samples.

These estimated peer effects are not large, representing less than a five percent change per standard deviation of exposure to liberal classmates. However, they stand in contrast to the consistently near-zero estimated effects of faculty and are consistent with the prior literature discussed above. The small magnitude is not surprising, as extracurricular factors may play a dominant role in ideological identity formation. In the same survey we use to measure political ideology, students report spending 18 hours per week socializing, partying, or participating in other organized events with peers, compared to 17 hours in class. As one explanation for the classroom peer effects, students report spending 17 hours studying outside of class, and almost universally report that they study with others at least some of the time. Students are also more likely to report they frequently

discuss political content outside of class (39 percent) compared to in class (29 percent).

This leads us to our second mechanism: the content covered by instructors in class. If course topics are relatively fixed, and instructors have limited ability to tailor their class to their political preferences, then there is little room for faculty to affect partisanship. This is especially likely to be the case for introductory and intermediate courses, which must cover particular material in order to prepare students for upper-level courses in the major.

We test whether course content differs by instructor partisanship using two datasets. We begin by analyzing the text from 435,000 course descriptions at our focal flagship. We use this text data to study the prevalence of materials related to politically salient topics, such as diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) and LGBTQ+ issues. By linking instructors to voter records, we are able to test whether Democrats are more likely to mention liberal topics in course descriptions and study whether exposure is driven by student preferences (demand) or instructor decision-making (supply).

We focus on a set of left-leaning topics included in a list of phrases compiled by the Trump administration, drawing on a list of keywords that PEN America has determined were used to review federal grants and websites in 2025.³⁴ The full list, shown in Appendix Table A.20, contains nearly 400 phrases, many of which are similar or overlapping (e.g., both “DEI” and “Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion”). Given this, we consolidate phrases into larger topics: LGBTQ+, Race/Racism, Politics, DEI, Feminism, Science, Privilege and Socioeconomic Status, Immigration, Hate Speech, Health, Advocacy, and what we term Woke Words that do not fit into the other categories (e.g., “cultural competence” and “intersectionality”). In our main analyses, we exclude relatively vague words such as “gender” and “diversity”, which appear in many course descriptions in the natural sciences; we also exclude “political” which appears in the majority of political science course descriptions.³⁵ However, we include all multi-word phrases related to these topics, such as “gender diversity” and “diverse backgrounds”. We also include these general words in analyses presented in Appendix Figures A.17-A.19, and results are similar.

As Table A.20 shows, more than one-third of banned phrases do not appear in any courses, and less than 20 percent appear in even one out of 500. Overall exposure to these course topics is limited. Appendix Figure A.16 graphs the number of courses students take during college whose descriptions

³⁴ To identify course descriptions with these phrases, we use regular expressions to identify whether each phrase occurs in a lower-cased version of the course description surrounded by word boundaries. The full list of keywords is available at <https://pen.org/banned-words-list/>.

³⁵ We also exclude a subset of words that do not fit easily into any of these categories, representing 8.6 percent of all course descriptions with any word from the list. The most commonly occurring excluded words are “integration” (43 percent of excluded courses, primarily occurring in mathematics) and “expression” (26 percent of excluded courses, primarily occurring in language courses).

contain phrases in each category. The average student takes 1.8 courses during college that discuss race or racism, 1.3 courses about LGBTQ+ issues, and 0.2 courses that discuss DEI in their course descriptions. If we restrict to just lower-level courses, exposure is even lower: the average student takes fewer than one lower-level course with flagged phrases in any of these categories, except for Race/Racism which averages just above one.

Exposure to these courses is also largely determined by student baseline ideology, as students who enter college as liberals enroll in more courses whose descriptions contain left-leaning phrases (Figure VI). Compared to conservatives, liberal students take 36 percent more courses about race/racism, 55 percent more courses whose descriptions contain Woke Words, and nearly three times as many courses about feminism. We estimate regressions comparing enrollment rates in courses using these flagged phrases. When we include department fixed effects, partisan differences attenuate by approximately 75 percent. This suggests that the student sorting across fields we documented in Section III.A drives exposure to liberal course topics. There is no partisan difference in exposure when we include course fixed effects, further validating our identifying assumption that students may choose which courses to take, but do not select into courses beyond this.

We find no evidence that courses discuss these liberal topics more often when the instructor is a Democrat. Liberal phrases appear more often in course sections taught by Democrats (Figure VII). However, this is because Democratic faculty are more likely to teach in fields where these materials are concentrated. We estimate regressions that include course and term fixed effects, comparing descriptions for two instructors with different partisanship teaching the same class.³⁶ Within courses, there is almost no difference by instructor partisanship in the likelihood that descriptions contain terms in any of these categories. Only two differences are statistically significant. Phrases related to DEI appear in an additional one course out of 200 when taught by Democrats, and phrases related to LGBTQ+ issues appear in one *fewer* course out of 100 when taught by Democrats.

Rather, changes in course content appear to be driven by student demand. Figure VIII shows coefficients from two-way fixed effects regressions, where the dependent variable is the share of each department's semester course offerings with a liberal topic in the description. In the left sub-figure, the independent variable is the share of the department's courses taught by Democrats in that semester. In the right sub-figure, it is the share of students who identify as liberal at the start

³⁶ Note that course descriptions do change within a given class; when we regress each course topic indicator on a vector of class fixed effects, the average R-squared is 0.55, implying almost half of variation in course topics exists within rather than between courses.

of college. By including department and term fixed effects, we identify the relationship between within-department changes in faculty or student composition and course content, accounting for secular trends and time-invariant differences across departments.

There is no relationship between the share of courses taught by Democrats and the department’s overall likelihood of including liberal phrases in course descriptions. In contrast, when the share of liberal students in a department increases by ten percentage points, the share of courses with any liberal phrase increases by nearly five percentage points. The topic areas with the largest increases are science (e.g., climate change), DEI (e.g., inequality and equity), and health (e.g., disability and mental health). These differences are entirely due to departments introducing new courses rather than changing the topics of existing courses; when we estimate these regressions at the course instead of department level, including a course fixed effect reduces the point estimates to zero. This suggests that the perceived increase in emphasis on these topics in higher education may be the natural consequence of changes to the student body composition.

Lastly, because course descriptions are an imperfect measure of instructional material, we collect data on assigned textbooks as an alternative measure of course content. We identify the assigned textbooks for each class offered in the 2021 and 2022 school years from the university registrar and link books to comprehensive lists of topics maintained by the United States Library of Congress using ISBNs. We describe this linkage procedure in detail in Appendix D. Using this data, we identify all assigned textbooks about any of the following topics: queer theory, critical race theory, communism, feminism, slavery, race or ethnicity, gender, and the LGBTQ+ community. We did not identify any courses assigning textbooks about either critical race or queer theory, and therefore dropped these topics.³⁷

Figures A.20 to A.22 show that estimated exposure to liberal topics is similar using these textbook-based measures. Six percent of courses with known textbooks discuss any of these topics. Moderate and conservative students enroll in fewer courses that assign these materials, with moderates 28 percent less likely to encounter liberal topics in textbooks and conservatives 53 percent less likely. Democratic instructors are no more likely to require textbooks about liberal topics than other instructors teaching the same courses.

Taken together, this evidence suggests that exposure to courses that focus on left-leaning

³⁷ These analyses are limited in scope, as the data are only available for two academic years and we do not observe other types of assigned readings such as academic papers. Nevertheless, they provide complementary evidence on another measure of course content. In practice, the two measures are highly correlated: for example, 70 percent of courses with an assigned book about race or ethnicity also discuss race or ethnicity in their course description, while 90 percent of courses with an assigned book about LGBTQ+ issues discuss LGBTQ+ topics in their description.

political topics is relatively limited and driven by student demand for these materials. These topics are concentrated in fields of study with more Democratic instructors and liberal students. They appear at higher rates when more liberal students enroll in particular departments, but do not appear at higher rates when Democratic faculty work in particular departments or teach particular courses. This suggests that an instructor’s scope for affecting student partisanship is likely limited to how content is discussed rather than changes in types of content.

VI Conclusion

In this paper, we provide the first causal evidence on whether faculty affect students’ political partisanship. Using public university salary data, voter registration records, student surveys and transcripts, and text data from course descriptions and assigned textbooks, we document the partisanship of faculty at public flagship universities and study how faculty partisanship affects the politics of their students and the content they teach.

In line with other work (Bonica et al. 2024; Jelveh, Kogut, and Naidu 2024; Klein and Stern 2005; Chin et al. 2025), we find that university faculty are disproportionately Democratic, and that this is particularly so in the humanities and social sciences. However, we also show that exposure to liberal faculty does not make students more liberal. This is because liberal professors assign similar course materials as other instructors teaching the same topics and students sort to fields that align with their pre-existing beliefs. If anything, we observe suggestive evidence that students who take humanities and social sciences courses with Democrats are more likely to become Republicans, though these estimates are small and not particularly robust.

This study is limited in a few ways. We estimate the effects of instructors with different partisanship teaching the same courses, meaning we abstract from the general effects of classroom topics. Because we study students already enrolled in college, we are unable to study whether the college experience *overall* makes students more liberal. Our sample does become more liberal during college; while we do not have a plausible control group to test whether this is a causal effect of college, previous research suggests that one may exist (Apfeld et al. 2024; Cavaille and Marshall 2019; Firoozi 2025). We argue that peers are a much more likely explanation for these changes than faculty. We can also only study effects within the current ecosystem where faculty and students are mostly liberals, meaning we cannot say whether faculty would have more of an effect if students were exposed to a more diverse set of viewpoints.

Our findings point to the importance of future research. We only study partisanship at state flagships, where faculty are more likely to come from elite academic backgrounds and students are higher socioeconomic status on average. Because our student estimates use data from only one institution, it would be useful to conduct similar analyses in other settings. Our text analyses focuses on whether topics are discussed in class; we cannot distinguish how instructors teach about topics. Nevertheless, this work provides valuable evidence on the political life of academic institutions, and suggests that liberalizing effects on young adults may not arise from the classroom itself.

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Tables

Table I. Student Sample Characteristics

	All Students	By Baseline Ideology			By Pre-College Voter Reg.	
		Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Registered	Non-Registered
N	43,321	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,036	34,285
Ever Registered to Vote	0.923 (0.267)	0.966 (0.181)	0.952*** (0.213)	0.956*** (0.205)	1.000 (0.000)	0.903*** (0.296)
Non-Registered Pre-College	0.791 (0.406)	0.496 (0.500)	0.539*** (0.499)	0.508 (0.500)		
Baseline Ideol. From Voter Data	0.263 (0.440)	0.274 (0.446)	0.244*** (0.430)	0.247*** (0.431)	0.527 (0.499)	
Female	0.504 (0.500)	0.619 (0.486)	0.505*** (0.500)	0.446*** (0.497)	0.515 (0.500)	0.501** (0.500)
White	0.721 (0.449)	0.707 (0.455)	0.691* (0.462)	0.826*** (0.379)	0.754 (0.431)	0.712*** (0.453)
Black	0.056 (0.230)	0.059 (0.236)	0.058 (0.233)	0.019*** (0.138)	0.047 (0.212)	0.058*** (0.234)
Hispanic	0.057 (0.232)	0.060 (0.237)	0.073*** (0.261)	0.043*** (0.203)	0.063 (0.242)	0.056** (0.229)
Asian	0.154 (0.361)	0.168 (0.374)	0.179 (0.383)	0.081*** (0.273)	0.133 (0.340)	0.159*** (0.366)
In-State	0.614 (0.487)	0.654 (0.476)	0.604*** (0.489)	0.658 (0.474)	0.597 (0.490)	0.618*** (0.486)
HH Income < \$50k	0.126 (0.332)	0.146 (0.353)	0.160** (0.367)	0.095*** (0.293)	0.129 (0.335)	0.126 (0.332)
HH Income \$50k-100k	0.154 (0.361)	0.170 (0.376)	0.170 (0.376)	0.161 (0.368)	0.151 (0.358)	0.155 (0.362)
HH Income \$100k-200k	0.218 (0.413)	0.255 (0.436)	0.229*** (0.420)	0.251 (0.433)	0.233 (0.423)	0.214*** (0.410)
HH Income \$200k+	0.224 (0.417)	0.208 (0.406)	0.215 (0.411)	0.262*** (0.440)	0.239 (0.427)	0.220*** (0.414)
HS GPA	3.815 (0.193)	3.850 (0.148)	3.842*** (0.158)	3.853 (0.153)	3.847 (0.145)	3.806*** (0.202)
ACT (if reported)	29.9 (3.4)	30.4 (3.3)	30.1*** (3.4)	30.2** (3.2)	30.4 (3.4)	29.8*** (3.4)
SAT (if reported)	1356 (131)	1382 (120)	1365*** (130)	1363*** (122)	1384 (123)	1348*** (132)
Athlete	0.035 (0.184)	0.016 (0.126)	0.031*** (0.174)	0.039*** (0.195)	0.023 (0.151)	0.038*** (0.192)
Honors Program	0.066 (0.248)	0.093 (0.291)	0.063*** (0.243)	0.055*** (0.228)	0.079 (0.270)	0.063*** (0.242)

Note: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two-sided t-tests). T-tests for Moderates and Conservatives are relative to Liberals, while t-tests for non-registered students are relative to registered students. Summary statistics are presented as means with standard deviations in parentheses. Column (1) (“All Students”) includes all students enrolling between Fall 2010 to Fall 2018 who are US citizens or permanent residents, who can be classified by their pre-college political orientation (Liberal, Moderate, or Conservative) based on either the L2 or survey data, or who were not registered to vote before college. See Table A.4 for summary statistics on all students, including those excluded from primary analyses.

Table II. Within-Student Changes in Self-Reported Ideology and Partisanship

Follow-Up Partisanship	Baseline Partisanship		
<i>Campus Survey</i>	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Conservative</i>
Liberal	93.5%	47.7%	13.8%
Moderate	5.5%	43.0%	17.9%
Conservative	1.0%	9.3%	68.4%
N at Baseline	3,443	1,049	1,154
<i>Voter Records</i>	<i>Democrat</i>	<i>Independent</i>	<i>Republican</i>
Democrat	95.1%	20.3%	13.9%
Independent	1.9%	76.2%	5.2%
Republican	3.0%	3.6%	80.9%
N At Baseline	3,019	843	902

Note: Top panel contains students who responded to a campus-wide survey on political beliefs multiple times. Bottom panel contains voter records information for individuals registered before starting college. Partisanship either comes from party registration or from participation in partisan primaries when the student is not registered with a political party. Voter record at baseline is the closest record to the year of college start. Follow-up voter registration is the first available record starting in students' last semester in college.

Table III. Within-Student Changes in Political Preferences

Follow-Up Partisanship	Baseline Partisanship			
	<i>Liberal</i>	<i>Moderate</i>	<i>Conservative</i>	<i>Not Registered</i>
Democrat	59.9%	31.4%	25.3%	29.9%
Non-Partisan	33.4%	57.7%	40.8%	56.2%
Republican	3.3%	6.1%	29.5%	4.2%
Not Registered	3.4%	4.8%	4.4%	9.7%
N	11,113	3,501	3,700	34,285

Note: Party affiliations at the end of college based on students' political ideology when they enter college. Baseline ideology is measured either from party registration of participation in political primaries pre-college, or from a student survey taken during students' first year in college. Voter record at baseline is the closest record to the year of college start. Endline voter registration is the first available record starting in students' last semester in college.

