Human-capital formation in school depends largely on the selection and retention of teachers. I conduct a discrete-choice experiment with responses linked to administrative teacher and student records to examine teacher preferences for compensation structure and working conditions. I calculate willingness-to-pay for a rich set of work attributes. High-performing teachers have similar preferences to other teachers, but they have stronger preferences for performance pay. Taking the preference estimates at face value I explore how schools should structure compensation to meet various objectives. Under each objective, schools appear to underpay in salary and performance pay while overpaying in retirement. Restructuring compensation can increase both teacher welfare and student achievement.
Preferences, Selection, and the Structure of Teacher Pay
Keywords
Teachers, Labor Markets, Compensation, Salaries, Pay-for-performance, Teacher Selection, Teacher Retention
Education level
Document Object Identifier (DOI)
10.26300/hr7y-1137
EdWorkingPaper suggested citation:
Johnston, Andrew C.. (). Preferences, Selection, and the Structure of Teacher Pay. (EdWorkingPaper: -202). Retrieved from
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