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Michael Bates
Do Pensions Enhance Worker Effort and Selection? Evidence from Public Schools
Why do employers offer pensions? We empirically examine two theoretical rationales, namely that pensions improve worker effort and worker selection. We test these hypotheses using rich administrative measures on effort and output for teachers around the pension-eligibility notch. When workers cross the notch, their effective compensation falls by roughly 50 percent of salary, but we observe no reduction in worker effort or output. This implies that pension payments do not increase effort. As for selection, we find that pensions retain low-value-added and high-value-added workers at the same rate, implying similar preferences across teacher quality and no influence on selection.
Teacher Labor Market Equilibrium and Student Achievement
We study whether reallocating existing teachers across schools within a district can increase student achievement, and what policies would help achieve these gains. Using a model of multi-dimensional value-added, we find meaningful achievement gains from reallocating teachers within a district. Using an estimated equilibrium model of the teacher labor market, we find that achieving most of these gains requires directly affecting teachers' preferences over schools. In contrast, directly affecting principals' selection of teachers can lower student achievement. Our analysis highlights the importance of equilibrium and second-best reasoning in analyzing teacher labor market policies.