Table IV. Estimated Effects of Democratic Faculty on Student Party Affiliation

	Correlation	Add Dept. FE	Add Course FE	Add Lagged Ideol.	Add Covariates
<i>Democrat Post-College</i>					
Instructor Democratic	0.0060** (0.0024)	-0.0004 (0.0017)	0.0004 (0.0016)	0.0001 (0.0015)	-0.0012 (0.0016)
Moderate				-0.2329*** (0.0094)	-0.2178*** (0.0093)
Conservative				-0.2662*** (0.0090)	-0.2562*** (0.0089)
Department Fixed Effects		X			
Course Fixed Effects			X	X	X
Student Covariates					X
Course Covariates					X
R-Squared	0.262	0.263	0.265	0.303	0.331
N Enrollments	467,455	467,455	467,455	467,455	467,455
N Students	43,321	43,321	43,321	43,321	43,321
Outcome Mean	0.358	0.358	0.358	0.358	0.358
<i>Republican Post-College</i>					
Instructor Democratic	-0.0034*** (0.0013)	0.0005 (0.0009)	-0.0001 (0.0009)	0.0000 (0.0009)	0.0006 (0.0010)
Moderate				0.0368*** (0.0049)	0.0327*** (0.0049)
Conservative				0.2387*** (0.0078)	0.2293*** (0.0078)
Department Fixed Effects		X			
Course Fixed Effects			X	X	X
Student Covariates					X
Course Covariates					X
R-Squared	0.014	0.015	0.017	0.106	0.112
N Enrollments	467,455	467,455	467,455	467,455	467,455
N Students	43,321	43,321	43,321	43,321	43,321
Outcome Mean	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062

Note: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (standard errors clustered at student and course level). The standard deviation in the number of courses with a Democrat is approximately 3.2; estimates can be scaled accordingly. Regressions are weighted such that coefficients represent the effect of a modal (4-credit) course. We include introductory and intermediate (100- and 200-level) courses. Dept. = department, Ideol. = ideology. All regressions include cohort and class term fixed effects. Columns 4 and 5 also control for whether the student was registered pre-college, and the source of their baseline ideology (the survey or voter records). Student covariates are gender, race/ethnicity, parent education, in-state status, family household income, high school GPA and SAT/ACT scores, athlete status, and honors program participation. Course covariates are enrollment, instructor characteristics (rank, predicted gender and race, GPA and course evaluations in previous semesters), and class start time.

Table V. Estimated Effects of Democratic Faculty, by Baseline Partisanship

	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Registered	Not Registered
<i>Democrat Post-College</i>					
Instructor Democratic	-0.0025 (0.0024)	0.0082 (0.0056)	-0.0051 (0.0056)	-0.0012 (0.0032)	-0.0018 (0.0018)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.387	0.263	0.242	0.365	0.313
N Enrollments	124,764	40,957	43,207	95,725	371,721
N Students	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,036	34,285
Outcome Mean	0.599	0.315	0.253	0.583	0.299
<i>Republican Post-College</i>					
Instructor Democratic	0.0009 (0.0012)	-0.0008 (0.0043)	0.0011 (0.0050)	-0.0017 (0.0026)	0.0016* (0.0009)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.022	0.057	0.421	0.294	0.033
N Enrollments	124,764	40,957	43,207	95,725	371,721
N Students	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,036	34,285
Outcome Mean	0.033	0.061	0.296	0.141	0.042

Note: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (standard errors clustered at student and course level). The standard deviation in the number of courses with a Democrat is approximately 3.2 for the first four samples and 3.0 for non-registered; estimates can be scaled accordingly. Regressions are weighted such that coefficients represent the effect of a modal (4-credit) course. We include introductory and intermediate (100- and 200-level) courses. All regressions include cohort and class term fixed effects and control for the source of their baseline ideology (the survey or voter records). Regressions in the left panel control for registration status pre-college and regressions in the right panel control for baseline political preferences. Student covariates are gender, race/ethnicity, parent education, in-state status, family household income, high school GPA and SAT/ACT scores, athlete status, and honors program participation. Course covariates are enrollment, instructor characteristics (rank, predicted gender and race, GPA and course evaluations in previous semesters), and class start time.

Table VI. Estimated Effects of Democratic Faculty in Humanities and Social Sciences

	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Registered	Not Registered
<i>Democrat Post-College</i>						
Instructor Democratic	-0.0028 (0.0022)	-0.0024 (0.0038)	-0.0076 (0.0091)	-0.0137 (0.0091)	-0.0079* (0.0047)	-0.0027 (0.0025)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.334	0.395	0.281	0.256	0.375	0.313
N Enrollments	161,127	43,900	12,736	13,518	32,787	128,332
N Students	38,110	9,990	3,045	3,217	7,893	30,217
Outcome Mean	0.364	0.593	0.317	0.260	0.583	0.307
<i>Republican Post-College</i>						
Instructor Democratic	0.0039*** (0.0014)	0.0023 (0.0019)	0.0075 (0.0073)	0.0130* (0.0067)	0.0064* (0.0035)	0.0035*** (0.0013)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.116	0.027	0.069	0.440	0.308	0.037
N Enrollments	161,127	43,900	12,736	13,518	32,787	128,332
N Students	38,110	9,990	3,045	3,217	7,893	30,217
Outcome Mean	0.062	0.033	0.061	0.288	0.136	0.042

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (standard errors clustered at student and course level). The standard deviation in the number of courses with a Democrat is approximately 1.69 for the first four samples and 3.0 for non-registered; estimates can be scaled accordingly. Regressions are weighted such that coefficients represent the effect of a modal (4-credit) course. We include introductory and intermediate (100- and 200-level) courses. All regressions include cohort and class term fixed effects and control for the source of their baseline ideology (the survey or voter records). Regressions split by partisanship control for registration status pre-college and vice versa; pooled regression controls for both. Student covariates are gender, race/ethnicity, parent education, in-state status, family household income, high school GPA and SAT/ACT scores, athlete status, and honors program participation. Course covariates are enrollment, instructor characteristics (rank, predicted gender and race, GPA and course evaluations in previous semesters), and class start time.


Table VII. Estimated Effects of Democratic Faculty, Student-Level Regressions

	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Registered	Not Registered
<i>Democrat Post-College</i>						
Share Instructors Democrat	-0.0113 (0.0116)	-0.0055 (0.0237)	0.0526 (0.0483)	-0.0114 (0.0423)	0.0022 (0.0253)	-0.0176 (0.0127)
Expected Share Democrat	-0.0513* (0.0292)	0.0520 (0.0595)	-0.1366 (0.1252)	-0.0386 (0.1126)	0.0046 (0.0642)	-0.0523 (0.0321)
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Expected Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.345	0.398	0.256	0.236	0.378	0.319
N Students	43,321	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,036	34,285
Outcome Mean	0.356	0.599	0.315	0.253	0.583	0.299
<i>Republican Post-College</i>						
Share Instructors Democrat	0.0009 (0.0067)	-0.0021 (0.0115)	-0.0119 (0.0266)	0.0007 (0.0381)	-0.0216 (0.0188)	0.0090 (0.0063)
Expected Share Democrat	-0.0185 (0.0165)	-0.0139 (0.0270)	-0.0463 (0.0655)	-0.1890* (0.1003)	-0.0702 (0.0468)	-0.0091 (0.0153)
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Expected Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.130	0.020	0.050	0.451	0.323	0.033
N Students	43,321	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,036	34,285
Outcome Mean	0.062	0.033	0.061	0.296	0.141	0.042

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (robust standard errors). In these regressions, we collapse the data to the student level and regress end-of-college partisanship on the share of courses taught by Democrats. We control for expected exposure to Democratic instructors to account for student sorting into courses, following the approach in Borusyak and Hull (2023). Regressions include cohort fixed effects and control for the source of students' baseline ideology (the survey or voter records). Regressions split by partisanship control for registration status pre-college and vice versa; pooled regression controls for both. Student covariates are gender, race/ethnicity, parent education, in-state status, family household income, high school GPA and SAT/ACT scores, athlete status, and honors program participation. Course covariates are enrollment, instructor characteristics (rank, predicted gender and race, GPA and course evaluations in previous semesters), and class start time. We also control for the expected value of the other course covariates, since students may sort along these characteristics as well.


Figures

Figure I. Sample of State Flagship Universities With Partisanship Information




Note: State flagship universities and whether partisanship is identified for each state. See Appendix Table A.1 for a list of schools and available years of salary data.

Figure II. Party Affiliation Among State Flagship Faculty




Note: College faculty (professors, lecturers, and other instructors of record) at 33 public flagship universities, linked to voter registration records. Non-voters are comprised of individuals we do not locate in the voter data.

Figure III. Party Affiliation by Academic Field




Note: College faculty (professors and lecturers) at 14 public flagship universities with known department affiliations, linked to voter registration records. Non-voters are comprised of individuals we do not locate in the voter data. Y-axis shows the share of faculty across all schools with each partisan affiliation; Figure A.3 shows this same statistic for the average field instead. Fields are defined by 2-digit CIP codes; see Appendix C for details.

Figure IV. Change in Student Ideology During College by Department




Note: Change in share of students who identify as liberal from their first to last survey response. 95 percent confidence intervals for the difference are shown. We omit fields with fewer than 25 graduates.

Figure V. Correlation Across Fields in Student and Instructor Partisanship




Note: The x-axis plots the share of course instructors in each field identified as a Democrat based on L2 voter files; the y-axis plots the average share of students in each course who identify as liberal in the left panel and conservative in the right panel. Student ideology is measured no later than students' first year in college and comes from a combination of a survey taken during college and pre-college voter records. We keep all academic fields with at least 25 unique courses across all years. Standard errors on the slope coefficients are robust.

Figure VI. Differences in Course Topic Exposure by Baseline Ideology




Note: Figure plots the difference in enrollment in courses where the course description contains any phrases in the Trump administration's list of flagged phrases for federal grants, by student baseline ideology. In both panels, the reference group is students who were liberal at baseline. We cluster standard errors at the student level and present 95 percent confidence intervals. We group phrases following the coding scheme in Appendix Table A.20.

Figure VII. Differences in Left-Leaning Phrases by Instructor Partisanship



Note: Figure plots the difference in the proportion of course descriptions containing keywords in the Trump administration's list of phrases that will be flagged in federal grant applications, by the instructor's partisanship (Democrat versus other). The blank bar contains the raw difference. The dark blue bar contains the difference within the same course (i.e., from a regression with course fixed effects), with 95 percent confidence intervals clustered at the course level. We group phrases following the coding scheme in Appendix Table A.20.

Figure VIII. Department-Level Supply and Demand of Liberal Course Topics



Note: Figure plots estimates from a two-way fixed effects regression that estimates the within-department change in the share of courses with liberal course topics when more courses are taught by Democrats (left), or more course enrollments are from liberal students (right). Estimates are scaled to represent a ten percentage point change in the share of Democratic instructors or liberal students (both are approximately one standard deviation). Standard errors are clustered at the department level. Liberal topics are identified from keywords in the Trump administration's list of phrases that will be flagged in federal grant applications. We group phrases following the coding scheme in Appendix Table A.20.

A.1 Appendix Tables and Figures

Table A.1. Flagship University Data Description

	Payroll Data	Share Faculty Merged to L2	First Year	Last Year	Party: Registration	Party: Primary	Party: Modeled	Can ID Department
	University of Alaska-Fairbanks	Yes	0.62	2008	2023	Yes		Yes
	University of Alabama-Tuscaloosa	No						
	University of Arkansas-Fayetteville	Yes	0.58	2017	2017	Yes		Yes
	University of Arizona	Yes	0.75	2017	2023	Yes		Yes
	University of California-Berkeley	Yes	0.83	2006	2015	Yes		Yes
	University of Colorado-Boulder	Yes	0.78	2020	2023	Yes		
	University of Connecticut-Storrs	No						
	University of Delaware-Newark	Yes	0.68	2020	2022	Yes		
	University of Florida-Gainesville	Yes	0.64	2018	2023	Yes		
	University of Georgia-Athens	Yes	0.77	2017	2023	No	Yes	No
	University of Hawai'i at Manoa	Yes	0.11	2010	2023	No	No	Yes
	University of Iowa	Yes	0.72	2017	2023	Yes		
	University of Idaho-Moscow	Yes	0.64	2017	2023	Yes		
	University of Illinois-Urbana-Champaign	Yes	0.74	2016	2023	No	Yes	No
	Indiana University-Bloomington	Yes	0.72	2011	2022	No	Yes	No
	University of Kansas	Yes	0.72	2017	2023	Yes		
	University of Kentucky	Yes	0.74	2017	2023	Yes		
	Louisiana State University	Yes	0.50	2019	2022	Yes		
	University of Massachusetts-Amherst	Yes	0.70	2017	2023	Yes		
	University of Maryland-College Park	No						
	University of Maine	Yes	0.76	2017	2023	Yes		Yes
	University of Michigan-Ann Arbor	Yes	0.78	2012	2023	No	Yes	No
	University of Minnesota	Yes	0.71	2017	2023	No	No	Yes
	University of Missouri-Columbia	Yes	0.73	2019	2023	No	No	Yes
	University of Mississippi	No						
	University of Montana-Missoula	Yes	0.79	2017	2023	No	No	Yes
	University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill	Yes	0.73	2017	2023	Yes		Yes
	University of North Dakota	No						
	University of Nebraska-Lincoln	Yes	0.74	2017	2023	Yes		
	University of New Hampshire	Yes	0.70	2018	2023	Yes		
	Rutgers University	No						
	University of New Mexico	Yes	0.71	2023	2023	Yes		Yes
	University of Nevada-Reno	Yes	0.69	2017	2023	Yes		Yes
	Stony Brook University	Yes	0.74	2017	2023	Yes		
	The Ohio State University	Yes	0.75	2017	2023	No	Yes	No
	University of Oklahoma	No						
	University of Oregon	Yes	0.79	2017	2023	Yes		Yes
	Pennsylvania State University	Yes	0.80	2017	2023	Yes		
	University of Rhode Island	No						
	University of South Carolina	Yes	0.74	2017	2023	No	Yes	No
	University of South Dakota	No						
	University of Tennessee	No						
	University of Texas at Austin	Yes	0.78	2023	2023	No	Yes	No
	University of Utah	Yes	0.68	2017	2023	Yes		Yes
	University of Virginia	Yes	0.75	2017	2023	No	Yes	No

University of Vermont	Yes	0.76	2017	2020	No	No	Yes	Yes
University of Washington	Yes	0.77	2017	2022	No	Yes	No	
University of Wisconsin-Madison	Yes	0.78	2010	2023	Yes	No	Yes	
West Virginia University	No							
University of Wyoming	Yes	0.56	2017	2023	Yes			

Note: List of state flagship universities and whether we are able to identify the partisanship of faculty at each school. We measure partisanship by merging faculty names to state voter registration files from L2.

Table A.2. Baseline Ideology Measurement and Sample Criteria

Baseline Ideology Source	Registered	Not Registered
Survey	4,272	9,278
Voter Records	4,764	–
Neither	<i>9,594</i>	25,007
N Excluded From Sample	<i>9,594</i>	–
N Included in Sample	9,036	34,285
Total N	18,630	34,285

Note: Table describes our main analysis sample and the source of their baseline ideology data. Bolded cells are included in the main analyses, while italicized cells are only included in robustness checks. We define students' baseline political ideology based on a combination of voter records and a campuswide survey completed during their freshman year; when both measures are present, we prioritize voter records. We include students who were not registered to vote prior to college ($N = 34,285$), and classify their ideology based on the survey when available. Our main sample excludes students who were registered to vote prior to college but whose baseline ideology is not measured in either data source ($N = 9,594$).

Table A.3. Source of Baseline Student Ideology Measures

Baseline Ideology Source	Analysis Sample	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Not Registered
Survey	13,496	8,063	2,646	2,787	9,278
Voter Records	4,818	3,050	855	913	0
Neither	25,007	0	0	0	25,007
Total N	43,321	11,113	3,501	3,700	34,285

Note: Table describes the source of our baseline ideology measures for students included in the main analysis sample. Students are classified as liberal at baseline if they either were registered to vote and affiliated with a liberal political party (Democratic, Green, Peace) prior to entering college, or if they indicated they were liberal on a campuswide survey during their freshman year; when both measures are present, we prioritize voter records. Students are classified as conservative if they are registered and affiliated with a conservative political party (Republican, Libertarian, Constitution, American, Conservative) or indicated they were conservative on the survey. Students are classified as moderate if they are registered as an independent before college or indicated they were a moderate on the campuswide survey. We include students who were not registered to vote prior to college, and classify their ideology based on the survey when available.

Table A.4. Student Sample Characteristics

	All Students	By Baseline Ideology				By Pre-College Voter Reg.	
		Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Reg. Unknown	Registered	Non-Registered
N	52,915	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,594	9,036	34,285
Ever Registered to Vote	0.937 (0.243)	0.966 (0.181)	0.952*** (0.213)	0.956*** (0.205)	1.000 (0.000)	1.000 (0.000)	0.903*** (0.296)
Non-Registered Pre-College	0.648 (0.478)	0.496 (0.500)	0.539*** (0.499)	0.508 (0.500)			
Baseline Ideol. From Voter Data	0.263 (0.440)	0.274 (0.446)	0.244*** (0.430)	0.247*** (0.431)		0.527 (0.499)	
Female	0.491 (0.500)	0.619 (0.486)	0.505*** (0.500)	0.446*** (0.497)	0.430*** (0.495)	0.515 (0.500)	0.501** (0.500)
White	0.728 (0.445)	0.707 (0.455)	0.691* (0.462)	0.826*** (0.379)	0.762*** (0.426)	0.754 (0.431)	0.712*** (0.453)
Black	0.054 (0.227)	0.059 (0.236)	0.058 (0.233)	0.019*** (0.138)	0.048*** (0.215)	0.047 (0.212)	0.058*** (0.234)
Hispanic	0.056 (0.231)	0.060 (0.237)	0.073*** (0.261)	0.043*** (0.203)	0.053* (0.225)	0.063 (0.242)	0.056** (0.229)
Asian	0.148 (0.355)	0.168 (0.374)	0.179 (0.383)	0.081*** (0.273)	0.120*** (0.325)	0.133 (0.340)	0.159*** (0.366)
In-State	0.597 (0.490)	0.654 (0.476)	0.604*** (0.489)	0.658 (0.474)	0.523*** (0.499)	0.597 (0.490)	0.618*** (0.486)
HH Income < \$50k	0.122 (0.327)	0.146 (0.353)	0.160** (0.367)	0.095*** (0.293)	0.101*** (0.301)	0.129 (0.335)	0.126 (0.332)
HH Income \$50k-100k	0.150 (0.357)	0.170 (0.376)	0.170 (0.376)	0.161 (0.368)	0.131*** (0.338)	0.151 (0.358)	0.155 (0.362)
HH Income \$100k-200k	0.215 (0.411)	0.255 (0.436)	0.229*** (0.420)	0.251 (0.433)	0.201*** (0.401)	0.233 (0.423)	0.214*** (0.410)
HH Income \$200k+	0.231 (0.422)	0.208 (0.406)	0.215 (0.411)	0.262*** (0.440)	0.262*** (0.440)	0.239 (0.427)	0.220*** (0.414)
HS GPA	3.814 (0.191)	3.850 (0.148)	3.842*** (0.158)	3.853 (0.153)	3.811*** (0.181)	3.847 (0.145)	3.806*** (0.202)
ACT (if reported)	29.9 (3.4)	30.4 (3.3)	30.1*** (3.4)	30.2** (3.2)	29.9*** (3.5)	30.4 (3.4)	29.8*** (3.4)
SAT (if reported)	1356 (130)	1382 (120)	1365*** (130)	1363*** (122)	1353*** (127)	1384 (123)	1348*** (132)
Athlete	0.036 (0.186)	0.016 (0.126)	0.031*** (0.174)	0.039*** (0.195)	0.038*** (0.191)	0.023 (0.151)	0.038*** (0.192)
Honors Program	0.065 (0.246)	0.093 (0.291)	0.063*** (0.243)	0.055*** (0.228)	0.060*** (0.237)	0.079 (0.270)	0.063*** (0.242)

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (two-sided t-tests). T-tests for Moderates, Conservatives, and Registered Unknown are relative to Liberals, while t-tests for non-registered students are relative to registered students. Summary statistics are presented as means with standard deviations in parentheses. Column (1) (“All Students”) includes all students enrolling between Fall 2010 to Fall 2018 who are US citizens or permanent residents.

Table A.5. Demographic Differences By Ideology and Party Affiliation

	Pre-College: Liberal		Post-College: Democrat	
	Bivariate	Multivariate	Bivariate	Multivariate
Female	0.140*** (0.007)	0.149*** (0.007)	0.075*** (0.007)	0.073*** (0.007)
<i>Race/Ethnicity (vs White)</i>				
Black	0.116*** (0.015)	0.122*** (0.016)	0.095*** (0.017)	0.098*** (0.017)
Hispanic	0.018 (0.015)	0.025 (0.016)	0.030* (0.015)	0.045*** (0.016)
Asian	0.080*** (0.010)	0.056*** (0.010)	0.018* (0.010)	0.041*** (0.010)
Other Race	-0.009 (0.015)	-0.009 (0.014)	-0.046*** (0.013)	-0.076*** (0.014)
First-Gen	0.019* (0.010)	0.003 (0.012)	-0.025* (0.011)	0.016 (0.011)
Single-Parent Household	0.057*** (0.010)	0.037*** (0.011)	-0.016 (0.010)	0.003 (0.010)
In-State	0.023*** (0.008)	0.033*** (0.008)	0.166*** (0.008)	0.112*** (0.008)
<i>Parent Household Income (vs \$200k+)</i>				
HH Income <\$50k	0.067*** (0.012)	0.052*** (0.014)	-0.017 (0.014)	0.014 (0.013)
HH Income \$50k-100k	0.039*** (0.012)	0.036*** (0.012)	-0.030*** (0.012)	-0.028** (0.012)
HH Income \$100k-200k	0.047*** (0.011)	0.045*** (0.011)	-0.012 (0.010)	0.005 (0.011)
HS GPA	0.029 (0.024)	-0.121*** (0.026)	-0.032 (0.025)	0.192*** (0.024)
SAT/ACT Percentile Rank	0.001*** (0.000)	0.001*** (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)
Athlete	-0.219*** (0.025)	-0.202*** (0.025)	-0.088*** (0.024)	-0.116*** (0.025)
Honors Program	0.115*** (0.012)	0.094*** (0.012)	0.027** (0.012)	0.026* (0.013)
Matriculated 2016 or Later	0.047*** (0.007)	0.050*** (0.007)	0.381*** (0.007)	0.365*** (0.007)
Dep. Var. Mean	0.607	0.607	0.475	0.475
N	18,408	18,408	18,408	18,408

Note: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (robust standard errors). Sample consists of students with known baseline partisanship, either due to responding to a university-wide survey or being registered to vote prior to college. Bivariate coefficients are for each variable separately (where all of race/ethnicity and all household income indicators are considered one variable). Test score percentile rank takes the highest of students' scores, since students often report only one of the ACT/SAT. Regression includes indicators for missing covariates.

Table A.6. Balance Tests for Student Sorting Into Course Section

Student Characteristic	Difference (std. err.)	Sample Mean	N Enrollments	N Students
Liberal at Baseline	0.0035 (0.0022)	0.2565	467,455	43,321
Moderate at Baseline	0.0012 (0.0011)	0.0808	467,455	43,321
Conservative at Baseline	0.0010 (0.0011)	0.0854	467,455	43,321
Not Registered Pre-College	0.0016 (0.0021)	0.2086	467,455	43,321
Baseline Ideol. From Voter File	0.0001 (0.0020)	0.1112	467,455	43,321
Female	0.0024 (0.0032)	0.5038	467,455	43,321
White	-0.0010 (0.0025)	0.7208	467,455	43,321
Black	0.0022 (0.0022)	0.0558	467,455	43,321
Hispanic	-0.0006 (0.0012)	0.0572	467,455	43,321
Asian	-0.0015 (0.0015)	0.1541	467,455	43,321
Other Race	0.0018 (0.0021)	0.0710	467,455	43,321
First-Generation	0.0004 (0.0010)	0.1311	467,455	43,321
Single-Parent HH	0.0015 (0.0019)	0.1510	467,455	43,321
In-State	0.0048** (0.0024)	0.6138	467,455	43,321
HH Income <\$50k	0.0036* (0.0022)	0.1264	467,455	43,321
HH Income \$50k-100k	-0.0022 (0.0015)	0.1542	467,455	43,321
HH Income \$100k-200k	-0.0003 (0.0021)	0.2183	467,455	43,321
HH Income \$200k+	0.0056** (0.0023)	0.2241	467,455	43,321
HS GPA	-0.0002 (0.0011)	3.8149	467,455	43,321
SAT/ACT Percentile Rank	-0.2515 (0.1573)	46.3407	467,455	43,321
Athlete	-0.0005 (0.0012)	0.0352	467,455	43,321
Honors Program	-0.0029* (0.0016)	0.0660	467,455	43,321

Note: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (standard errors clustered at student and course level). All regressions include class term fixed effects and the following course covariates: enrollment, instructor characteristics (rank, predicted gender and race, GPA and course evaluations in previous semesters), and class start time.

Table A.7. Estimated Effects of Faculty on Student Partisanship, All Covariates

	Correlation	Add Dept. FE	Add Course FE	Add Lagged Ideol.	Add Covariates	Correlation	Add Dept. FE	Add Course FE	Add Lagged Ideol.	Add Covariates
<i>Democrat Post-College</i>						<i>Republican Post-College</i>				
Instructor Democratic	0.0060** (0.0024)	-0.0004 (0.0017)	0.0004 (0.0016)	0.0001 (0.0015)	-0.0012 (0.0016)	-0.0034*** (0.0013)	0.0005 (0.0009)	-0.0001 (0.0009)	0.0000 (0.0009)	0.0006 (0.0010)
Baseline Ideol. From Voter File				0.0905*** (0.0109)	0.1101*** (0.0106)			0.0950*** (0.0078)	0.0902*** (0.0077)	
Not Registered Pre-College				-0.0435*** (0.0085)	-0.0558*** (0.0083)			-0.0503*** (0.0055)	-0.0480*** (0.0055)	
<i>Baseline Ideology</i>										
Moderate				-0.2329*** (0.0094)	-0.2178*** (0.0093)			0.0368*** (0.0049)	0.0327*** (0.0049)	
Conservative				-0.2662*** (0.0090)	-0.2562*** (0.0089)			0.2387*** (0.0078)	0.2293*** (0.0078)	
<i>Demographics</i>										
Female					0.0483*** (0.0045)				-0.0292*** (0.0026)	
Black					0.0611*** (0.0108)				-0.0174*** (0.0050)	
Hispanic					0.0092 (0.0100)				-0.0039 (0.0057)	
Asian					0.0119** (0.0060)				-0.0311*** (0.0030)	
Other Race					0.0054 (0.0083)				-0.0149*** (0.0048)	
First-Gen					-0.0206*** (0.0072)				-0.0020 (0.0040)	
Single-Parent HH					-0.0171*** (0.0064)				-0.0035 (0.0035)	
In-State					0.1630*** (0.0050)				-0.0124*** (0.0027)	
HH Income <\$50k					-0.0300*** (0.0087)				-0.0088* (0.0049)	
HH Income \$50k-100k					-0.0233*** (0.0075)				0.0048 (0.0044)	
HH Income \$100k-200k					-0.0158** (0.0064)				-0.0028 (0.0038)	
HS GPA					-0.0412*** (0.0127)				0.0107 (0.0074)	
SAT/ACT Percentile Rank					0.0003*** (0.0001)				-0.0001** (0.0001)	
Athlete					-0.0439*** (0.0117)				0.0155* (0.0079)	
Honors Program					0.0160** (0.0079)				-0.0025 (0.0041)	
<i>Course Characteristics</i>										
N Students in Course					0.0000 (0.0000)				0.0000 (0.0000)	
Assistant Professor					0.0004 (0.0027)				-0.0002 (0.0018)	
Associate Professor					0.0019 (0.0033)				-0.0010 (0.0018)	
Full Professor					-0.0026				0.0006	

Instructor Rank Unknown					(0.0028)					(0.0014)
					-0.0014					0.0024**
Instructor Lagged GPA					(0.0019)					(0.0011)
					0.0017					0.0006
Instructor Lagged Course Eval.					(0.0027)					(0.0012)
					0.0039					0.0004
Prob. Instructor Asian					(0.0029)					(0.0015)
					-0.0025					0.0016
Prob. Instructor Black					(0.0036)					(0.0019)
					-0.0045					0.0002
Prob. Instructor Hispanic					(0.0041)					(0.0024)
					0.0072					0.0036
Prob. Instructor Other Race					(0.0107)					(0.0051)
					-0.0149					-0.0321
Prob. Instructor Female					(0.0563)					(0.0310)
					0.0032**					-0.0007
					(0.0016)					(0.0010)
<i>Class Start Time (omitted: before 9am)</i>										
Class Start 9am-12pm					0.0001					-0.0008
					(0.0022)					(0.0014)
Class Start 12pm-3pm					0.0024					-0.0017
					(0.0027)					(0.0014)
Class Start 3pm-6pm					0.0042					-0.0040**
					(0.0036)					(0.0018)
Dept. Fixed Effects		X					X			
Course Fixed Effects			X					X		
R-Squared	0.262	0.263	0.265	0.303	0.331	0.014	0.015	0.017	0.106	0.112
N Enrollments	467,455	467,455	467,455	467,455	467,455	467,455	467,455	467,455	467,455	467,455
N Students	43,321	43,321	43,321	43,321	43,321	43,321	43,321	43,321	43,321	43,321
Outcome Mean	0.358	0.358	0.358	0.358	0.358	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062	0.062

Note: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (standard errors clustered at student and course level). The standard deviation in the number of courses with a Democrat is approximately 3.2; estimates can be scaled accordingly. Regressions are weighted such that coefficients represent the effect of a modal (4-credit) course. We include introductory and intermediate (100- and 200-level) courses. Dept. = department, Ideol. = ideology. All regressions include cohort and class term fixed effects.

Table A.8. Estimated Effects of Democratic Faculty, Student-Level Regressions

	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Registered	Not Registered
<i>Democrat Post-College</i>						
0-25% Courses Democrat	-0.0035 (0.0063)	-0.0200 (0.0131)	-0.0117 (0.0260)	0.0411* (0.0212)	-0.0110 (0.0141)	-0.0029 (0.0069)
50-75% Courses Democrat	-0.0029 (0.0045)	-0.0018 (0.0087)	0.0194 (0.0166)	0.0301* (0.0156)	0.0029 (0.0101)	-0.0052 (0.0049)
75-100% Courses Democrat	-0.0261*** (0.0081)	-0.0293* (0.0153)	-0.0547* (0.0312)	-0.0016 (0.0320)	-0.0249 (0.0167)	-0.0287*** (0.0090)
Expected Democrat Share FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Expected Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.345	0.398	0.257	0.237	0.378	0.319
N Students	43,321	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,036	34,285
Outcome Mean	0.356	0.599	0.315	0.253	0.583	0.299
<i>Republican Post-College</i>						
0-25% Courses Democrat	-0.0005 (0.0037)	0.0037 (0.0066)	0.0179 (0.0163)	-0.0296 (0.0184)	0.0036 (0.0111)	-0.0034 (0.0035)
50-75% Courses Democrat	0.0004 (0.0026)	0.0025 (0.0041)	-0.0063 (0.0091)	-0.0143 (0.0139)	-0.0108 (0.0072)	0.0032 (0.0026)
75-100% Courses Democrat	0.0013 (0.0045)	-0.0018 (0.0069)	0.0268 (0.0210)	-0.0202 (0.0301)	-0.0062 (0.0120)	0.0027 (0.0044)
Expected Democrat Share FE	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Expected Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.130	0.020	0.051	0.452	0.324	0.033
N Students	43,321	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,036	34,285
Outcome Mean	0.062	0.033	0.061	0.296	0.141	0.042

Note: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (robust standard errors). In these regressions, we collapse the data to the student level and regress end-of-college partisanship on the share of courses taught by Democrats. We categorize students based on the share of courses, omitting the “25-50% Courses Democrat” group because it is the largest. We include fixed effects for each expected exposure bin to account for student sorting into courses, following the approach in Borusyak and Hull (2023). Regressions include cohort fixed effects and control for the source of students’ baseline ideology (the survey or voter records). Regressions split by partisanship control for registration status pre-college and vice versa; pooled regression controls for both. Student covariates are gender, race/ethnicity, parent education, in-state status, family household income, high school GPA and SAT/ACT scores, athlete status, and honors program participation. Course covariates are enrollment, instructor characteristics (rank, predicted gender and race, GPA and course evaluations in previous semesters), and class start time. We also control for the expected value of the other course covariates, since students may sort along these characteristics as well.

Table A.9. Estimated Effects of All Faculty Partisanship Groups

	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Registered	Not Registered
<i>Democrat Post-College</i>						
Instructor Republican	-0.0031 (0.0032)	-0.0019 (0.0044)	-0.0103 (0.0073)	-0.0016 (0.0073)	-0.0013 (0.0050)	-0.0028 (0.0039)
Instructor Registered Other	0.0048* (0.0029)	0.0029 (0.0039)	-0.0119 (0.0087)	0.0072 (0.0081)	0.0011 (0.0070)	0.0069** (0.0034)
Instructor Non-Voter	0.0021 (0.0017)	0.0027 (0.0029)	-0.0038 (0.0071)	0.0088 (0.0067)	0.0030 (0.0041)	0.0021 (0.0018)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.331	0.387	0.263	0.242	0.365	0.313
N Enrollments	467,455	124,764	40,957	43,207	95,725	371,721
N Students	43,321	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,036	34,285
Outcome Mean	0.356	0.599	0.315	0.253	0.583	0.299
<i>Republican Post-College</i>						
Instructor Republican	0.0002 (0.0012)	0.0011 (0.0022)	0.0033 (0.0070)	0.0050 (0.0067)	0.0064 (0.0039)	-0.0017 (0.0013)
Instructor Registered Other	-0.0005 (0.0017)	-0.0007 (0.0020)	-0.0011 (0.0049)	0.0007 (0.0070)	0.0054 (0.0049)	-0.0026* (0.0015)
Instructor Non-Voter	-0.0011 (0.0013)	-0.0021 (0.0014)	-0.0003 (0.0048)	-0.0035 (0.0063)	-0.0015 (0.0033)	-0.0012 (0.0012)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.112	0.022	0.056	0.421	0.294	0.033
N Enrollments	467,455	124,764	40,957	43,207	95,725	371,721
N Students	43,321	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,036	34,285
Outcome Mean	0.062	0.033	0.061	0.296	0.141	0.042

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (standard errors clustered at student and course level). The standard deviation in the number of courses with a Democrat is approximately 3.2 for the first four samples and 3.0 for non-registered; estimates can be scaled accordingly. Regressions are weighted such that coefficients represent the effect of a modal (4-credit) course. We include introductory and intermediate (100- and 200-level) courses. All regressions include cohort and class term fixed effects and control for the source of their baseline ideology (the survey or voter records). Regressions split by partisanship control for registration status pre-college and vice versa; pooled regression controls for both. Student covariates are gender, race/ethnicity, parent education, in-state status, family household income, high school GPA and SAT/ACT scores, athlete status, and honors program participation. Course covariates are enrollment, instructor characteristics (rank, predicted gender and race, GPA and course evaluations in previous semesters), and class start time.

Table A.10. Estimated Effects of All Faculty Partisanship Groups in Humanities and Social Sciences

	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Registered	Not Registered
<i>Democrat Post-College</i>						
Instructor Republican	-0.0035 (0.0063)	-0.0037 (0.0083)	-0.0125 (0.0194)	0.0011 (0.0163)	0.0043 (0.0130)	-0.0029 (0.0083)
Instructor Registered Non-Partisan	0.0016 (0.0057)	0.0065 (0.0067)	-0.0101 (0.0166)	0.0153 (0.0149)	0.0140 (0.0108)	0.0003 (0.0062)
Instructor Non-Voter	0.0045* (0.0024)	0.0028 (0.0041)	0.0139 (0.0104)	0.0161 (0.0114)	0.0077 (0.0061)	0.0044* (0.0026)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.334	0.395	0.281	0.257	0.375	0.313
N Enrollments	161,127	43,900	12,736	13,518	32,787	128,332
N Students	38,110	9,990	3,045	3,217	7,893	30,217
Outcome Mean	0.364	0.593	0.317	0.260	0.583	0.307
<i>Republican Post-College</i>						
Instructor Republican	0.0023 (0.0029)	0.0008 (0.0039)	-0.0059 (0.0124)	0.0131 (0.0148)	0.0040 (0.0091)	0.0011 (0.0023)
Instructor Registered Non-Partisan	-0.0024 (0.0033)	0.0056 (0.0038)	-0.0164* (0.0089)	-0.0072 (0.0160)	0.0033 (0.0064)	-0.0043 (0.0032)
Instructor Non-Voter	-0.0051*** (0.0016)	-0.0046** (0.0022)	-0.0060 (0.0087)	-0.0188** (0.0077)	-0.0104** (0.0040)	-0.0041** (0.0016)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.116	0.027	0.069	0.44	0.308	0.037
N Enrollments	161,127	43,900	12,736	13,518	32,787	128,332
N Students	38,110	9,990	3,045	3,217	7,893	30,217
Outcome Mean	0.062	0.033	0.061	0.288	0.136	0.042

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (standard errors clustered at student and course level). The standard deviation in the number of courses with a Democrat is approximately 3.2 for the first four samples and 3.0 for non-registered; estimates can be scaled accordingly. Regressions are weighted such that coefficients represent the effect of a modal (4-credit) course. We include introductory and intermediate (100- and 200-level) courses. All regressions include cohort and class term fixed effects and control for whether the student was registered pre-college, and the source of their baseline ideology (the survey or voter records). Regressions split by partisanship control for registration status pre-college and vice versa; pooled regression controls for both. Student covariates are gender, race/ethnicity, parent education, in-state status, family household income, high school GPA and SAT/ACT scores, athlete status, and honors program participation. Course covariates are enrollment, instructor characteristics (rank, predicted gender and race, GPA and course evaluations in previous semesters), and class start time.

Table A.11. Estimated Effects of Faculty Donation Histories on Student Partisanship

	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conserv.	Registered	Not Registered	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conserv.	Registered	Not Registered
	<i>Democrat Post-College</i>						<i>Republican Post-College</i>					
<i>Ever Donated</i>												
Instructor Ever Donated	-0.0002 (0.0018)	0.0025 (0.0027)	0.0015 (0.0063)	-0.0072 (0.0055)	-0.0018 (0.0038)	0.0007 (0.0020)	0.0011 (0.0008)	-0.0005 (0.0013)	-0.0022 (0.0032)	-0.0004 (0.0044)	-0.0015 (0.0024)	0.0016* (0.0008)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
<i>Outcome Mean</i>	<i>0.356</i>	<i>0.599</i>	<i>0.315</i>	<i>0.253</i>	<i>0.583</i>	<i>0.299</i>	<i>0.062</i>	<i>0.033</i>	<i>0.061</i>	<i>0.296</i>	<i>0.141</i>	<i>0.042</i>
R-Squared	0.331	0.387	0.263	0.243	0.365	0.313	0.112	0.022	0.057	0.421	0.294	0.033
N Enrollments	467,455	124,764	40,957	43,207	95,725	371,721	467,455	124,764	40,957	43,207	95,725	371,721
N Students	43,321	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,036	34,285	43,321	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,036	34,285
<i>Categorical Donation Score</i>												
CFScore Below Median	0.0004 (0.0023)	0.0026 (0.0033)	-0.0005 (0.0085)	-0.008 (0.0064)	-0.0007 (0.0044)	0.0009 (0.0025)	0.0005 (0.0010)	-0.0011 (0.0016)	0.0021 (0.0042)	0.0034 (0.0051)	-0.0012 (0.0028)	0.0009 (0.0009)
CFScore Above Median	-0.0008 (0.0020)	0.0025 (0.0033)	0.0033 (0.0073)	-0.0065 (0.0070)	-0.0029 (0.0043)	0.0005 (0.0023)	0.0016 (0.0011)	0.0001 (0.0014)	-0.0060* (0.0033)	-0.0037 (0.0054)	-0.0017 (0.0031)	0.0022* (0.0011)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
<i>Outcome Mean</i>	<i>0.356</i>	<i>0.599</i>	<i>0.315</i>	<i>0.253</i>	<i>0.583</i>	<i>0.299</i>	<i>0.062</i>	<i>0.033</i>	<i>0.061</i>	<i>0.296</i>	<i>0.141</i>	<i>0.042</i>
R-Squared	0.331	0.387	0.263	0.243	0.365	0.313	0.112	0.022	0.057	0.421	0.294	0.033
N Enrollments	467,455	124,764	40,957	43,207	95,725	371,721	467,455	124,764	40,957	43,207	95,725	371,721
N Students	43,321	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,036	34,285	43,321	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,036	34,285
<i>Continuous Donation Score</i>												
Instructor CFScore	0.0009 (0.0019)	0.0015 (0.0024)	0.0006 (0.0086)	0.0012 (0.0074)	-0.0024 (0.0035)	0.0019 (0.0024)	-0.0009 (0.0010)	0.0019 (0.0018)	-0.0072* (0.0041)	-0.0071 (0.0060)	-0.0006 (0.0029)	-0.0002 (0.0009)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
<i>Outcome Mean</i>	<i>0.360</i>	<i>0.597</i>	<i>0.315</i>	<i>0.253</i>	<i>0.580</i>	<i>0.301</i>	<i>0.063</i>	<i>0.033</i>	<i>0.062</i>	<i>0.291</i>	<i>0.141</i>	<i>0.042</i>
R-Squared	0.342	0.400	0.290	0.252	0.379	0.324	0.116	0.028	0.074	0.442	0.305	0.036
N Enrollments	235,870	62,936	19,884	20,945	47,702	188,110	235,870	62,936	19,884	20,945	47,702	188,110
N Students	42,580	10,993	3,643	3,453	8,868	33,712	42,580	10,993	3,643	3,453	8,868	33,712

Note: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (standard errors clustered at student and course level). CFScore = campaign finance score, a standardized measure of the political lean of an individual's campaign donation history (Bonica 2023). Scores are standardized to have mean zero, standard deviation one, where negative scores are more liberal and positive scores are more conservative. The top panel compares students taught by instructors who ever donated to political campaigns versus instructors who did not. The middle panel splits donors based on above and below median CF scores and compares both of these instructor groups to instructors who never donated. Regressions are weighted such that coefficients represent the effect of a modal (4-credit) course. We include introductory and intermediate (100- and 200-level) courses. All regressions include cohort and class term fixed effects and control for the source of their baseline ideology (the survey or voter records). Regressions split by partisanship control for registration status pre-college and vice versa; pooled regression controls for both. Student covariates are gender, race/ethnicity, parent education, in-state status, family household income, high school GPA and SAT/ACT scores, athlete status, and honors program participation. Course covariates are enrollment, instructor characteristics (rank, predicted gender and race, GPA and course evaluations in previous semesters), and class start time.

Table A.12. Estimated Effects of Democratic Faculty, Including Upper-Level Courses

	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Registered	Not Registered
<i>Democrat Post-College</i>						
Instructor Democratic	-0.0007 (0.0012)	-0.0022 (0.0020)	0.0043 (0.0046)	-0.0010 (0.0044)	-0.0027 (0.0025)	-0.0011 (0.0014)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.337	0.392	0.265	0.245	0.369	0.318
N Enrollments	720,728	195,812	62,651	65,912	150,871	569,797
N Students	43,633	11,164	3,514	3,727	9,109	34,524
Outcome Mean	0.357	0.600	0.314	0.253	0.583	0.297
<i>Republican Post-College</i>						
Instructor Democratic	0.0002 (0.0008)	0.0013 (0.0010)	0.0004 (0.0033)	-0.0011 (0.0042)	-0.0010 (0.0020)	0.0011 (0.0007)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.117	0.025	0.069	0.431	0.303	0.035
N Enrollments	720,728	195,812	62,651	65,912	150,871	569,797
N Students	43,633	11,164	3,514	3,727	9,109	34,524
Outcome Mean	0.062	0.033	0.061	0.297	0.141	0.041

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (standard errors clustered at student and course level). The standard deviation in the number of courses with a Democrat is approximately 4.2 for all samples except for liberal students (4.1); estimates can be scaled accordingly. Regressions are weighted such that coefficients represent the effect of a modal (4-credit) course. We include all courses, regardless of level. All regressions include cohort and class term fixed effects and control for the source of their baseline ideology (the survey or voter records). Regressions split by partisanship control for registration status pre-college and vice versa; pooled regression controls for both. Student covariates are gender, race/ethnicity, parent education, in-state status, family household income, high school GPA and SAT/ACT scores, athlete status, and honors program participation. Course covariates are enrollment, instructor characteristics (rank, predicted gender and race, GPA and course evaluations in previous semesters), and class start time.

Table A.13. Estimated Effects of Democratic Faculty in Humanities and Social Sciences, Including Upper-Level Courses

	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Registered	Not Registered
<i>Democrat Post-College</i>						
Instructor Democratic	-0.0007 (0.0018)	-0.0017 (0.0031)	-0.0048 (0.0077)	-0.0115 (0.0075)	-0.0070* (0.0037)	-0.0004 (0.0020)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.342	0.398	0.281	0.259	0.379	0.321
N Enrollments	258,744	73,216	19,864	20,851	54,148	204,537
N Students	39,527	10,288	3,138	3,338	8,211	31,316
Outcome Mean	0.362	0.596	0.314	0.257	0.583	0.304
<i>Republican Post-College</i>						
Instructor Democratic	0.0020* (0.0011)	0.0019 (0.0016)	0.0046 (0.0058)	0.0067 (0.0063)	0.0040 (0.0028)	0.0021* (0.0011)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.124	0.032	0.088	0.459	0.321	0.037
N Enrollments	258,744	73,216	19,864	20,851	54,148	204,537
N Students	39,527	10,288	3,138	3,338	8,211	31,316
Outcome Mean	0.062	0.033	0.061	0.291	0.137	0.042

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (standard errors clustered at student and course level). The standard deviation in the number of courses with a Democrat is (for samples from left to right) 2.7, 2.9, 2.8, 2.6, 2.8, and 2.7; estimates can be scaled accordingly. Regressions are weighted such that coefficients represent the effect of a modal (4-credit) course. We include all courses, regardless of level. All regressions include cohort and class term fixed effects and control for the source of their baseline ideology (the survey or voter records). Regressions split by partisanship control for registration status pre-college and vice versa; pooled regression controls for both. Student covariates are gender, race/ethnicity, parent education, in-state status, family household income, high school GPA and SAT/ACT scores, athlete status, and honors program participation. Course covariates are enrollment, instructor characteristics (rank, predicted gender and race, GPA and course evaluations in previous semesters), and class start time.

Table A.14. Estimated Effects of Faculty on Student Partisanship at Age 25

	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Registered	Not Registered	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Registered	Not Registered
<i>Democrat Post-College</i>							<i>Republican Post-College</i>					
Instructor Democratic	-0.0016 (0.0020)	-0.0042 (0.0039)	-0.0022 (0.0061)	-0.0014 (0.0064)	0.0066 (0.0056)	-0.0029 (0.0023)	0.0004 (0.0010)	0.0012 (0.0017)	0.0012 (0.0048)	-0.0005 (0.0057)	-0.0073 (0.0046)	0.0020** (0.0010)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.182	0.109	0.124	0.151	0.249	0.181	0.070	0.021	0.052	0.190	0.209	0.031
N Enrollments	307,014	66,584	22,412	27,027	35,312	271,661	307,014	66,584	22,412	27,027	35,312	271,661
N Students	28,486	5,735	1,831	2,226	3,273	25,213	28,486	5,735	1,831	2,226	3,273	25,213
Outcome Mean	0.216	0.391	0.202	0.168	0.413	0.191	0.049	0.035	0.055	0.224	0.165	0.034
<i>Democrat Age 25</i>							<i>Republican Age 25</i>					
Instructor Democratic	-0.0011 (0.0023)	-0.0027 (0.0041)	-0.0115* (0.0069)	-0.0113 (0.0069)	0.0031 (0.0056)	-0.0016 (0.0026)	0.0014 (0.0014)	0.0023 (0.0024)	0.0030 (0.0052)	0.0010 (0.0058)	-0.0039 (0.0056)	0.0027** (0.0012)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.182	0.109	0.124	0.151	0.249	0.181	0.070	0.021	0.052	0.190	0.209	0.031
N Enrollments	307,014	66,584	22,412	27,027	35,312	271,661	307,014	66,584	22,412	27,027	35,312	271,661
N Students	28,486	5,735	1,831	2,226	3,273	25,213	28,486	5,735	1,831	2,226	3,273	25,213
Outcome Mean	0.473	0.684	0.496	0.409	0.590	0.458	0.082	0.052	0.094	0.285	0.193	0.067

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (standard errors clustered at student and course level). Sample includes students who matriculated in Fall 2015 or earlier, for whom we observe partisanship at age 25 in the L2 data. The standard deviation in the number of courses with a Democrat is approximately 3.2; estimates can be scaled accordingly. Regressions are weighted such that coefficients represent the effect of a modal (4-credit) course. We include introductory and intermediate (100- and 200-level) courses. All regressions include cohort and class term fixed effects and control for the source of their baseline ideology (the survey or voter records). Regressions split by partisanship control for registration status pre-college and vice versa; pooled regression controls for both. Student covariates are gender, race/ethnicity, parent education, in-state status, family household income, high school GPA and SAT/ACT scores, athlete status, and honors program participation. Course covariates are enrollment, instructor characteristics (rank, predicted gender and race, GPA and course evaluations in previous semesters), and class start time.

Table A.15. Estimated Effects of Democratic Faculty, Courses With One Section Per Semester

	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Registered	Not Registered
<i>Democrat Post-College</i>						
Instructor Democratic	-0.0014 (0.0033)	0.0006 (0.0062)	0.0103 (0.0145)	-0.0063 (0.0113)	-0.0002 (0.0070)	-0.0015 (0.0040)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.348	0.394	0.284	0.254	0.373	0.328
N Enrollments	111,402	30,541	9,142	9,443	23,425	87,961
N Students	38,598	10,123	3,151	3,316	8,084	30,514
Outcome Mean	0.366	0.599	0.324	0.256	0.586	0.308
<i>Republican Post-College</i>						
Instructor Democratic	0.0026 (0.0021)	0.0013 (0.0028)	-0.0027 (0.0068)	0.0005 (0.0116)	0.0005 (0.0054)	0.0038 (0.0024)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.116	0.031	0.085	0.433	0.312	0.037
N Enrollments	111,402	30,541	9,142	9,443	23,425	87,961
N Students	38,598	10,123	3,151	3,316	8,084	30,514
Outcome Mean	0.062	0.033	0.061	0.288	0.137	0.042

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (standard errors clustered at student and course level). Sample excludes courses with multiple sections taught in the same semester. The standard deviation in the number of courses with a Democrat is approximately 1.5 for all samples except for liberal students (1.7) and students registered before college (1.6); estimates can be scaled accordingly. Regressions are weighted such that coefficients represent the effect of a modal (4-credit) course. We include all courses, regardless of level. All regressions include cohort and class term fixed effects and control for the source of their baseline ideology (the survey or voter records). Regressions split by partisanship control for registration status pre-college and vice versa; pooled regression controls for both. Student covariates are gender, race/ethnicity, parent education, in-state status, family household income, high school GPA and SAT/ACT scores, athlete status, and honors program participation. Course covariates are enrollment, instructor characteristics (rank, predicted gender and race, GPA and course evaluations in previous semesters), and class start time.

Table A.16. Estimated Effects of Democratic Faculty, Include Unknown Baseline Partisanship

	All Students	Registered Students	Registered, Unknown Baseline
<i>Democrat Post-College</i>			
Instructor Democratic	-0.0002 (0.0014)	0.0021 (0.0023)	0.0050 (0.0036)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.313	0.314	0.251
N Enrollments	565,341	193,616	97,878
N Students	52,915	18,630	9,594
Outcome Mean	0.363	0.482	0.386
<i>Republican Post-College</i>			
Instructor Democratic	0.0000 (0.0010)	-0.0025 (0.0019)	-0.0023 (0.0027)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.097	0.174	0.051
N Enrollments	565,341	193,616	97,878
N Students	52,915	18,630	9,594
Outcome Mean	0.071	0.124	0.109

Note: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (standard errors clustered at student and course level). The standard deviation in the number of courses with a Democrat is approximately 3.2 for the first two samples and 3.1 for the last sample; estimates can be scaled accordingly. Regressions are weighted such that coefficients represent the effect of a modal (4-credit) course. We include introductory and intermediate (100- and 200-level) courses. All regressions include cohort and class term fixed effects and control for whether the student was registered pre-college, and the source of their baseline ideology (the survey or voter records). Student covariates are gender, race/ethnicity, parent education, in-state status, family household income, high school GPA and SAT/ACT scores, athlete status, and honors program participation. Course covariates are enrollment, instructor characteristics (rank, predicted gender and race, GPA and course evaluations in previous semesters), and class start time.

Table A.17. Estimated Effects of Democratic Faculty, No Course Weighting

	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Registered	Not Registered
<i>Democrat Post-College</i>						
Instructor Democratic	-0.0006 (0.0015)	-0.0013 (0.0024)	0.0063 (0.0056)	-0.0025 (0.0053)	-0.0015 (0.0032)	-0.0008 (0.0018)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.332	0.386	0.262	0.243	0.365	0.314
N Enrollments	467,455	124,764	40,957	43,207	95,725	371,721
N Students	43,321	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,036	34,285
Outcome Mean	0.356	0.599	0.315	0.253	0.583	0.299
<i>Republican Post-College</i>						
Instructor Democratic	0.0004 (0.0009)	0.0005 (0.0011)	0.0002 (0.0040)	-0.0003 (0.0047)	-0.0025 (0.0024)	0.0014 (0.0009)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.113	0.021	0.057	0.421	0.294	0.033
N Enrollments	467,455	124,764	40,957	43,207	95,725	371,721
N Students	43,321	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,036	34,285
Outcome Mean	0.062	0.033	0.061	0.296	0.141	0.042

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (standard errors clustered at student and course level). The standard deviation in the number of courses with a Democrat is approximately 3.2 for the first four samples and 3.0 for non-registered; estimates can be scaled accordingly. We include introductory and intermediate (100- and 200-level) courses. All regressions include cohort and class term fixed effects and control for the source of their baseline ideology (the survey or voter records). Regressions split by partisanship control for registration status pre-college and vice versa; pooled regression controls for both. Student covariates are gender, race/ethnicity, parent education, in-state status, family household income, high school GPA and SAT/ACT scores, athlete status, and honors program participation. Course covariates are enrollment, instructor characteristics (rank, predicted gender and race, GPA and course evaluations in previous semesters), and class start time.

Table A.18. Implications of Alternative Clustering Decisions

	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Registered	Not Registered
<i>Democrat Post-College</i>						
Instructor Democratic	-0.0012	-0.0025	0.0082	-0.0051	-0.0012	-0.0018
<i>Two-Way Clustering</i>	(0.0016)	(0.0024)	(0.0056)	(0.0056)	(0.0032)	(0.0018)
<i>Student Clustering</i>	(0.0016)	(0.0029)	(0.0055)	(0.0052)	(0.0035)	(0.0018)
<i>Course Clustering</i>	(0.0015)	(0.0024)	(0.0055)	(0.0055)	(0.0030)	(0.0018)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
N Enrollments	467,455	124,764	40,957	43,207	95,725	371,721
N Students	43,321	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,036	34,285
Outcome Mean	0.356	0.599	0.315	0.253	0.583	0.299
<i>Republican Post-College</i>						
Instructor Democratic	0.0006	0.0009	-0.0008	0.0011	-0.0017	0.0016
<i>Two-Way Clustering</i>	(0.0010)	(0.0012)	(0.0043)	(0.0050)	(0.0026)	(0.0009)
<i>Student Clustering</i>	(0.0009)	(0.0014)	(0.0033)	(0.0045)	(0.0025)	(0.0010)
<i>Course Clustering</i>	(0.0010)	(0.0011)	(0.0041)	(0.0050)	(0.0025)	(0.0009)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
N Enrollments	467,455	124,764	40,957	43,207	95,725	371,721
N Students	43,321	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,036	34,285
Outcome Mean	0.062	0.033	0.061	0.296	0.141	0.042

Note: *p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (standard errors clustered at student and course level). The standard deviation in the number of courses with a Democrat is approximately 3.2 for the first four samples and 3.0 for non-registered; estimates can be scaled accordingly. Regressions are weighted such that coefficients represent the effect of a modal (4-credit) course. We include introductory and intermediate (100- and 200-level) courses. All regressions include cohort and class term fixed effects and control for the source of their baseline ideology (the survey or voter records). Regressions split by partisanship control for registration status pre-college and vice versa; pooled regression controls for both. Student covariates are gender, race/ethnicity, parent education, in-state status, family household income, high school GPA and SAT/ACT scores, athlete status, and honors program participation. Course covariates are enrollment, instructor characteristics (rank, predicted gender and race, GPA and course evaluations in previous semesters), and class start time.

Table A.19. Estimated Effects of Faculty and Peers

	All	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Registered	Not Registered
<i>Democrat Post-College</i>						
Instructor Democratic	-0.0013 (0.0016)	-0.0025 (0.0024)	0.0082 (0.0056)	-0.0051 (0.0056)	-0.0012 (0.0030)	-0.0019 (0.0018)
Share Peers Liberal	0.0528** (0.0224)	0.0258 (0.0322)	0.0871 (0.0686)	0.1058 (0.0772)	-0.0321 (0.0393)	0.0789*** (0.0259)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.322	0.378	0.25	0.23	0.357	0.303
N Enrollments	467,455	124,764	40,957	43,207	95,725	371,721
N Students	43,321	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,036	34,285
Outcome Mean	0.356	0.599	0.315	0.253	0.583	0.299
F-Statistic	20,306	6,825	3,882	6,192	6,863	24,985
<i>Republican Post-College</i>						
Instructor Democratic	0.0006 (0.0010)	0.0009 (0.0011)	-0.0009 (0.0041)	0.001 (0.0050)	-0.0017 (0.0025)	0.0017* (0.0009)
Share Peers Liberal	-0.0269** (0.0124)	-0.0278* (0.0160)	-0.0219 (0.0409)	-0.0382 (0.0709)	0.0250 (0.0275)	-0.0473*** (0.0130)
Course Fixed Effects	X	X	X	X	X	X
Student Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
Course Covariates	X	X	X	X	X	X
R-Squared	0.109	0.017	0.045	0.411	0.286	0.030
N Enrollments	467,455	124,764	40,957	43,207	95,725	371,721
N Students	43,321	11,113	3,501	3,700	9,036	34,285
Outcome Mean	0.062	0.033	0.061	0.296	0.141	0.042
F-Statistic	20,306	6,825	3,882	6,192	6,863	24,985

Note: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$ (standard errors clustered at student and course level). The standard deviation in the number of courses with a Democrat is approximately 3.2 for the first four samples and 3.0 for non-registered; estimates can be scaled accordingly. Peer ideology is the leave-out share of students who identified as liberal early in college; we instrument for the course section's average peer ideology using the average across course sections in that semester to account for measurement error. Regressions are weighted such that coefficients represent the effect of a modal (4-credit) course. We include introductory and intermediate (100- and 200-level) courses. All regressions include cohort and class term fixed effects and control for the source of their baseline ideology (the survey or voter records). Regressions split by partisanship control for registration status pre-college and vice versa; pooled regression controls for both. Student covariates are gender, race/ethnicity, parent education, in-state status, family household income, high school GPA and SAT/ACT scores, athlete status, and honors program participation. Course covariates are enrollment, instructor characteristics (rank, predicted gender and race, GPA and course evaluations in previous semesters), and class start time.

Table A.20. Prevalence and Categorization for Flagged Phrases in Course Descriptions

Phrases	Prop. Courses	Advocacy	DEI (Broad) (Main)	Feminism (Broad) (Main)	Hate Speech	Health	Immigration	LGBTQ+ (Broad) (Main)	Politics (Broad) (Main)	Race/Racism	Science	SES	Woke Words	None
Gender	0.069							X						
Race	0.054									X				
Identity	0.051							X	X					
Community	0.043												X	
Women	0.039				X									
Diverse	0.033		X											
Sexuality	0.027							X	X					
Diversity	0.023		X											
Racial	0.023									X				
Climate	0.022										X			
Ethnicity	0.022									X				
Integration	0.021												X	X
Justice	0.021													
Black	0.020									X				
Expression	0.017													
Climate Change	0.016										X			X
Hispanic	0.016									X				
Sex	0.013							X						
Inequality	0.011		X											
Activism	0.010	X												
Historically	0.010													X
Discrimination	0.009											X		
Indigenous	0.009									X				
Pollution	0.009										X			
Racism	0.009									X				
Social Justice	0.009												X	
Institutional	0.008							X						X
Orientation	0.008													X
Promote	0.008											X		
Sociocultural	0.008													
Female	0.007				X									
Gendered	0.007							X	X					
Green	0.007										X			
Multicultural	0.007												X	
Oppression	0.007												X	
Accessible	0.006					X								
Definition	0.006													X
Feminism	0.006				X	X								
Immigrants	0.006						X							
Inequalities	0.006		X											
Woman	0.006				X									
Activists	0.005	X												
Cultural Heritage	0.005												X	
Gay	0.005							X	X					
Ideology	0.005													
Minority	0.005							X	X	X				
Queer	0.005													
Race And Ethnicity	0.005									X				
Stereotypes	0.005											X		
Advocacy	0.004	X												
Belong	0.004												X	
Disability	0.004													
Equality	0.004		X	X										
Global Warming	0.004										X			
Prejudice	0.004											X		
Privilege	0.004											X		
Trans	0.004							X	X					
Bias	0.003											X		
Cultural Differences	0.003												X	
Equity	0.003		X	X										
Exclusion	0.003													X
Hate	0.003					X								
Inclusion	0.003		X	X										
Migrant	0.003						X							
Minorities	0.003									X				

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Table A.20 – continued from previous page

Phrases	Prop. Courses	Advocacy	DEI (Broad) (Main)	Feminism (Broad) (Main)	Hate Speech	Health	Immigration	LGBTQ+ (Broad) (Main)	Politics (Broad) (Main)	Race/Racism	Science	SES	Woke Words	None
Native American	0.003									X			X	
Trauma	0.003													
Abortion	0.002					X						X		
Biases	0.002													
Environmental Justice	0.002										X			
Inclusive	0.002		X	X										
Injustice	0.002		X	X										
Intersectional	0.002												X	
Lesbian	0.002							X	X					
Marginalized	0.002											X		
Mental Health	0.002					X								
Obesity	0.002					X								
Racial Identity	0.002									X				
Segregation	0.002											X		
Traumatic	0.002									X			X	
Tribal	0.002													
Victims	0.002									X				X
Accessibility	0.001					X								
Advocate	0.001	X												
Advocates	0.001	X												
Affirmative Action	0.001									X				
Air Pollution	0.001										X			
Alternative Energy	0.001										X			
Autism	0.001					X								
Barriers	0.001												X	
Biased	0.001											X		
Clean Water	0.001													
Continuum	0.001							X	X					
Covid19	0.001					X								
Critical Race Theory	0.001									X				
Culturally Appropriate	0.001												X	
Disabilities	0.001					X								
Disabled	0.001					X								
Diverse	0.001		X	X										
Back-grounds														
Diverse Group	0.001		X	X										
Diversified	0.001		X											
Elderly	0.001					X								
Energy Conversion	0.001										X			
Equitable	0.001		X	X										
Evidencebased	0.001													
Excluded	0.001													
Gender Identity	0.001							X	X					
Geothermal	0.001										X			
Hate Speech	0.001													
Intersectionality	0.001					X							X	
Intersex	0.001							X	X					
Lgbt	0.001							X	X					
Lgbtq	0.001							X	X					
Non-Binary	0.001							X	X					
Nuclear Energy	0.001										X			
Nuclear Power	0.001										X			
People Of Color	0.001									X				
Polarization	0.001								X	X				
Privileges	0.001											X		
Racially	0.001									X				
Science-Based	0.001												X	
Socioeconomic Status	0.001											X		
Stereotype	0.001											X		
Systemic	0.001											X		
Transgender	0.001							X	X				X	
Underrepresented	0.001											X		

Continued on next page

Table A.20 – continued from previous page

Phrases	Prop. Courses	Advocacy	DEI (Broad) (Main)	Feminism (Broad) (Main)	Hate Speech	Health	Immigration	LGBTQ+ (Broad) (Main)	Politics (Broad) (Main)	Race/Racism	Science	SES	Woke Words	None
Vaccines	0.001					X								
Vulnerable	0.001											X		
Water Pollution	0.001										X			
Water Quality	0.001										X			
Water Treatment	0.001										X			
Affirmative Action Program	0		X	X										
Affirming Care	0							X	X					
Affordable Home	0													X
Affordable Housing	0													X
Agricultural Water	0										X			
Agrioltaics	0										X			
Allinclusive	0							X	X					
Allyship	0							X	X					
Antiracism	0									X				
Antiracist	0									X				
Asexual	0							X	X					
Assigned At Birth	0							X	X					
Assigned Female At Birth	0							X	X					
Assigned Male At Birth	0							X	X					
At Risk	0												X	
Aviation Fuel	0										X			
Barrier	0												X	
Biased Toward	0											X		
Biases Towards	0											X		
Bioenergy	0										X			
Biofuel	0										X			
Biogas	0										X			
Biologically Female	0							X	X					
Biologically Male	0							X	X					
Biomethane	0										X			
BIPOC	0													
Bisexual	0							X	X					
Black And Latinx	0									X				
Cancer Moonshot	0					X								
Carbon Emissions Mitigation	0										X			
Carbon Footprint	0										X			
Carbon Markets	0										X			
Carbon Pricing	0										X			
Carbon Sequestration	0										X			
CEC	0										X			
Changing Climate	0										X			
Clean Energy	0										X			
Clean Fuel	0										X			
Clean Power	0										X			
Climate Accountability	0										X			
Climate Consulting	0										X			
Climate Crisis	0										X			
Climate Model	0										X			
Climate Models	0										X			
Climate Resilience	0										X			
Climate Risk	0										X			
Climate Science	0										X			
Climate Smart Agriculture	0										X			
Climate Smart Forestry	0										X			
Climate Variability	0										X			
Climatechange	0										X			
Climatesmart	0										X			
Commercial Sex Worker	0					X								

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Table A.20 – continued from previous page

Phrases	Prop. Courses	Advocacy	DEI (Broad)	DEI (Main)	Feminism (Broad)	Feminism (Main)	Hate Speech	Health	Immigration	LGBTQ+ (Broad)	LGBTQ+ (Main)	Politics (Broad)	Politics (Main)	Race/Racism	Science	SES	Woke Words	None
Community Diversity	0		X	X														
Community Equity	0		X	X														
Confirmation Bias	0																X	
Contaminants Of Environme	0														X			
Cultural Compe- tence	0																X	
Cultural Relevance	0																X	
Cultural Sensitivity	0																X	
Culturally Respon- sive	0																X	
DEI	0		X	X														
DEIAB	0		X	X														
DEIJ	0		X	X														
Diesel	0														X			
Dietary Guideline	0							X										
Ultraprocessed																		
Disadvantaged	0															X		
Discriminated	0															X		
Discriminatory	0															X		
Disparity	0															X		
Diverse Communi- ties	0		X	X														
Diverse Community	0		X	X														
Diverse Groups	0		X	X														
Diversify	0		X															
Diversifying	0		X															
Diversity And Inclu- sion	0		X	X														
Diversity Efforts	0		X	X														
Diversity Equity And Inclusion	0		X	X														
Diversity In The Workplace	0		X	X														
EEJ	0														X			
EJ	0														X			
Electric Vehicle	0														X			
Enhance The Diver- sity	0		X	X														
Enhancing Diversity	0		X	X														
Entitlement	0																	X
Environmental Quality	0														X			
Equal Opportunity	0		X	X														
Equitableness	0		X	X														
Equity Efforts	0		X	X														
Ethanol	0														X			
Females	0				X													
Fetus	0							X										
Field Drainage	0																	
Fluoride	0							X										
Fostering Inclusivity	0																	
Fuel Cell	0														X			
GBV	0									X	X							
Gender Based	0									X	X							
Gender Based Vio- lence	0									X	X							
Gender Diversity	0									X	X							
Gender Dysphoria	0									X	X							
Gender Expression	0									X	X							
Gender Ideology	0									X	X							
Gender Nonconfor- mity	0									X	X							
Gender Transition	0									X	X							
Gender-Affirming Care	0									X	X							

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Table A.20 – continued from previous page

Phrases	Prop. Courses	Advocacy	DEI (Broad) (Main)	Feminism (Broad) (Main)	Hate Speech	Health	Immigration	LGBTQ+ (Broad) (Main)	Politics (Broad) (Main)	Race/Racism	Science	SES	Woke Words	None
Genders	0							X	X					
Ghg Emission	0										X			
Ghg Modeling	0										X			
Ghg Monitoring	0										X			
Green Infrastruc- ture	0										X			
Greenhouse Gas Emission	0										X			
Groundwater Pollu- tion	0										X			
Gulf Of Mexico	0													X
H5N1Bird Flu	0					X								
Health Disparity	0					X								
Health Equity	0					X								
Hispanic Minority	0									X				
Housing Affordabil- ity	0													X
Housing Efficiency	0													X
Hydrogen Vehicle	0										X			
Implicit Bias	0											X		
Implicit Biases	0											X		
Inclusive Leadership	0		X	X										
Inclusiveness	0		X	X										
Inclusivity	0		X	X										
Increase Diversity	0		X	X										
Increase The Diver- sity	0		X	X										
Indigenous Commu- nity People	0									X				
Inequitable	0		X	X										
Inequities	0		X	X										
Key Groups	0												X	
Key People	0												X	
Key Populations	0												X	
Latinx	0									X				
Lowemission Vehicle	0										X			
Lowincome Housing	0													X
Male Dominated	0			X	X									
Marginalize	0											X		
Marijuana	0					X								
Measles	0					X								
Membrane Filtra- tion	0										X			
Men Who Have Sex With Men	0							X	X					
Methane Emissions	0										X			
Microplastics	0										X			
Minority Serving In- stitution	0									X				
Most Risk	0													X
MSI	0									X				
MSM	0									X				
MX	0									X				
NCI Budget	0					X								
Netzero	0													
Non-Citizen	0						X				X			
Non-Conforming	0							X	X					
Nonpoint Source	0										X			
Pollution	0													
Opioids	0					X								
Oppressive	0												X	
Pansexual	0							X	X					
PCB	0					X								
Peanut Allergies	0					X								
Peoplecentered Care	0												X	
Personcentered	0												X	

Continued on next page

Table A.20 – continued from previous page

Phrases	Prop. Courses	Advocacy	DEI (Broad) (Main)	Feminism (Broad) (Main)	Hate Speech	Health	Immigration	LGBTQ+ (Broad) (Main)	Politics (Broad) (Main)	Race/Racism	Science	SES	Woke Words	None
Personcentered Care	0												X	
PFAAs	0										X			
PFOA	0										X			
Photovoltaic	0										X			
Pollution Abatement	0										X			
Pollution Remediation	0										X			
Prefabricated Housing	0													X
Pregnant People	0							X	X					
Pregnant Person	0							X	X					
Pregnant Persons	0							X	X					
Promote Diversity	0		X	X										
Promoting Diversity	0		X	X										
Pronoun	0							X	X					
Pronouns	0							X	X					
Prostitute	0					X								
Pyrolysis	0													
QT	0							X	X					
Racial Diversity	0									X				
Racial Inequality	0									X				
Racial Justice	0									X				
Runoff	0										X			
Rural Water	0										X			
Safe Drinking Water	0										X			
Sediment Remediation	0										X			
Selfassessed	0													X
Sense Of Belonging	0												X	
Sexual Preferences	0							X	X					
Social Vulnerability	0											X		
Socio Cultural	0											X		
Socio Economic	0											X		
Soil Pollution	0										X			
Solar Energy	0										X			
Solar Power	0										X			
Special Populations	0												X	
Stem Cell Or Fetal Tissue	0					X								
Subsidized Housing	0													X
Sustainable Construction	0										X			
They/Them	0							X	X					
Tile Drainage	0										X			
Topics Of Federal Investi	0													X
Transexual	0							X	X					
Transexualism	0							X	X					
Transexuals	0							X	X					
Transgender Military Personnel	0								X					
Transgender People	0							X	X					
Transitional Housing	0													X
Two-Spirit	0							X	X					
Unconscious Bias	0											X		
Under Appreciated	0											X		
Under Represented	0											X		
Under Served	0											X		
Underprivileged	0											X		
Underrepresentation	0											X		
Underrepresented	0						X	X						
Women	0													
Underserved	0											X		
Understudied	0											X		


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Table A.20 – continued from previous page

Phrases	Prop. Courses	Advocacy	DEI (Broad) (Main)	Feminism (Broad) (Main)	Hate Speech	Health	Immigration	LGBTQ+ (Broad) (Main)	Politics (Broad) (Main)	Race/ Racism	Science	SES	Woke Words	None
Undervalued	0											X		
Victim	0													
Vulnerable Populations	0											X		X
Water Collection	0										X			
Water Conservation	0										X			
Water Distribution	0										X			
Water Efficiency	0										X			
Water Management	0										X			
Water Storage	0										X			
White Privilege	0											X		
Wind Power	0													
Women In Leadership	0			X	X									


Note: List of all phrases flagged in federal grant applications during the second Trump administration. The second column shows the proportion of course sections at the focal flagship whose descriptions contain this term; phrases are sorted from most- to least-prevalent. The remaining columns show how we categorize each term. “Main” categorizations are those we use in our primary analyses, versus “Broad” categorizations which often include generic words that appear in many courses (such as “Gender” or “Political”).

Figure A.1. Faculty Campaign Donation Scores by Party Registration




Note: CF scores are a scalar measure of the political ideology of individuals' campaign donation history, estimated by Bonica (2014). The measure is scaled to have a national mean of zero and standard deviation of one, with negative scores indicating more liberal donation histories and positive scores indicating more conservative donation histories.

Figure A.2. Faculty Party Affiliation Relative to State




Note: College faculty (professors and lecturers) at 33 public flagship universities, linked to voter registration records. We define partisanship either based on party registration status or participation in primary elections, depending on the state.

Figure A.3. Average School-Level Party Affiliation by Academic Field




Note: College faculty (professors and lecturers) at 14 public flagship universities with known department affiliations, linked to voter registration records. Non-voters are comprised of individuals we do not locate in the voter data. Y-axis shows the average share of faculty with each partisan affiliation across schools, keeping only schools with at least 20 faculty ever affiliated with that field. Fields are defined by 2-digit CIP codes; see Appendix C for details.

Figure A.4. Faculty Voter Registration Rate by Rank




Note: College faculty (professors and lecturers) at 14 public flagship universities with known faculty rank, linked to voter registration records. We define partisanship either based on party registration status or participation in primary elections, depending on the state. Rank is identified from faculty job titles.

Figure A.5. Faculty Party Affiliation by Rank




Note: College faculty (professors and lecturers) at 14 public flagship universities with known faculty rank, linked to voter registration records. We define partisanship either based on party registration status or participation in primary elections, depending on the state. Rank is identified from faculty job titles.

Figure A.6. Student Policy Preferences by Ideology




Note: The bar heights show the share of students who ranked each policy issue among the three most-important to consider when choosing which political candidate to support. This question was asked in two survey waves, in 2013 and 2017. N = 1,815 liberal students, 622 moderate students, and 488 conservative students.

Figure A.7. Change in Self-Reported Ideology by Student Characteristics




Note: Change in share of students who identify as liberal from their first to last survey response during college. 95 percent confidence intervals for the baseline/follow-up difference are shown.

Figure A.8. Correlation Between Department Student Ideology and Instructor Partisanship




Note: The x-axis plots the share of course instructors in each field identified as a Democrat based on L2 voter files; the y-axis plots the average share of students in each course who identify as liberal in the left panel, moderate in the middle panel and conservative in the right panel. Student ideology is measured no later than students' first year in college and comes from a combination of a survey taken during college and pre-college voter records. We keep all academic fields with at least 25 unique courses across all years. Standard errors on the slope coefficients are robust.

Figure A.9. Correlation Between Department Share Liberal Students and Instructor Partisanship, by Course Level




Note: The x-axis plots the share of course instructors in each field identified as a Democrat based on L2 voter files; the y-axis plots the average share of students in each course who identify as liberal. Student ideology is measured no later than students' first year in college and comes from a combination of a survey taken during college and pre-college voter records. Lower-level courses are 100- and 200-level courses. We keep all academic fields with at least 25 unique courses across all years. Standard errors on the slope coefficients are robust.

Figure A.10. Correlation Between Department Share Moderate Students and Instructor Partisanship, by Course Level




Note: The x-axis plots the share of course instructors in each field identified as a Democrat based on L2 voter files; the y-axis plots the average share of students in each course who identify as moderate. Student ideology is measured no later than students' first year in college and comes from a combination of a survey taken during college and pre-college voter records. Lower-level courses are 100- and 200-level courses. We keep all academic fields with at least 25 unique courses across all years. Standard errors on the slope coefficients are robust.

Figure A.11. Correlation Between Share Conservative Students and Instructor Partisanship, by Course Level




Note: The x-axis plots the share of course instructors in each field identified as a Democrat based on L2 voter files; the y-axis plots the average share of students in each course who identify as conservative. Student ideology is measured no later than students' first year in college and comes from a combination of a survey taken during college and pre-college voter records. Lower-level courses are 100- and 200-level courses. We keep all academic fields with at least 25 unique courses across all years. Standard errors on the slope coefficients are robust.

Figure A.12. Correlation Across Fields in Residualized Student Ideology and Instructor Partisanship




Note: The x-axis plots the share of course instructors in each field identified as a Democrat based on L2 voter files; the y-axis plots the average residual from regressions of student ideology (liberal or conservative) on the following demographic characteristics: sex, race/ethnicity, first-generation status, whether the student grew up in a single-parent household, in-state status, parent household income (<\$50k, \$50k-100k, \$100k-200k, \$200k+), high school GPA, SAT/ACT percentile rank (using the higher of the two ranks for each student), whether the student is an athlete or in the honors program, and whether the student entered college in 2016 or later. Student ideology is measured no later than students' first year in college and comes from a combination of a survey taken during college and pre-college voter records. We keep all academic fields with at least 25 unique courses across all years. Standard errors on the slope coefficients are robust.

Figure A.13. Changes in Sorting After Changes in Beliefs




Note: The y-axis plots the share of courses taken with a Democrat, for students who became more liberal or more conservative between their two surveys. The first set of bars comes from courses taken between the two survey waves, the second set comes from courses taken after the last survey response. Confidence interval comes from a course-level regression with standard errors clustered at the student level ($N = 1,362$ students).

Figure A.14. Within-Field and Within-Course Variation in Instructor Partisanship




Note: Share of instructors in each field and each course who are Democrats. Lower-level courses (100- and 200-level) only.

Figure A.15. Actual vs Expected Exposure to Democratic Instructors




Note: Left panel plots the share of courses for each student taught by a Democrat against the expected share based on which courses they enroll in, presenting the density within each cell as a heatmap. The right panel graphs the difference between actual and expected exposure. Lower-level courses (100- and 200-level) only.

Figure A.16. Differences in Course Topic Exposure by Baseline Ideology




Note: Figure plots the number of courses students take during college where the course description contains any phrases in the Trump administration's list of flagged phrases for federal grants. The average student takes 18.8 courses and 11.8 lower-level courses during our sample window. Students are grouped by their political ideology when entering college, based on their party identification and survey responses. We group phrases following the coding scheme in Appendix Table A.20.

Figure A.17. Differences in Course Topic Exposure by Baseline Ideology, Broader Categorizations




Note: Figure plots the number of courses students take during college where the course description contains any phrases in the Trump administration’s list of flagged phrases for federal grants. In contrast to Figure A.16, we use a broader definition of phrases included in categories (e.g., including “diversity” in the DEI category even though this appears in many biology courses); see Appendix Table A.20 for a list of all phrases in each category. The average student takes 18.8 courses and 11.8 lower-level courses during our sample window. Students are grouped by their political ideology when entering college, based on their party identification and survey responses. We group phrases following the coding scheme in Appendix Table A.20.

Figure A.18. Differences in Course Topic Exposure Within Departments and Fields, Broader Categorizations




Note: Figure plots the difference in enrollment in courses where the course description contains any phrases in the Trump administration’s list of flagged phrases for federal grants, by student baseline ideology. In contrast to Figure VI, we use a broader definition of phrases included in categories (e.g., including “diversity” in the DEI category even though this appears in many biology courses); see Appendix Table A.20 for a list of all phrases in each category. In both panels, the reference group is students who were liberal at baseline. We cluster standard errors at the student level and present 95 percent confidence intervals. We group phrases following the coding scheme in Appendix Table A.20.

Figure A.19. Differences in Left-Leaning Phrases by Instructor Partisanship, Broader Categorizations




Note: Figure plots the difference in the proportion of course descriptions containing keywords in the Trump administration’s list of phrases that will be flagged in federal grant applications, by the instructor’s partisanship (Democrat versus other). In contrast to Figure VII, we use a broader definition of phrases included in categories (e.g., including “diversity” in the DEI category even though this appears in many biology courses); see Appendix Table A.20 for a list of all phrases in each category. The blank bar contains the raw difference. The light blue bar contains the difference after removing department means. The dark blue bar contains the difference within the same course (i.e., from a regression with course fixed effects), with 95 percent confidence intervals clustered at the course level. We group phrases following the coding scheme in Appendix Table A.20.

Figure A.20. Differences in Liberal Textbook Topic Exposure by Baseline Ideology




Note: Figure plots the number of courses students take during college where the course had an assigned textbook related to a given topic. Topics are identified by matching book ISBNs to the Library of Congress database of book topics. The average student takes 18.8 courses and 11.8 lower-level courses during our sample window. Students are grouped by their political ideology when entering college, based on their party identification and survey responses. We group textbook topics following the coding scheme described in Appendix D.

Figure A.21. Differences in Liberal Textbook Topic Exposure Within Departments and Fields



Note: Figure plots the difference in enrollment in courses where the course had an assigned textbook related to a given topic, by student baseline ideology. Topics are identified by matching book ISBNs to the Library of Congress database of book topics. In both panels, the reference group is students who were liberal at baseline. We cluster standard errors at the student level and present 95 percent confidence intervals. We group textbook topics following the coding scheme described in Appendix D.

Figure A.22. Differences in Left-Leaning Phrases by Instructor Partisanship



Note: Figure plots the difference in the proportion of courses where an assigned textbook related to a given topic, by the instructor's partisanship (Democrat versus other). Topics are identified by matching book ISBNs to the Library of Congress database of book topics. The blank bar contains the raw difference. The dark blue bar contains the difference within the same course (i.e., from a regression with course fixed effects), with 95 percent confidence intervals clustered at the course level. We group textbook topics following the coding scheme described in Appendix D.

B Matching Individuals to Voter Records

B.1 Matching Faculty to Voter Records

To match faculty at state flagships to voter records, we use a relatively simple algorithm based on individual names and county of residence. We use the following matching procedure:

1. Perform simple name cleaning to replace nicknames in the faculty salary data with their common full names (e.g., Andrew for Andy)
2. Merge each instructor to all individuals in the state L2 voter file who share the same first and last name
3. When faculty match to multiple individuals, we prioritize those living in the county as the university, before prioritizing the three most-populous adjacent counties with the largest population, and finally keeping individuals elsewhere in the state
4. Within each county, we prioritize individuals sharing the same middle initial as the faculty member
5. Break remaining ties by prioritizing individuals predicted to have a college education based on L2’s marketing algorithm
6. For any remaining ties, choose an individual at random

Because faculty can move in and out of each state and institution, we perform this matching procedure separately for each year of L2 data (2018-2023). We then identify the most-common match for each instructor and use that individual as their unique voter record. 89.3 percent of faculty match to the same individual in all years (8.4 percent match to two individuals ever).

Overall, we match 72.2 percent of salary records (a faculty-year observation) to an individual in the voter records. On just first and last name, the median matched individual only matches to one voter in the state (interquartile range 1-3), suggesting that steps 3-6 have a relatively small impact on our matching accuracy. L2’s algorithm predicts that 51.4 percent of matched voters have a post-graduate degree, 27.6 percent have a bachelor’s degree, and 21 percent have less than a college degree.

We undertake multiple validation tests for our matching algorithm. First, we randomly select five matched and five unmatched faculty from each school and compare the likelihood that they attended a university outside the United States as a proxy measure of citizenship.¹ Our results provide supportive evidence that we are correctly matching US citizens to their voter records. Of the 330 randomly sampled faculty, 39 percent of unmatched faculty received one of their degrees outside of the United States, a share 3.5 times higher than that for matched faculty (11 percent).

As an additional validation exercise, we use the same algorithm to match individuals to information on political donations. We link faculty to the Database on Ideology, Money, and Elections (DIME; Bonica 2023, 2014), which includes both individual donation histories as well as a “campaign finance score” (CFscore) summarizing the partisan lean of each donation portfolio.² These

¹ This measure is of course imperfect: American citizens can leave the country for school, and individuals born outside the United States can both attend school in the US and become naturalized citizens.

² Bonica (2014) calculates these CFscores using a correspondence analysis approach, which orders sets of donations based on the share of dollars that goes towards liberal or conservative candidates (relative to other portfolios). For example, for two individuals who both donated to Kamala Harris’ 2024 presidential campaign, if one individual also

scores are standardized to have mean zero, standard deviation one, with negative scores indicating a liberal donation history and positive scores indicating a conservative donation history.

Appendix Figure A.1 plots DIME campaign finance scores for voters we identify as Democrats, Republicans, and non-partisans. Republican voters have CFscores further to the right than Democratic or non-partisan voters. The average Republican faculty has a CF score of -0.17, compared to -0.89 for Democrats and -0.75 for non-partisans. Notice that even Republican faculty tend to make donations that are slightly left of the nation as a whole. Forty percent of Democratic faculty donate to political campaigns, compared to 27 percent of Republican faculty;³ it could therefore be the case that more-politically involved Republican faculty are on average less-conservative than less-politically involved faculty. Alternatively, even Republican academics could be less-conservative than the typical Republican. Nevertheless, the relative difference suggests that our algorithm assigns faculty to partisan records consistently.

B.2 Matching Students to Voter Records

We link university administrative student records to individual voter-file records using a multi-pass matching algorithm. For the voter file, we use L2 voter-registration data for 2018–2022. For the student records, we use names and date-of-birth information from university administrative files. Prior to matching, we standardize first, middle, and last names (including middle initials), birth month/day/year, and gender in both sources.

We then merge student records to the voter file using progressively less restrictive combinations of these identifiers. This procedure yields a natural ordering of match quality. Specifically, we assign each student the highest-quality match available according to the following hierarchy:

1. Last name, first name, *full* middle name, birth year, birth month, birth day, and gender.
2. Last name, first name, *middle initial*, birth year, birth month, birth day, and gender.
3. Last name, first name, *full* middle name, birth year, birth month, and birth day.
4. Last name, first name, *middle initial*, birth year, birth month, and birth day.
5. Last name, first name, *full* middle name, birth year, birth month, and gender.
6. Last name, first name, *middle initial*, birth year, birth month, and gender.
7. Last name, first name, *full* middle name, birth year, and birth month.
8. Last name, first name, *middle initial*, birth year, and birth month.
9. Last name, first name, birth year, birth month, birth day, and gender.
10. Last name, first name, birth year, birth month, and birth day.
11. Last name, first name, birth year, birth month, and gender.
12. Last name, first name, *full* middle name, and birth year.

donated to a Republican candidate for US Senate and the other also donated to a Democratic candidate, the second individual would be ranked as more liberal than the first since their donations share more overlap with individuals who donated to further-left candidates. We refer interested readers to the paper for more details.

³ As another sign that our algorithm correctly identifies faculty, note that only 8 percent of non-registered voters have ever made a campaign donation in our data.

13. Last name, first name, *middle initial*, and birth year.
14. Last name, first name, and birth year.

When a student record links to multiple voter-file individuals within a given match-quality tier, we resolve ties using the following sequence of rules:

- Prefer individuals predicted by L2 to have some college education or above (in any matched year).
- Prefer the most stable link across time: for each student we select the modal matched voter-file individual across 2018–2022.
- Prefer individuals whose voter-registration state matches the student’s high-school state in the university records.
- Prefer individuals who report voting at least once in the state containing the university.
- Prefer individuals classified by L2 as active voters.
- Break any remaining ties at random.

Table B.1. Match quality summary: eligible population and main analysis sample

Stage	All eligible students		Main analysis sample	
	Count	%	Count	%
Total students	62,516	100.00%	43,307	100.00%
Matched to voter file	57,989	92.76%	39,971	92.30%
Quality 1–5 (of matched)	24,324	41.95%	16,368	40.95%
Quality 6–10 (of matched)	3,394	5.85%	2,266	5.67%
Quality 11–14 (of matched)	30,271	52.20%	21,337	53.38%

Note: The unit of observation is a unique student. *All eligible students* restricts the administrative student records to U.S. citizens who appear as undergraduates and whose first term of attendance is between 2010 and 2018. *Main analysis sample* further restricts to students included in the main analysis. *Matched to voter file* indicates that the student was linked to an individual in the L2 voter file using cleaned name, date of birth, and gender fields and the tie-breaking rules described in the text; unmatched students are those for whom no link is available. Match-quality levels are integer ranks where lower values indicate stricter agreement on identifying fields (e.g., including full date of birth and gender), and higher values allow fewer fields to agree. The *Matched to voter file* percentage is computed relative to the total number of students in each column; the match-quality percentages are computed among matched students within each column.

Table B.1 summarizes the quality of the student–voter-file linkage by grouping matches into three bins (quality 1–5, 6–10, and 11–14), reported separately for the eligible student population and for our main analysis sample. In both samples, most matches fall into the coarser-quality bin (11–14), while a substantial share are high-quality matches (1–5) that rely on richer identifying information. Once a unique link is established, we use the L2 person identifier to merge students to L2 voter-history records, which report participation in primary and general elections since 2000.

Table B.2. Validation of L2-based measures against NSLVE (shares only)

Year Election Type	2012 Presidential	2014 Midterm	2016 Presidential	2018 Midterm	2020 Presidential	2022 Midterm
Voter Registration shares						
<i>Total registered / total enrolled (NSLVE)</i>	55.06%	50.97%	71.01%	68.63%	75.98%	69.59%
$\widehat{Register}^{UndGrad} / Enrolled^{UndGrad}$ (NSLVE)	61.15%	43.59%	77.71%	71.74%	83.69%	74.87%
$Register^{UndGrad} / Enrolled^{UndGrad}$ (L2)	49.27%	44.17%	67.71%	71.15%	83.10%	70.76%
<i>Main sample: Register^{UndGrad} / Enrolled^{UndGrad} (L2)</i>	47.95%	40.75%	69.78%	74.51%	92.35%	90.88%

Note: NSLVE registration and turnout rates use institution totals from NSLVE. NSLVE does not report undergraduate registrations; we impute the undergraduate registration rate by allocating total registrations in proportion to the undergraduate share of voters (UndGrad voted / total voted). L2-based rates use Fall-term active enrollment (registered or withdrawn) in the election year; the overall L2 registration rate is a lower bound because unmatched students are treated as unregistered.

To assess whether the resulting linked measures are plausible at the institution level, we benchmark our L2-based registration rates against external aggregates from NSLVE (NSLVE 2022).

We benchmark our L2-based measures against institution-level statistics from the National Study of Learning, Voting, and Engagement (NSLVE), which reports voter-registration and voting aggregates for more than 1,000 US colleges and universities. Each NSLVE report provides institution-wide totals for enrolled students, registered students, and ballots cast. While NSLVE sometimes reports enrollment and turnout separately for undergraduates versus non-undergraduates, registrations are only reported for the full student body. To construct an undergraduate registration benchmark, we impute undergraduate registrations by allocating total registrations in proportion to the undergraduate share of voters:

$$\widehat{Register}^{UndGrad} = Register^{Total} \times \frac{Voters^{UndGrad}}{Voters^{Total}}.$$

Table B.2 benchmarks our L2-based measures against institution-level aggregates from NSLVE. The first row, *Total registered / total enrolled (NSLVE)*, is the institution-wide registration rate reported by NSLVE, ranging from 50.97% (2014) to 75.98% (2020). Because NSLVE does not report registrations separately for undergraduates, the second row imputes an undergraduate registration rate, *UndGrad registered / UndGrad enrolled (NSLVE)*, which varies between 43.59% (2014) and 83.69% (2020). The third row, *UndGrad registered / UndGrad enrolled (L2)*, computes the analogous undergraduate registration share in our linked data; this measure closely tracks the NSLVE-imputed undergraduate benchmark in later cycles—for example, 44.17% in 2014 (vs. 43.59% in NSLVE) and 83.10% in 2020 (vs. 83.69% in NSLVE)—with larger gaps in earlier presidential cycles such as 2012 (49.27% vs. 61.15%) and 2016 (67.71% vs. 77.71%). The fourth row repeats this calculation for our *main analysis sample*, where registration shares are similar to the L2 undergraduate series in earlier years (e.g., 47.95% in 2012 and 40.75% in 2014) and markedly higher in the later cycles (92.35% in 2020 and 90.88% in 2022), consistent with the fact that the analysis restrictions select a more electorally engaged subset of students.

C Categorizing Departments

C.1 Transcript Records

Our student-level data contains 6-digit CIP codes for each graduating major and course taken during college, along with associated descriptions. We use these to manually categorize courses based on department. Our categorizations are quite close to using the first two digits of the CIP code, which is the simple field grouping defined by the US Department of Education. However, we split up some 2-digit groupings because they may contain multiple departments with different instructional norms and topics. For example, all social sciences courses share a single CIP category (45); we split up these fields separately. Table C.1 below lists each department in our data and the associated CIP codes and descriptions.

Table C.1. Mapping Between Course Categories and 2-Digit CIP Codes

2-Digit CIP	Assigned Field Name	6-Digit CIP	6-Digit CIP Name
03	Environment	03.0101	Natural Resources/Conservation, General
03	Environment	03.0103	Environmental Studies
04	Architecture	04.0201	Architecture
04	Architecture	04.0301	City/Urban, Community, and Regional Planning
05	World Studies	05.0102	American/United States Studies/Civilization
05	World Studies	05.0103	Asian Studies/Civilization
05	World Studies	05.0104	East Asian Studies
05	World Studies	05.0108	Near and Middle Eastern Studies
05	World Studies	05.0110	Russian Studies
05	World Studies	05.0111	Scandinavian Studies
05	World Studies	05.0113	Southeast Asian Studies
05	World Studies	05.0128	Korean Studies
05	World Studies	05.0134	Latin American and Caribbean Studies.
05	World Studies	05.0199	Area Studies, Other
05	World Studies	05.0201	African-American/Black Studies
05	World Studies	05.0202	American Indian/Native American Studies
05	World Studies	05.0203	Hispanic-American, Puerto Rican, and Mexican-American/Chicano Studies
05	Women/Gender	05.0207	Women's Studies
09	Communication	09.0101	Speech Communication and Rhetoric
09	Communication	09.0199	Communication and Media Studies, Other
09	Communication	09.0702	Digital Communication and Media/Multimedia
11	Computer Sci	11.0103	Information Technology
11	Computer Sci	11.0401	Information Science/Studies
11	Computer Sci	11.0802	Data Modeling/Warehousing and Database Administration
13	Education	13.0101	Education, General
13	Education	13.1401	Teaching English as a Second or Foreign Language/ESL Language Instructor
14	Engineering	14.0101	Engineering, General
14	Engineering	14.0201	Aerospace, Aeronautical, and Astronautical/Space Engineering, General
14	Engineering	14.0501	Bioengineering and Biomedical Engineering
14	Engineering	14.0701	Chemical Engineering
14	Engineering	14.0801	Civil Engineering, General
14	Engineering	14.1001	Electrical and Electronics Engineering
14	Engineering	14.1401	Environmental/Environmental Health Engineering
14	Engineering	14.1801	Materials Engineering
14	Engineering	14.1901	Mechanical Engineering
14	Engineering	14.2201	Naval Architecture and Marine Engineering
14	Engineering	14.2301	Nuclear Engineering
14	Engineering	14.2701	Systems Engineering
14	Engineering	14.3101	Materials Science
14	Engineering	14.3501	Industrial Engineering
14	Engineering	14.3601	Manufacturing Engineering

14	Engineering	14.4201	Mechatronics, Robotics, and Automation Engineering.
14	Engineering	14.9999	Engineering, Other
16	Languages	16.0102	Linguistics
16	Languages	16.0104	Comparative Literature
16	Languages	16.0300	East Asian Languages, Literatures, and Linguistics, General
16	Languages	16.0400	Slavic Languages, Literatures, and Linguistics, General
16	Languages	16.0402	Russian Language and Literature
16	Languages	16.0406	Czech Language and Literature
16	Languages	16.0407	Polish Language and Literature
16	Languages	16.0408	Bosnian, Serbian, and Croatian Languages and Literatures
16	Languages	16.0410	Ukrainian Language and Literature
16	Languages	16.0501	German Language and Literature
16	Languages	16.0504	Dutch/Flemish Language and Literature
16	Languages	16.0599	Germanic Languages, Literatures, and Linguistics, Other
16	Languages	16.0601	Modern Greek Language and Literature
16	Languages	16.0801	Iranian Languages, Literatures, and Linguistics
16	Languages	16.0900	Romance Languages, Literatures, and Linguistics, General
16	Languages	16.0901	French Language and Literature
16	Languages	16.0902	Italian Language and Literature
16	Languages	16.0904	Portuguese Language and Literature
16	Languages	16.0905	Spanish Language and Literature
16	Languages	16.0907	Catalan Language and Literature
16	Languages	16.0999	Romance Languages, Literatures, and Linguistics, Other
16	Languages	16.1100	Middle/Near Eastern and Semitic Languages, Literatures, and Linguistics, General
16	Languages	16.1101	Arabic Language and Literature
16	Languages	16.1102	Hebrew Language and Literature
16	Languages	16.1103	Ancient Near Eastern and Biblical Languages, Literatures, and Linguistics
16	Languages	16.1199	Middle/Near Eastern and Semitic Languages, Literatures, and Linguistics, Other
16	Languages	16.1202	Ancient/Classical Greek Language and Literature
16	Languages	16.1203	Latin Language and Literature
16	Languages	16.1599	Turkic, Uralic-Altaic, Caucasian, and Central Asian Languages, Literatures, and Linguistics, Other
16	Languages	16.1601	American Sign Language (ASL)
16	Languages	16.9999	Foreign Languages, Literatures, and Linguistics, Other
23	English	23.0101	English Language and Literature, General
23	English	23.9999	English Language and Literature/Letters, Other
24	Other	24.0101	Liberal Arts and Sciences/Liberal Studies
24	Other	24.0102	General Studies
24	Other	24.0103	Humanities/Humanistic Studies
24	Other	24.0199	Liberal Arts and Sciences, General Studies and Humanities, Other
26	Biology	26.0101	Biology/Biological Sciences, General
26	Biology	26.0202	Biochemistry


26	Biology	26.0203	Biophysics
26	Biology	26.0204	Molecular Biology
26	Biology	26.0403	Anatomy
26	Biology	26.0499	Cell/Cellular Biology and Anatomical Sciences, Other
26	Biology	26.0503	Medical Microbiology and Bacteriology
26	Biology	26.0507	Immunology
26	Biology	26.0806	Human/Medical Genetics
26	Biology	26.0901	Physiology, General
26	Biology	26.1001	Pharmacology
26	Biology	26.1102	Biostatistics
26	Biology	26.1103	Bioinformatics
26	Biology	26.1301	Ecology
26	Biology	26.1310	Ecology and Evolutionary Biology.
26	Biology	26.1501	Neuroscience.
27	Mathematics	27.0101	Mathematics, General
27	Statistics	27.0501	Statistics, General
28	Navy/Military	28.0101	Air Force JROTC/ROTC
28	Navy/Military	28.0301	Army JROTC/ROTC
28	Navy/Military	28.0401	Navy/Marine Corps JROTC/ROTC
30	Other	30.0601	Systems Science and Theory
30	Other	30.1301	Medieval and Renaissance Studies
30	Other	30.1401	Museology/Museum Studies
30	Other	30.1501	Science, Technology and Society
30	Other	30.1801	Natural Sciences
30	Other	30.2001	International/Globalization Studies
30	Other	30.2201	Ancient Studies/Civilization
30	Other	30.2202	Classical, Ancient Mediterranean, and Near Eastern Studies and Archaeology
30	Other	30.2501	Cognitive Science, General
30	Other	30.9999	Multi-/Interdisciplinary Studies, Other
31	Kinesiology	31.0501	Sports, Kinesiology, and Physical Education/Fitness, General
31	Kinesiology	31.0504	Sport and Fitness Administration/Management
31	Kinesiology	31.0505	Exercise Science and Kinesiology
38	Philosophy	38.0101	Philosophy
38	Religion	38.0201	Religion/Religious Studies
38	Religion	38.0205	Islamic Studies
38	Religion	38.0206	Jewish/Judaic Studies
40	Astronomy	40.0201	Astronomy
40	Atmospheric Sci.	40.0401	Atmospheric Sciences and Meteorology, General
40	Atmospheric Sci.	40.0499	Atmospheric Sciences and Meteorology, Other
40	Chemistry	40.0501	Chemistry, General
40	Chemistry	40.0507	Polymer Chemistry
40	Geology	40.0601	Geology/Earth Science, General
40	Physics	40.0801	Physics, General
42	Psychology	42.0101	Psychology, General

44	Public Policy	44.0501	Public Policy Analysis, General
44	Public Policy	44.0701	Social Work
45	Other Soc. Sci.	45.0101	Social Sciences, General
45	Anthropology	45.0202	Physical and Biological Anthropology
45	Anthropology	45.0299	Anthropology, Other
45	Archaeology	45.0301	Archeology
45	Economics	45.0601	Economics, General
45	Other Soc. Sci.	45.0701	Geography
45	Political Sci	45.1001	Political Science and Government, General
45	Sociology	45.1101	Sociology, General
45	Other Soc. Sci.	45.9999	Social Sciences, Other
50	Arts	50.0301	Dance, General
50	Arts	50.0501	Drama and Dramatics/Theatre Arts, General
50	Arts	50.0509	Musical Theatre.
50	Arts	50.0601	Film/Cinema/Media Studies
50	Arts	50.0701	Art/Art Studies, General
50	Arts	50.0703	Art History, Criticism and Conservation
50	Arts	50.0901	Music, General
50	Arts	50.0902	Music History, Literature, and Theory
50	Arts	50.0903	Music Performance, General
50	Arts	50.0904	Music Theory and Composition
50	Arts	50.0909	Music Management and Merchandising
50	Arts	50.0910	Jazz/Jazz Studies
50	Arts	50.9999	Visual and Performing Arts, Other
51	Nursing/Health	51.0000	Health Services/Allied Health/Health Sciences, General
51	Nursing/Health	51.1201	Medicine
51	Nursing/Health	51.2001	Pharmacy
51	Nursing/Health	51.2004	Medicinal and Pharmaceutical Chemistry
51	Nursing/Health	51.2010	Pharmaceutical Sciences.
51	Nursing/Health	51.2201	Public Health, General
51	Nursing/Health	51.2202	Environmental Health
51	Nursing/Health	51.2211	Health Services Administration
51	Nursing/Health	51.3801	Registered Nursing/Registered Nurse.
52	Business	52.0201	Business Administration and Management, General
52	Business	52.0299	Business Administration, Management and Operations, Other
52	Business	52.0601	Business/Managerial Economics
52	Business	52.0701	Entrepreneurship/Entrepreneurial Studies
52	Business	52.1003	Organizational Behavior Studies
52	Business	52.1401	Marketing/Marketing Management, General
54	History	54.0101	History, General

C.2 Salary Records

We categorize academic department names from salary records into fields of study using the US Department of Education’s 2020 Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) codes. Salary records typically contain the faculty member’s department or college (e.g., “School of Education” or “Biological Chemistry Dept”). We estimate a fuzzy match between department name strings in the salary records and the corresponding CIP code descriptions. We use a bigram algorithm, which splits names into two-character sections and calculates similarities between the two strings. For each department in the salary records, we assign the 2-digit CIP code with the highest similarity score (which ranges from 0-1); we drop similarity scores below 0.25. The first panel in Figure C.1 shows the distribution of similarity scores, and the second panel shows the share of matches with a similarity score above 0.50. The mean similarity score is 0.55, though the match quality rate varies by field; only 9 percent of law school matches have a similarity score above 0.5, while this rate is 100 percent in English, math/statistics, and kinesiology.

Figure C.1. Distribution of Similarity Scores Across CIP Codes



Note: Similarity scores are from a fuzzy matching (bigram) algorithm between departments listed in salary records and 2020 Classification of Instructional Programs (CIP) code descriptions. 209,328 faculty salary records from 14 flagship universities with known department affiliations (The Universities of Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Texas, and Washington).

D Library of Congress Topics

We collect comprehensive lists of required textbooks at our public flagship via the university registrar. The data cover the 2021 and 2022 academic years.

We identify textbook topics by matching our sample to data from the Library of Congress (LOC) by International Standard Book Number (ISBN).¹ Note that our textbook data are imperfect: only 29 percent of all courses have valid ISBN numbers, with this share disproportionately lower in STEM fields. In addition, the LOC database does not generally collect e-textbooks from large publishers, such as Pearson.

Appropriately measuring politically salient topics is challenging because conservatives and liberals do not typically agree on the meaning of terms. For instance, to liberals critical race theory refers to the formal academic theories that originated in law and then were taken up in some social sciences and humanities (Ray 2023; Stanley 2024). However, to conservatives, critical race theory refers to a much broader set of frameworks; for instance, Rufo (2021) describes terms like “equity”, “social justice”, and “diversity and inclusion” as euphemisms used to teach critical race theory without explicitly claiming to do so. Rufo further argues that critical race theory is a reformulation of Marxism.

We use two definitions of politically salient topics that match each of these extremes. Our narrow measure includes just books within the formal academic disciplines of critical race theory and queer theory as identified by the Library of Congress. However, we observe no books in the two years of textbook data among undergraduate courses that fit this narrow definition at our flagship. Our broad measure in line with Rufo’s definition includes all books about topics in the following fields: gender, race, LGBTQIA+, and communism. Within these fields we include numerous sub-topics (e.g., “race” includes books about slavery, and “gender” includes books about feminism). Lastly, we include a list of other politically salient topics that do not neatly fit into these categories (social justice, critical pedagogy, intersectionality, and others).

To measure politically salient topics using the Library of Congress classifications, we write regular expressions that capture a set of theoretical constructs. Below we list each construct, the most common corresponding Library of Congress topics, and example books:

Sex and Gender.

Women; Gay men; African American women; Young women; African American young men; Sexual orientation; Brothers and sisters; African American men; Fathers and daughters; Man-woman relationships; Married women; Teenage girls; Girls; Sex role; Enslaved women; Female friendship; Overweight women; Sisters; Husband and wife; Gender identity; Women’s rights; Women authors; African American women athletes; Transgender people; Sex; Young men; Women’s Health; Sexual minorities; Mothers and daughters; Men; Mexican American women; Muslim women; Sexual behavior; Sex differences; Muslim girls; Sex customs; African American women authors; Women immigrants; Women superheroes; Genital Diseases, Female; Women, Black; Sex discrimination against women; Brothers; Sexism; Women poets; Fathers and sons; Korean American women; SOCIAL SCIENCE / Women’s Studies; Fathers; Masculinity; BIOGRAPHY & AUTOBIOGRAPHY / Women; Indian women; Boys; SOCIAL SCIENCE / Gender Studies; Male friendship; Female offenders; Teenage boys; Women’s health services; Leadership in

¹ We link ISBN numbers with the Library of Congress Online Catalog via the Library of Congress API: <https://www.loc.gov/apis/additional-apis/search-retrieval-via-url/>

women; Women healers; Women authors, American; African American girls; Sex discrimination in criminal justice administration; Jewish women; Adult child sexual abuse victims; Women's studies; Gender-nonconforming people; Gender nonconformity; Self-actualization (Psychology) in women; Women and literature; Women, White; Middle-aged women; Women prisoners; African American teenage girls; Women revolutionaries; Women with disabilities; Women swimmers; Women athletes with disabilities; Coming out (Sexual orientation); African American women political activists; African American boys; Sex (Psychology); Sex industry; Sex crimes; Hispanic American women; Mentally ill women; Minority women; Bisexual women; Women political activists; Women and peace; Women college students; Mexican American women authors; Sex discrimination in employment; Middle-aged men; Sex differences (Psychology); Asexuality (Sexual orientation); Women teachers; African American women civil rights workers; Quiché women; Women college teachers; Rural women; Older men; Grandfathers; Women, Huli; Danish American women; Women in Judaism; Sex discrimination; Femininity.

Example Books:

1. Scripting the Black masculine body: identity, discourse, and racial politics in popular media by Ronald L. Jackson
2. King and the dragonflies by Kacen Callender
3. love & lies of Rukhsana Ali by Sabina Khan
4. Fathers and sons by Ivan Sergeevich Turgenev and Richard Freeborn
5. Reckoning: Black Lives Matter and the democratic necessity of social movements by Deva R Woodly

Communism and Socialism

Communism, Socialism, Post-communism, National socialism.

Example Books:

1. Marxism, cultural studies and sport by Ben Carrington and Ian McDonald
2. Making revolution: the communist movement in eastern and central China, 1937-1945 by Yung-fa Chen
3. Revolution and resistance in Eastern Europe: challenges to communist rule by Kevin McDermott and Matthew Stibbe
4. Sexual hegemony: statecraft, sodomy, and capital in the rise of the world system by Christopher Chitty
5. Marx's Capital: illustrated by David N. Smith and Phil Evans

Race/Racism

Race relations, Racism, Race discrimination, Race identity, Multiracial people, Racism in education, Relations raciales, Racism in sports, Race, SOCIAL SCIENCE / Discrimination & Race Relations, Race awareness, Racial profiling in law enforcement, Race in literature, Black race, JUVENILE FICTION / Social Themes / Prejudice & Racism, Anti-racism, YOUNG ADULT FICTION / Social Themes / Prejudice & Racism, Interracial marriage.

Example Books:

1. hard rain: America in the 1960s, our decade of hope, possibility, and innocence lost by Frye

Gaillard

2. Measuring manhood: race and the science of masculinity, 1830-1934 by Melissa N. Stein
3. Not my type: automating sexual racism in online dating by Apryl Williams
4. Immigrant families by Cecilia Menjívar, Leisy J. Abrego
5. Freedom dreams: the Black radical imagination by Robin D. G. Kelley and Aja Monet

LGBTQ+

Gay men, Homophobia, Sexual orientation, SOCIAL SCIENCE / Gay Studies, Lesbians, Gender identity, Transgender people, Sexual minorities, Gay people, Homosexuality, Homophobia in the military, Queer theory, Gender nonconformity, Abused lesbians, Gay teenagers, Coming out (Sexual orientation), Bisexual women, African American lesbians, Asexuality (Sexual orientation), Gay rights.

Example Books:

1. Homo psyche: on queer theory and erotophobia by Gila Ashtor
2. Dancer from the dance: a novel by Andrew Holleran
3. ¡Cuéntamelo!: oral histories by LGBT Latino immigrants by Julian Delgado Lopera
4. Queer kinship and family change in Taiwan by Amy Brainer
5. Unbecoming: a memoir of disobedience by Anuradha Kristina Bhagwati

Feminism

Feminism, Feminist theory, Feminists, African American feminists, SOCIAL SCIENCE / Feminism & Feminist Theory.

Example Books:

1. sexual politics of meat: a feminist-vegetarian critical theory by Carol J. Adams
2. Transnational feminism in the United States: knowledge, ethics, and power by Leela Fernandes
3. Crip genealogies by Mel Y. Chen, Alison Kafer, Eunjung Kim, Julie Avril Minich, and Therí A. Pickens
4. On the inconvenience of other people by Lauren Gail Berlant
5. Empowered: popular feminism and popular misogyny by Sarah Banet-Weiser

Slavery

Slavery, Enslaved persons, Slave trade, Enslaved women, Slaveholders, Slaves, Fugitive slaves, Slave ships, Antislavery movements, Relations with slaves.

Example Books:

1. Freedom's captives: slavery and gradual emancipation on the Colombian Black Pacific by Yesenia Barragan
2. Slaves in the family by Edward Ball
3. hard fight for we: women's transition from slavery to freedom in South Carolina by Leslie A. Schwalm
4. Uncle Tom's cabin, or, Life among the lowly by Harriet Beecher Stowe

5. They were her property: white women as slave owners in the American South by Stephanie E. Jones-Rogers

Other Politically Salient Terms

Social justice, Critical pedagogy, Segregation in education, Sociology of disability, Culturally relevant pedagogy, Intersectionality (Sociology), Decolonization, Social justice and education, Segregation, Disability studies.

Example Books:

1. We've been doing it your way long enough: choosing the culturally relevant classroom by Janice Baines, Carmen Tisdale, and Susi Long
2. Transforming teacher education for social justice by Eva Zygmunt and Patricia Clark
3. Stages of reckoning: antiracist and decolonial actor training
4. Pedagogies of crossing: meditations on feminism, sexual politics, memory, and the sacred by M. Jacqui Alexander
5. Environmental justice in postwar America: a documentary reader